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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation examines the transformation of China's Yunnan borderlands with 
mainland Southeast Asia and South Asia, especially during the late 19th and the 20th 
century, in terms of political, social, economic and cultural changes. It moves beyond the 
traditional paradigm that stresses the diversity and difference of mainland Southeast 
Asian polities, and instead, emphasizes the similarities they shared in long-term 
interactions based on common religions, economic patterns, wars, intra-regional 
migration, and trade before the area was divided into sub-regions influenced by 
traditional and new imperial powers. This unique perspective provides a new approach to 
understanding the deep-rooted social and economic dilemmas and inequities caused by 
the competition of big powers in the region. Based on a careful examination of China's 
model, this dissertation calls the scholars' attention to how the indigenous societies 
evolved in response to different alternatives for modernization provided or enforced by 
colonial and regional powers.  
This dissertation addresses a phenomenon that occurred in China's nation building 
process in which a complicated local history of Yunnan that had a rich historical legacy 
of contributions from both Chinese migrants and indigenous ethnic minorities was 
replaced with one that focused only the ethnic minorities in the region, as well as their 
participation in a reconstructed national history. This simplified and ethicized history 
supports a multi-ethnic Chinese national identity that avoids the historical, political, 
social and cultural context of the independence of the indigenous societies, and instead, 
stresses their submission to Chinese authority and the unification of China.  
  ii 
This study also emphasizes the process through which the boundaries between 
China and other countries in the region are shifting to focus on issues of homeland 
security and geopolitical interest. Also frequent economic and cultural exchanges from all 
sides have diluted the previous ideological confrontations in the current era of China-
centric globalization. 
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CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
 
From the 4th century B.C when some areas of Yunnan first appeared in the 
Chinese historical documents until now, Yunnan’s role shifted from a relatively 
independent area outside of China to a Chinese colony, China’s tributary, and a frontier 
province of China. The long and rich local history of Yunnan provides abundant 
resources for scholar’s engagement in the study of China’s frontier, in terms of social 
economic history, political development, ethnic studies, culture and religions, 
environmental history and many other possibilities. However, the studies of Yunnan have 
been limited: First of all, the quantity of the scholarship is limited. Second, the 
perspectives that the scholars have brought to the subjects is limited in focus. The 
majority of the current scholarship on Yunnan concentrates on ethnic minorities and their 
identities.  The nature of the political economy, migration, trade, wars, and environment 
has only attracted a few scholars. The study of Yunnan has the danger of being over 
“simplified” and “ethnicized”. The same problem plagues the studies of other parts of the 
Chinese frontier as well. This dissertation focuses on demographical, social, cultural, 
political and historical context of Yunnan.  
For centuries, ethnocentric Chinese scholars and explorers wrote about a 
backward and isolated Yunnan populated by the barbarians. Interpreted by a culturally 
and politically dominant group, the history of Yunnan belonged to the kind of official 
history that privileged dominant regional civilizations, telling stories how “a backward, 
2 
naive, and perhaps barbaric people are gradually incorporated into an advanced, superior, 
and more prosperous society and culture.”1 
The European explorers, missionaries and politicians were the first group of 
people who brought Yunnan to the international attention. A “Yunnan Myth” was created 
by the French and British who observed Yunnan’s important role in geopolitics, trans-
regional and trans-national trade, and thus promoted as exploitation as well as a target for 
investment. 2 The Yunnan Myth pictured Yunnan as a place of “tremendous potential 
wealth which could be rendered actual by opening the province to European commerce.”3 
Archibald Ross Colquhoun, E.C Baber, H.M Consul Garderner, F.S Bourne as well as 
Archibald J. Little from Britain, as well as Admiral de la Grandiere, Francis Garnier, 
Doudart de Lagree, Jean Dupuis and M. Emil Rocher from France promoted the Yunnan 
Myth in travel literature and journals from the late 1870s to the late 1880s. In 1894, 
Prince Heri D’ Orleans wrote to re-promote the Yunnan Myth after it was cooled down 
for a little while, and in the following decade, the French initiated railway building in the 
area. 4  As the Yunnan myth gradually faded away because of the topological 
inaccessibility, Yunnan’s isolation and backwardness became magnified. As a result, 
Yunnan’s role in trans-national and trans-regional trade before the People’s Republic of 
China era has been neglected. 
                                                 
1 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009), 8. 
2 Etienne Dennery, “A French View of the Situation in the Far East”, in International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939), Vol. 17, No.4 (July-August, 1938): 528-540. 
3 Warren B. Walsh, “The Yunnan Myth”, in The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May, 1943): 272-
285. 
4 Warren B. Walsh, “The Yunnan Myth”, in The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May, 1943): 272-
285. 
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Western trained anthropologists, sociologists and scientists found that Yunnan 
was an ideal place for field work. In the first half of the twentieth century, Joseph Rock, 
Herold J, Wiens, Tien Ju-kang, C.P. Fitzgerald, Chen Hansheng, and other Chinese 
native scholars, such as Fang Guoyu, contributed to the pioneer research on Yunnan. 
Their studies concerned the Chinese migration, the expansion of the Chinese empire, 
ethnic minorities, the social and economic structure of ethnic societies, and religions.5 
Basic paradigms for studies of Yunnan as well as the Chinese frontier were formulated, 
which included: sinicization, nation building, colonialism (and neo-colonialism), and 
modernization. Yunnan received renewed attention from western scholars when China 
began to open up in the late 1970s. Ethnic identification, ethnic education, ethnic tourism, 
and everything concerning the ethnic minorities in Yunnan became the focus of much 
scholarship. The Naxi people, based on their unique matrilineal society, attracted 
considerable attention from western anthropologists and sociologists. Besides that, 
studies of the Dai, Hui, Bai, Hani, Bulang and Yi people also proliferated.6  
                                                 
5 See Joseph Rock’s two volume books, The Ancient Na-Khi Kingdom of Southwest China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University for the Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1947). C.P Fitzgerald, The Tower of Five Glories: 
A Study of The Min Chia of Ta Li, Yunnan (Westport: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1973). Herold J. Wiens, China's 
March toward the Tropics (Hamden: Shoe String Press, 1954). Tien Ju-Kang, Peaks of Faith: Protestant 
Mission in Revolutionary China (Netherlands: E J. Brill, Leiden, 1992). Tien, Ju-Kang, Religious Cults of 
the Pai-I along the Burma-Yunnan Border (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1986). 
Chen Hansheng, Jie Fang Qian Xishuangbanna Tudi Zhidu 解放前西双版纳土地制度 [the land property 
system of Xishuangbanna before the PRC era] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1984). Chen’s 
book was initially published in the U.S in 1949. Chinese scholar Fang Guoyu published a series books on 
Yunnan, including Dianxi Bianqu Kaocha Ji (1940). This book was republished in 2008. See Dianxi 
Bianqu Kaocha Ji 滇西边区考察记 [An investigation on the Western Yunnan peripheries] (Kunming: 
Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2008). 
6 From 1970s to 1990s, only a few scholars discussed non-ethnic topics. For example, there are Dorothy 
Solinger and Donald Sutton’s research on the militarization of Yunnan. George Moseley wrote on China’s 
Southwestern frontier. See Dorothy J. Solinger, Regional Government and Political Integration in 
Southwest China, 1949-1954: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). Donald S. 
Sutton, Provincial militarism and the Chinese Republic: the Yunnan Army, 1905-25(Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1980). George V.H.III. Moseley, The Consolidation of the South China Frontier 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1973). There are a handful articles and 
books ethnic minorities, their cultural and identities, as well as ethnic identification, such as: Jiang 
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When scholars engaged a broader range of topics such as migration, gender, 
border and trade, they applied new approaches and concepts brought from the studies of 
the U.S West. Guo Xiaolin compared the Yunnan frontier to a marketplace where people 
of “different backgrounds and from all directions congregate and interact — exchanging 
what one has for what one has not”. Guo believes that “amalgamation”, instead of 
elimination, dominated the process of cultural change. Therefore, variation is able to 
survive.7 John McKinnon and C. Patterson Giersch have discussed the geological 
changes and its relationship to societal transformation. “Influenced by Richard White’s 
seminal work on North America, Yang (Bing) creatively melds the musty ‘sinicization’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
Yingliang (江应梁 ): Dai Zu Shi 傣族史  [The history of the Dai People](Chengdu: Sichuan minzu 
chubanshe, 1983); Colin Mackerras, China's Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration since 1912 (New 
York: Longman/St. Martin's Press, 1995);  Stevan Harrell, “The History of the History of the Yi”, in 
Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers, edited by Stevan Harell (Seattle:  University of 
Washington, 1995); Emily Chao, “Hegemony, Agency, and Re-presenting the Past: The Invention of 
Dongba Culture among the Naxi of Southwest China”, in Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan, 
edited by Melissa Brown (Berkeley: China Research Monograph, Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University of California, 1996); Stevan Harrell, Ways of being ethnic in Southwest China (Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 2001); Cai Hua, A Society without Fathers or Husbands: the Na 
of China, translated by Asti Hustvedt(New York : Zone Books ; Cambridge, Mass.: Distributed by The 
MIT Press, 2001);  Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Sui, and Donald S. Sutton, Empire at the Margins: 
Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University 
of California Press, 2006) Guo Xiaoling, State and Ethnicity in China’s southwest (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 
Susan McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China, (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2009); Haibo Yu, Identity and Schooling among the Naxi: Becoming Chinese with Naxi 
Identity (Emerging Perspectives on Education in China) (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010); Tim Oaks 
and Donald Sutton, Faith on Display: Religion, Tourism, and the Chinese State (Lanham, Boulder, New 
York, Toronto, and Plymouth, UK: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010)Thomas S Mullaney, 
Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011). Some Chinese scholars engaged in the migration and communication between 
Yunnan and the outside world, such as   Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 
[The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 2004). Lu Ren (陆韧), 
Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: 
Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997). Monographs on the transformation of the Yunnan frontier includes: C 
Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge, 
MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2006), and Yang Bing, Between Winds and Clouds: the 
Making of Yunnan (Second Century BCE to Twentieth Century CE) (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009). James C. Scott also discussed Yunnan from a broader perspective of the Zomia and the hill 
tribes. See James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia 
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009). 
7 Guo Xiaoling, State and Ethnicity in China’s Southwest (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 68. 
5 
concept (assimilation to Chinese ways) with an analysis of how contact with non-Chinese 
people transformed migrants into Yunnanese.” 8 Ecological changes, transnational trade, 
opium, women trafficking and the migration of the Hmong people are also discussed by 
various scholars who mainly focus on the transformation of Yunnan and Guangxi’s 
border with mainland Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. 9 The connections between 
Yunnan, Burma and India, as well as the development of the indigenous communities 
were recorded in Thant Myint-U’s travelogue published in 2011. 10 
It is obvious that current studies of Yunnan are unbalanced. The ethnic minority-
centered discourse provides too narrow a perspective on frontier history. Today, as more 
and more people become aware of geopolitics and think of Yunnan in a broad global and 
regional context, the need for more of a “comprehensive” and “longue durée” history 
becomes urgent. This dissertation attempts to bring the complicated local history of 
Yunnan to a larger audience.  
The aforementioned paradigms of sinicization, the grand unification of China, 
state building, colonialism (neo-colonialism), and modernization can be critiqued from a 
variety of points of view.  
Sinicization is a Chinese centered approach. It emphasizes Chinese migrants as 
well as the Chinese administration as the overwhelming forces that swept through the 
frontier region. There are several major flaws with this paradigm. First of all, sinicization 
                                                 
8 C. Patterson Giersch, “Asia, review of Between Winds and Clouds: The Making of Yunnan (Second 
Century BCE to Twentieth Century CE) by Yang Bing”, in The American Historical Review, Vol. 115, and 
No.4 (October, 2010):1116-1117. 
9 Grant Evans, Christopher Hutton and Kuah Khun Eng, Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social and 
Cultural Change in the Border Regions (New York: St. Martin’s Press; Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2000). 
10 Thant Myint-U, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2011). 
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overstresses that the Chinese influence was the dominant force behind the assimilation of 
indigenous people into the Chinese cultural realm. It exaggerates the level of the Chinese 
influence on the frontier. At the same time, it neglects the process of the indigenization of 
the Chinese elements, and underestimates the agency as well as the strength of the 
indigenous people and local cultures. Second, this paradigm is Sino-centric, emphasizing 
the superiority of the Chinese culture and the Chinese example of social, political, 
economic and cultural transformation. Sinicization means the “civilizing mission” of 
Chinese culture, with parallels to Jackson Turner’s paradigm of the “civilizing mission” 
on the American Frontier. Stevan Harrell argues that there is no fundamental difference 
between the civilizing mission of the CCP and its predecessors. Both tried to transform 
the people of the periphery according to Han-Chinese norms.11 Third, the term siniczation 
does not have a clear definition, and is used as a general term to portray the vague 
Chinese cultural influence on the indigenous. It ignores the differences between the 
state’s operations in the frontier and the Chinese migrant’s activities. Giersch pointed out 
that siniczation presumes that “indigenous communities will inevitably dissolve in a 
flood of Chinese values when faced with Han migrants.”12  And in the case of the Qing 
period, Sinicization “also ignores the facts that the Qing imperial family were not Han, 
but Manchus, and that many of the high-level officials who served in eighteenth-century 
Yunnan were Manchu or Han-martial bannermen.”13 The vagueness of Sinicization 
makes it even more difficult to apply during the PRC era because the CCP has focused on 
                                                 
11 Stevan Harrell, Ways of being ethnic in Southwest China, (Seattle and London: University of Washington 
Press, 2001)3-36, 31. 
12 C. Patterson Giersch, "A Motley Throng: Social Change on Southwest China's Early Modern Frontier, 
1700-1880”, in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol, 60, No.1 (February, 2001):67-94. 
13 C. Patterson Giersch, "A Motley Throng: Social Change on Southwest China's Early Modern Frontier, 
1700-1880”, in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol, 60, No.1 (February, 2001):67-94. 
7 
transforming China and the frontiers according to the principles of indigenized Marxism. 
Herold Wiens points out that the spread of the communist culture caused the 
“communization” of the indigenous people, and characterized the process of siniczation 
during the CCP era.14 Guo Xiaolin argues, the idea that “a dominant culture constantly 
stands out and is capable of assimilating all others is too simplistic an assumption”.15 On 
the other hand, scholars whose effort eliminates Chinese centered language sometimes 
can lead to an ethnic-centered approach that overstresses the independence of the ethnic 
minorities from the Chinese influence.   
The paradigm of modernization has similar problems with siniczation. It is 
vaguely defined; it does not have a fixed criteria; and it can be often overly Chinese-
centered. Also, it can trigger overly ethnic-centered approaches as the solution to overly 
Chinese centered dialogues. When this paradigm is applied to the study of the Yunnan 
frontier, it too quite often remains undefined as a reference to industrial and economic 
development. Political, social and cultural institutions are often excluded from the 
paradigm of modernization, but inserted instead into state-local power relations or 
Sinicization.16 The separation of these aspects within the paradigm of modernization 
creates problems of analysis. It only provides snap-shots instead of providing a complete 
and long-term picture of the transformation of Yunnan frontier. The paradigm of 
modernization requires a relatively long-term vision and comparative approaches so that 
the continuity of as well as the deviation from the past can be taken into consideration.  
                                                 
14 Herold J. Wiens, China's March toward the Tropics (Hamden: Shoe String Press, 1954), 341-342. 
15 Guo Xiaoling, State and Ethnicity in China’s Southwest (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 64. 
16 Colin Mackerras, China's Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration since 1912 (New York: 
Longman/St. Martin's Press, 1995), 13. 
8 
The paradigm of the grand unification of China has become the official 
ideological narrative of the PRC government, echoed in the standard works of most 
Chinese scholars. The grand unification of China argues that China has been a unified 
country with multi-ethnic minorities since 200BC. It supports the concept of a coherent 
and unified Chinese nation that was constructed after 1949 in order to fit into a new 
historical and political discourse of history. Stevan Harrell has pointed out that after the 
communists took over China, there were two models for China’s future: the model of 
ancient empire wherein ethnic groups are not given equal rights; and the model of nation 
state wherein equality is secured on a base of “real or promised erasure of ethnic 
distinctions”.17 However, the CCP rejected both models and created a so called “unified 
country of diverse nationalities”.18  
In China, Fang Guoyu was considered “the founder of the academic paradigm of 
Yunnan historical geography and the history of minority nationalities in southwest 
China” by Chinese scholars. He began to make a significant contribution on ethnic 
studies (studies about nationalities) as the Chinese government initiated ethnic 
classification in 1950s. Before the 1950s, many scholars, including Fang Guoyu, Xu 
Jiarui, Xian Da and others concentrated on the study of the history of ethnic groups. 
Although the history of local ethnic groups had been studied by scholars, a systematic 
paradigm based on ethnic classification did not come into being until 1950s “when ethnic 
minorities were forced into the minority nationalities' autonomy system”. Thus, after 
1949, “an academic paradigm on the study of the minority nationalities of southwest 
                                                 
17 Stevan Harrell, Ways of being ethnic in Southwest China (Seattle and London: University of Washington 
Press, 2001), 31. 
18 Stevan Harrell, Ways of being ethnic in Southwest China (Seattle and London: University of Washington 
Press, 2001), 31. 
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China was needed. This paradigm served as an academic tool for the illustration of the 
political strategy on China's southwest frontier, so as to construct and interpret the newly-
built nation-state system and its history.”19 In the late 1980s, Fei Xiaotong’s 
interpretation of the Grand Unification of China as well as a multi-ethnic Chinese nation 
became the orthodox view. This also established the mainstream discourse of China 
frontier studies that centers on patriotism and nationalism. 20 
Under the paradigm of the grand unification of China, the local history of frontier 
areas is over simplified, and overly ethnicized. The major reason is that complicated local 
histories reveal too much of the social, cultural and political connections that China’s 
peripheries had with their adjacent areas, instead of with China and Chinese people. This 
directly contradicts the new history and identity of a unified Chinese nation especially 
after the establishment of the PRC. Thus, under the paradigm of the grand unification of 
China, the frontier and indigenous people are often portrayed as isolated, submissive, 
backward and suffering under the oppression of ethnic nobles. These people admire 
Chinese civilization, and are willing to learn from China. Ethnic identity is highly 
stressed within the PRC in terms of its contribution to the diversity and democracy to a 
multi-ethnic Chinese nation.  
                                                 
19 Ma Jianxiong “Local Knowledge Constructed by the State: Reinterpreting Myths and Imagining the 
Migration History of the Lahu in Yunnan, Southwest China”, in Asian Ethnology, Vol. 68, No. 1 (2009): 
111-129. 
20 Fei Xiaotong initially proposed a theory, namely the pattern of the diversity in the unity of the Chinese 
nation, in August, 1988 when he addressed a broad audience for the Tanner Lecture held at the Hong Kong 
Chinese University. Later this theory was expanded and elaborated in his book published in 1999. See Fei 
Xiaotong (费孝通), “Zhonghua Minzu Duoyuan Yiti Geju” 中华民族多元一体格局 [The Pattern of the 
Diversity in the Unity of the Chinese Nation], in Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) 北京
大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) [Journal of Peiking University (Humanities and Social Sciences)], Vol.4 
(1989): 1-19.  Also, Fei Xiaotong (费孝通), Zhonghua Minzu Duoyuan Yiti Geju 中华民族多元一体格局 
[The Pattern of the Diversity in the Unity of the Chinese Nation] (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue 
chubanshe, 1999). 
10 
The paradigm of nation building goes hand-in-hand with grand unification theory 
for Chinese scholars. And yet this is still a very new concept for scholars in China and 
few scholars have applied that in their research.  
Surprisingly, the paradigm of colonialism (and neo-colonialism) is a relatively 
neutral paradigm, and yet it is being criticized by most scholars in China for taking 
exception to the paradigm of the grand unification of China and Chinese nation building. 
The paradigm of colonialism or neo-colonialism does not consider Yunnan as a natural 
province of Imperial China. Instead, this paradigm advocates the relative independence or 
quasi-independence of Yunnan region throughout history. The geographical territory that 
eventually became the Yunnan province of China was a result of Chinese colonialism in 
response to the expansion of other colonial forces in the world. James Scott points out 
that a “cultural and administrative process of ‘internal colonialism’ usually accompanied 
the expansion of states”. This “internal colonialism” was characterized by the economic, 
political as well as military expansion of dominant peoples and countries.  
 James Scott gives a global list of internal colonialism, such as the “formation of 
most modern Western nation states”, “the imperial projects of the Romans, the Hapsburgs, 
the Ottomans, the Han, and the British,” and the European expansion in America, South 
Africa and Australia. 21 Moreover, the narrative of Chinese colonization has a continuous 
theme, composed of periodic progress, steps which are similar in nature but different in 
specific goals and strategies. In another words, under the paradigm of colonialism the 
expansion of pre-modern Chinese empires and modern Chinese regimes share the same 
purpose of colonizing the indigenous peoples and their lands. Stevan Harrell pointed out 
                                                 
21 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009), 3. 
11 
that the communists initiated increasing control over frontiers, urging ethnic people to 
follow the communist model, and praising themselves as the saviors who liberated ethnic 
people from the control of the landlords and lifted them out of poverty and 
backwardness.22 As a matter of fact, the colonial argument questions the validity of the 
Chinese control over the frontier area. It undermines the theoretical and legal foundation 
for the communist China as “inheriting” the ownership of the frontiers from preceding 
regimes. The Communist colonialism has received criticism not only from western 
scholars but also from local ethnic minorities. Tibetan and Uyurs activists have become 
“stubborn” separatists ever since the Communists took over their land after 1949. 
Under the influence of liberal and postmodern civil rights movements in the West 
in the 1960s and 1970s, China scholars changed their approaches to the studies of the 
frontiers of China. Just like their counter-parts who challenged traditional paradigms 
about the American West, they have begun the discussion of the “forgotten” and 
“invisible” history, concerning women, environment, and ethnic minorities. The studies 
of the functioning of the state’s power on the frontier and the identity of ethnic minorities 
under the control of state power have become increasingly popular in recent decades.  
There is a dichotomy between the Chinese and Western academics in the 
discussion of the application of state power in Yunnan. The majority of the scholars in 
China firmly believe in the consistent excise of a direct state control over the frontier 
since pre-modern times. There is a consensus among western scholars that China only 
had limited control over Yunnan before 1949. In 1940s, Tien Jukang pointed out that the 
                                                 
22 Stevan Harrell, Ways of being ethnic in Southwest China, (Seattle and London: University of Washington 
Press, 2001), 31. 
12 
actual range of control exercised by Han-Chinese was hindered by the tropical climate.23 
C. Patterson Giersch stresses that the Chinese were not successful in establishing an 
overwhelming and dominant authority in Yunnan or over other tributary frontiers in 
general. The complicated social, cultural, economic and political dynamics between 
Yunnan and adjacent Southeast Asian countries prevented the region from forming a 
“uniform frontier society” that could be solely dominated by any single political entity 
such as China.24 James Scott observes that the periphery states had the tendency of 
becoming “a zone of refuge” or “shatter zone”. These zones accommodated people who 
were proficient in running away from state authority and they remained in a state-less 
condition, as a result of an on-going process of “state-making” and “state-unmaking”. 25  
Hence, Yunnan’s experience as the “museum of human races” reflects 
demographic and cultural change in response to China’s expansion. 26 John McKinnon 
points out that the indigenous chiefs of Hani people, Tusi, under both imperial and 
Republican governments, were considered relatively independent. 27  Alan Winnington 
points out that even in inner Yunnan that borders Sichuan, Kuomintang (KMT) 
penetration was limited.28 A. Doak Barnett believes that Yunnan was among the last 
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provinces to follow the central government’s instruction in many areas.29 Barnett points 
out that “the political developments in the province were significantly influenced by the 
province’s special historical, geographical, ethnic, economic, and political background, 
and the new provincial leadership had to adjust their priorities an approaches in many 
ways to deal with the distinctive local problems”.30   
On the other hand, scholars in China are reluctant to acknowledge China’s limited 
and indirect control on its frontiers. Most scholars in China still hold unto the “heritage” 
and “tradition” of a unified Chinese empire since ancient times. Scholars in China often 
apply a double standards to the border and territorial issues. On one hand, Chinese 
scholars criticize the imperial forces that colonized and violated the sovereignty in the 
process, and argue for the restoration of the convicted territories and sovereignty to the 
victim countries. On the other hand, they equate the ancient Chinese Empire’s less 
control or nominal control over its frontier area to the sovereignty of a modern Chinese 
nation. They further claim the right for the PRC to “inherit” these territories from its 
predecessors. Chinese scholar Zhang Xiaosong refers to the exercise of indirect control 
(or even absence of control) of pre-modern Chinese empire as the “dual system of 
administration”, which subtly enhanced ethnic people’s consciousness about the Chinese 
political system and social integration. 31  
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It is obvious that such “dual system” and double standards justify the existence of 
a unified multi-ethnic Chinese empire, by constructing historical references as well as 
historical narrative to sustain the foundation, a myth, and validity for PRC to claim its 
right towards frontiers and tributaries.32 Even so, China has been condemned for invading 
and colonizing Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, but its control over the Southwestern 
Chinese frontier has received only minor critiques. And yet, the relatively “quietness” of 
the indigenous people in the Southwest does not suggest that the Southwestern frontier of 
China was always an integral part of China. A. Doak Barnett observed that soon after the 
Chinese Communist Party reached Yunnan, it began to establish “an unprecedented 
degree of centralized control and extended the Party’s and government’s outreach to the 
grassroots to an extent that no previous regime had been able to do”.33  
George Moseley points out that in Yunnan, the PLA soldiers were commissioned 
to bear to responsibility for social mobilization and winning people’s royalty towards the 
new regime.34 Besides pacifying the frontier and chasing bandits, Moseley noticed that 
the PLA was responsible for the overall improvement of local people’s material needs, 
thus convincing the indigenous people that the PLA “were more trustworthy than Chang 
Kai-shek’s bandits who had operated there in the past.”35  However, in terms of the 
effectiveness of state power, the central Chinese government still faces the dilemma over 
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the coordination of the central and local powers. Mette H. Hansen points out that there is 
disconnect between the central government’s blue plan and the actual practice of local 
authority. Local cadres often reject the government’s proposals and regulation concerning 
the education of ethnic peoples and local financial difficulties often force deviation from 
the plan36. Herold Wiens called attention to the insight from Chen Pisheng that the 
Yunnan frontier had the potential of fostering an “evolving separatism” within the 
sinicized tribal forces. Wiens believed that these tribal forces might become opposed to 
further continuing migration of Han-Chinese as a threat to undermine the social and 
economic position of indigenous power holders.37  
As for identity issue, current literature mainly suggests three forms: a Yunnanese 
identity, regular ethnic identities and the Chinese national identity. For example, Bing 
Yang has argued for the existence of a distinct Yunnanese identity. 38 But Yunnanese 
identity remains vague in many ways. Guo Xiaolin points out that “contacts between 
locals and outsiders constantly altered the configuration of society. Political affiliations 
between conquering powers and native leaders inevitably influenced the identity of local 
communities. 39 C. Paterson Giersch believes that “a Yunnanese identity must also be 
scrutinized”. 40 For, Giersch, the historical evidence for a Yunnanese consciousness is 
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limited, and does not build strong argument for identity formation.41 David G. Atwill 
argues that the Panthay Rebellion transformed a Muslim revolt to a confrontation 
between Yunnan and the central China.42 On the other hand, Giersch believes that this is 
“a bold, intriguing thesis”, however “the supporting evidence  does not prove  
conclusively that  a Yunnanese  identity existed  or  that Yunnanese  Han,  Hui, and  non-
Han  were  locked  in  a  coherent struggle  against  Qing and  Han  migrants”. 43 
Currently most scholars lay stress on ethnic identity and its relationship to 
Chinese national identity. The most discussed aspects of the identity issue are ethnic 
classifications, education, family and marriage, religions, arts and cultural revival during 
the post-Mao era. Discussions of the identity of people in Yunnan involve: the loss of 
ethnic identity, changing identity, searching for identity, construction of identity, keeping 
the original identity and constructed identity, and also finding a new identity. In fact, 
these perspectivs are often intertwined with each other, and generally suggest the loss of 
original ethnic identities and the agency of local people. However, in the eyes of Chinese 
scholars, these are necessary changes for the formation of an ethnic identity that is 
compatible with a unified Chinese nation.  
Concerning ethnic identification, Thomas Mullaney argues that the theoretical 
foundation of the CCP‘s ethnic classification system was derived from Henry Rudolph 
Davies, who investigated Yunnan in early twentieth century. The twenty-three ethnic 
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groups listed by Henry Rudolph Davies became the theoretical foundation for the future 
Chinese ethnological studies and ethnic classification.44 Therefore, it is a mistake to be 
too “quick to point out its (ethnic classification’s) political and methodological affinities 
with that of the Soviet Union, here we find much stronger ties to British colonial 
practice.”45  The new ethnic identities of the PRC period are defined by the state. Stevan 
Harrell points out that given the state-issued identity labels for some ethnic groups, and 
he therefore asks, "Is a relatively ideologically neutral history of the Yi possible?"46 
Stephane Gros’ points out that original ethnic identities were shaped by the political and 
cultural environment and were later upgraded to the status of a nationality (minzu) of 
minorities. 47 This “upgraded identity” is supposed to protect ethnic minorities from 
becoming marginalized in the Han and communist’s dominated country.  In fact, ethnic 
minorities’ lack of social and economic control determines their dependent relationship 
with the government, forcing them to exaggerate their ethnic identity in order to survive 
or make further financial improvement. 48 Steven Harrell also points out that a distinct 
ethnic identity with cultural exoticism has become the tool for some marginalized ethnic 
minorities to gain material advantages in the trend of economic development.49  
                                                 
44  Thomas S.Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 45. 
45  Thomas S.Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 65. 
46  Stevan Harrell, “The History of the History of the Yi”, in Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic 
Frontiers, edited by Stevan Harell (Seattle:  University of Washington, 1995).63. 
47Stéphane Gros, “Economic Marginalization and Social Identity among the Drung People of Northwest 
Yunnan”, in Moving Mountains: Ethnicity and Livelihoods in Highland China, Vietnam, and Laos, edited 
by Jean Michaud and Tim Forsyth (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 34-35. 
48 Stéphane Gros, “Economic Marginalization and Social Identity among the Drung People of Northwest 
Yunnan”, in Moving Mountains: Ethnicity and Livelihoods in Highland China, Vietnam, and Laos, edited 
by Jean Michaud and Tim Forsyth (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 47. 
49 Stevan Harrell, Ways of being ethnic in Southwest China (Seattle and London: University of Washington 
Press, 2001), 217. 
18 
Susan McCarthy in her study about Bai people in the valley of Dali demonstrated 
the symbols of identity, and the manipulation of the Bai identity by ethnic elites as well 
as local government. Specific characteristics of Bai that distinguish them from Han-
Chinese still remained ambiguous50. She spoke of the “very Bai-ness of the Bai”51, which 
ironically was promoted by the government and Bai elites.52 The Bai people’s “exotism” 
and uniqueness have been harnessed by government in order to lure tourist and investor 
funds.53  Ethnic peoples with fewer advantages or no advantages at all face the greatest 
challenge in keeping their identities. Dorothy Solinger points out that the more dependent 
that certain ethnic group is, the easier for that group to accept a state formulated 
identity.54  John McKinnon further reveals that small ethnic groups have suffered intense 
state control and a fundamental loss of agency.55 Moreover, the development of the 
ethnic cultural activities also face an awkward situation caused by the subtle relationship 
between the intensified state orientation and the zeal of ethnic activists.56 Sometimes, 
ethnic people’s distinct identity remains nominal. At the same time, ethnic diversity in 
the country is used as an instrument of government propaganda. 57 
                                                 
50 Susan McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China, (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2009), 101. 
51 Susan McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China, (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2009), 101. 
52 Susan McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China, (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2009), 101. 
53 Susan McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China, (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2009), 101. 
54 Dorothy J. Solinger, “Minority Nationalities in China's Yunnan Province: Assimilation, Power, and 
Policy in a Socialist State”, in World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October, 1977):1-23. 
55  John McKinnon “Hani Agency and Ways of Seeing Environmental Change on the China-Vietnam 
Border”, in Moving Mountains: Ethnicity and Livelihoods in Highland China, Vietnam, and Laos, edited by 
Jean Michaud and Tim Forsyth (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 132. 
56 Susan McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China, (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2009), 115-116. 
57 Susan McCarthy, Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China, (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2009), 101. 
19 
The gender issue also has emerged as part of ethnic identity discussions, 
especially for the Naxi women. Emily Chao argues that “genderized constructions of 
ethnic authenticity are not solely oppositional formulations invented to promote national 
identity in the present”58. Gender belongs to the “residual conceptions embedded in the 
historical process”, and the gender-politics has already emerged as ethnic people were 
being incorporated into the Chinese empire.59 And in current social, cultural, political and 
economic setting of China, Naxi women and mountain-people suggest that ethnic people 
are “different”, in another way, by being authentic60. Chao believes that the stress of 
ethnic authenticity suggests an imagined or constructed ethnic identity which involves the 
manipulation of the state’s power.61 In the “creation” of particular ethnic culture, also 
revealed the gender difference that is created through state and ethnic discourse. 62 
June Dreyer suggests that the minority issue in the communist China is essentially 
a problem of integration, powered by multiple motives such as the reasons of defense, 
economic and social well-being, and national pride.63 However, it becomes obvious that 
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either being Chinese or extremely non-Chinese have become two major ways for ethnic 
peoples to gain social and political success or attention. In fact, many scholars recognize 
the inevitable fact that the loss of a particular ethnic identity, or the creation of a new 
ethnic identity have contributed to the formation of a homogenized national identity of 
Chinese or sometimes a very vague local identity that is compatible with a higher level of 
Chinese national identity.64  
Certain cultural practices of the ethnic minorities also became the tools in serving 
the project of national building. Naxi leaders tried to situate the Naxi “closer to the 
Chinese according to the contemporary Stalinist-influenced evolutionist 
trajectory.”65“Patriotic education is especially high on the state’s agenda for non-Han 
people.”66 Collin Mackerras argues that in the process of national building in ethnic 
people “become merely the foil against which the Chinese nation as a whole can be 
promoted and strengthened”67. Ethnic minorities are involving into the nation of Chinese 
in both syntagmatical and paradigmatical sense. “They are becoming more like other 
Chinese, and they are also becoming integrated with them”. This is a process that is “not 
yet anywhere near complete”.68 
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These paradigms and popular topics of the studies on Yunnan have moved 
scholarly work into a narrow corner of ethnic-centered studies. This trend is unavoidable 
as “increasing emphasis on the diversity of ethnic, racial, and gender experience” have 
swept the academic world in 1990s. 69 It is impossible to avoid ethnicity in discussing 
frontier history of Yunnan because the Han is the only non-ethnic group there and in 
some areas of Yunnan. The ethnic population outnumbers the Han. However, when 
matrilineal society, ethnic revival, ethnic rights and ethnic classification have become the 
focus of attention, frontier history is also being “ethnicized”, simplified and fragmented. 
As an overly simplified and ethnicized frontier history begins to thrive, a complicated 
local history begins to disappear. The ethnicized history often understates the historical, 
political, cultural and social context of the frontier. Thus, the history of the Chinese 
migrants has been ignored, and thus their contribution in forming the local dynamics as 
well as the local history are neglected. At the same time, it is difficult to understand the 
current situation of ethnic minorities in Yunnan when based on a simplified ethnic history 
instead of a complete picture emphasizing local history.  
In fact, the emphasis on ethnic minority has placed local history inadvertently into 
the Chinese government’s nation building project. The construction of a unified Chinese 
nation with multiple ethnic minorities requires a simple local history that proves the 
frontier’s close connection with China proper. It shows that ethnic people have become a 
part of Chinese nation and been under the Chinese administration for over two thousand 
years. It is easier to justify such argument by peeling off the complicated historical, 
political, cultural and social context of the relatively independent frontier area, in order 
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teased out the history of ethnic minorities. Without a proper context, fresh and “naked” 
ethnic studies by focusing on the distinct cultural and religious practices, in another word, 
exoticism, stress the backwardness of their culture and economic development. This type 
of frontier history is inadvertently compatible with a unified Chinese national history as 
well as the discourse that highlights the CCP’s contribution to liberate the ethnic minority 
from the backwardness and oppression.  
It is the comprehensive local history that contests the concept of a unified Chinese 
national identity. And also it is the rich context of a local history that provided many 
ethnic activists the resources to question the paradigm of the grand unification of China. 
In Yunnan’s case, a comprehensive local history demonstrates kinship between Yunnan 
and Southeast Asia, instead of Yunnan and China. At the same time, many accounts from 
the local historical records suggest that the indigenization of the Chinese migrants was 
successful, creating a relatively stable local population. These people, composed by the 
original settlers, old and new migrants of different ethnic background, were influenced by 
China as well as adjacent Southeast Asian countries at the same time and at different 
levels. It is difficult to find the evidence of the existence of a unified Chinese national 
identity before the mid-20th century, and it is even more difficult to trace the existence of 
a collective identity that was of a higher level than indigenous local polities.  A 
comprehensive local history preserves the cultural roots and heritage of the indigenous 
people, on which in-depth ethnic studies and frontier studies are built.  
This dissertation breaks with the narrow tradition narrative of ethnic history. It 
brings back the local history of China’s frontiers. Through the case studies of the Yunnan 
borderlands, this dissertation examines the comprehensive local history of China’s 
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southwestern frontier that emphasizes its complexity, instead of its ethnic characteristics. 
The concept of Mandala describes the radiation of the state’s power in a manner of 
circles which stretches out without certain boundary and gradually diffuses in the process. 
In fact, the application of the concept of mandala in this dissertation demonstrates how 
Yunnan is pictured sitting in a zone that is influenced remotely from China and more 
directly from other Southeast Asian polities.  
On the theoretical and methodological level, this dissertation recognizes the 
indigenous people of Yunnan as composed of the original settlers70, mixing with migrants 
of different ethnic identities, including Chinese migrants. It argues that the indigenous 
people and their political entities belonged to several homogenous societies that were 
based on indigenous people’s kinship by linguistic families, geographic settlements, 
agricultural and economic patterns, as well as their religious beliefs. These homogenous 
entities were also tied together by intra-regional as well as transnational migration, trade 
and wars. This dissertation recognizes the relative independence of the indigenous people 
and their polities from the absolute control of either the Chinese state or other big 
regional powers in Southeast Asia.   
In this sense, this dissertation attempts to clarify the concepts of the Chinese ruled 
frontier and Chinese influenced frontier. The former included frontier areas that were 
directly under China’s jurisdiction. The latter included tributaries that were not governed 
by China or were under the indirect rule while receiving Chinese migrants. For centuries, 
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the Chinese state never recognized frontiers people, whether in Chinese ruled or 
influenced frontier. China was China proper, and the only Chinese were the Han people. 
In fact, Yunnan, especially Southern Yunnan, belonged to mainland Southeast 
Asia as a cultural and political entity more than it did to China. I argue that mainland 
Southeast Asia was like a cultural, economic and geographic motherboard to Yunnan. 
Especially in the 20th century, Yunnan, as well as other parts of mainland Southeast Asia, 
were carved out of their motherboard, incorporated into different regional powers, and 
given various alternatives of modernization. This dissertation considers Yunnan’s 
becoming a part of China as the demonstration of the Chinese alternative to the 
development of mainland Southeast Asia and the indigenous people. It carefully 
examines the Chinese model and briefly compares the Chinese model with the 
alternatives provided by adjacent Southeast Asian countries. It calls scholars’ attention to 
how the indigenous societies evolved in response to different alternatives for 
modernization provided or enforced by colonial and regional powers. Yunnan became an 
isolated and segregated frontier province since the 1950s, in the service of the world-wide 
communist camp as well as domestic Chinese politics and economy. The role of an 
isolate frontier base for China’s political economy violated Yunnan’s natural function as 
the corridor that facilitated the labor, capital and commodity exchange between China, 
Southeast Asia and South Asia. The prosperity of Yunnan, as well as other parts of 
mainland Southeast Asia lies in degrees to which these areas are involved in regional and 
transnational trade as well as labor exchange. From the 19th century until present, the 
indigenous communities were incorporated into the colonial world markets, isolated by 
different ideological forces, and then gradually sucked into the bottomless Chinese 
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domestic market. However, the long-term economic integration of this area seems to be 
shadowed by concerns on national security, particularly Southeast Asian countries’ fear 
towards China’s increasing ambition in world and regional politics, as well as its 
aggressive attitude in border disputes with neighboring countries. This perspective 
provides a new approach to understanding the deep-rooted social and economic dilemmas 
and inequities caused by the competition between larger powers over the region.  
Chapter two explains the emergence of homogenous societies by examining the 
trans-regional migration from China to Southeast Asia as well as the intra-regional 
migration and trade within Southeast Asia. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the 
kinship between Yunnan and Southeast Asia, so as to help the readers understand that 
Yunnan and adjacent Mainland Southeast Asian area once existed as a relatively 
independent region. Yunnan thrived because of its active role in connecting China with 
its Mainland Southeast Asian motherboard. This is not to argue the existence of a 
regional identity, for one never existed, but to recognize a situation of the “stateless”71, 
the absence of state control, or the limited state control.  
Chapter three concentrates on the militarized nature of the indigenous societies, 
and their relationship with the external colonial forces. First of all, it examines the roots 
of the indigenous power and legitimacy that were based on religious sanction, the ability 
for obtaining and monopolizing natural resources, as well as maintaining regional 
alliances. Based on the structure of the indigenous power and authority, it points out the 
necessity for indigenous powers to receive external support in order to overpower their 
competitors. By examining the Chinese colonization in Yunnan, this chapter points out 
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that Chinese colonization in Yunnan before the late 19th century did not cut Yunnan off 
from its mainland Southeast Asian motherboard because of the existence of strong 
localism. However, after 1950, the CCP’s completely uprooted the local powers by 
depriving the indigenous leaders’ control over natural resources and eliminating any 
possible basic social organizations. The establishment of the state military farms 
reorganized the indigenous population, ironically under a centralized and militarized 
social structure that followed the traditional Chinese strategy to consolidate the frontier.  
Chapter four discusses trade and wars as two overarching forces that have been 
battling and shaping the Yunnan borderlands. It focuses on how physical boundaries 
carved Yunnan out from mainland Southeast Asian Trade Empire and how the 
indigenous people struggled over the new lines that separated them and destroyed their 
original life patterns. By examining how the colonial economy and the communist state 
economy defined and redefined the economic and political spheres, this chapter discusses 
the degree to which border people exercised agency when they were caught in the power 
struggle and competition of interests of external larger powers. 
Chapter five examines the cultural changes to the Yunnan frontier forced by the 
establishment of a new national identity and national histories. By discussing two major 
educational channels, schools and movie theaters, this chapter presents the process in 
which the multi-channel educational system disappeared and was replaced by the limited 
vision of communist education. This chapter stresses the benefits of the multi-channel 
educational system that was existed before the mid-1950s in sustaining culturally and 
religiously a plural society. Today the plural society is under threat and is being replaced 
by a concentration on patriotism and nationalism sanctioned by the CCP. At the same 
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time, the rich local history of Yunnan presented in previous three chapters is also 
gradually disappearing, and Yunnan and its history has been ethnicized to fit into the 
nation building project of the CCP.  
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CHAPTER 2 THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
HOMOGENOUS INDIGENOUS SOCIETIES 
 
 
As a part of mainland Southeast  Asia, the Yunnan borderlands, including 
southwestern, southern and southeastern Yunnan, began to receive migrants from today’s 
China around 4th century, B.C. Over centuries, waves of new comers of various origins 
were absorbed by indigenous population and gradually evolved into various modern 
ethnic groups in this area.  
The conventional perspective and methodology stresses the diverse ethnic and 
tribal distinctions in mainland Southeast Asia and the Yunnan borderlands. This approach 
naturally divides the indigenous communities into numerous segments. 1  And yet, it is 
important to recognize that similarities and commonalities existed between indigenous 
peoples over centuries. 
 Through cross-classification, this chapter stresses the kinship between the 
indigenous people in the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia, instead of 
China.2 Cross-classification deconstructs the conventional image of the society marked 
                                                 
1 Outsiders who also had language and cultural barriers tend to see the differences among the indigenous 
societies than their ties and deep connections. Thus the emphasis on the diversity and segments of the 
indigenous people is quite common. Wolfram Eberhard’s survey on over 800 tribes and people mainly in 
Yunnan in the early 20th century presented a great diversity of the social structure of the indigenous people. 
Among them, some of the indigenous political units have advanced to relatively organized societies, 
whereas others, Eberhard called them splinter groups, were “labeled by their geographical location only 
instead of clearly knowing who they were.” Eberhard particularly pointed out that errors easily occurred 
particularly when he conducted his research on the splinter groups, “because the same tribe may be found 
in different geographic regions, and, thus, several different names may occur for the same people.” “Errors 
occur especially when these groups have no defined folk name but are divided according to horde or clan 
names.” See W. Eberhard, Kultur und Siedlung der RandVolkers China, T’oung Pao, Supplement to Vol. 
36, Leden, 1942, in Herold J. Wiens, China’s March toward the Tropics (Hamden: The Shoe String Press, 
1954), 35, quotation from 12. Also see Peter Bellwood, “Southeast Asia before History”, in The Cambridge 
History of Southeast Asia Volume 1: From Early Times to c.1800, edited by Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 56. 
2 By the early 1990s, scholars have reached the agreement that “there is considerable overlapping of human 
biological groupings, cultures and languages.” See Peter Bellwood, “Southeast Asia before History”, in The 
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by ethnic and tribal distinctions of indigenous communities, and then reconstructs a new 
image by stressing indigenous people’s linguistic kinship, mass intra-regional migration3, 
geographical settlements, economic patterns, and cultural as well as religious affinities. 
Cross-classification looks into common characteristics and ties that break down the 
traditional categorization of ethnic identities and re-organizes them into bigger and 
general groups. This approach provides a more accurate lens for understanding the social 
fibers of the indigenous societies, as well as the alienation or cooperation between 
particular indigenous groups.  
Thus, the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia witnessed the 
emergence of several homogenous societies. At the same time, intra-regional migration, 
wars, and trade further tied these homogenous societies together to a coherent local 
dynamics that was centered on a self-sufficient economy and limited regional markets. 
The appearance of the European colonial powers in mainland Southeast Asia in 
the 19th century quickly sucked the Yunnan borderlands into the world market and 
changed the pattern of local economic development. As the corridor that connected 
China’s domestic markets with international markets in mainland Southeast Asia as well 
as South Asia, the Yunnan borderlands became increasing dependent on the fluctuations 
on both sides, and yet more effected by Southeast Asia and South Asia. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume 1: From Early Times to c.1800, edited by Nicholas Tarling 
(Cambridge University Press, 1992), 56. 
3 The intra- tribal migration here refers to the migration that happened among the settlements of one general 
tribal group. The intra-tribal migration of the Bai-Yue tribes might occur between the settlements in 
southern China and mainland Southeast Asia, depending on the specific time span. Intra-regional migration 
mainly refers to the migration happed within Yunnan and within mainland Southeast Asia.  
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The Native Settlers and the Newcomers 
 
Chinese documents generally identify the Bai-Yue and the Bai-Pu tribes as the 
native settlers in the Yunnan borderlands. Around the 4th century B.C., the Di-Qiang 
tribes migrated into Yunnan and became the third major tribal group that existed before 
the Chinese appearance in the 3rd century B.C.4  About a thousand years later, the arrival 
of the Muslim and later the Miao-Yao tribes together with the earlier settlers formed six 
major cultural and ethnic systems in Yunnan that have lasted until today. 5  
Chinese colonial expansion since the 3rd century B.C failed to dominate the 
cultural and political climate in Yunnan. A large number of the new comers who arrived 
before the Mid-Qing era were gradually indigenized, and became a part of the local 
population. The native settlers and new comers mingled and evolved into new ethnic 
tribes and new indigenous political units, most of which were influenced but not 
dominated by the Chinese.  
Jiang Yingliang stressed the “completely indigenous” nature of the native 
dwellers in mainland Southeast Asia from the very beginning. 6 Archeological records 
show that earliest native settlers of the Yunnan borderlands could be traced back to the 
Paleolithic age in some areas of southern and western Yunnan, such as Mengzi, Hekou, 
and Baoshan. There are more signs of civilizations in the Yunnan borderlands that were 
dated back to the Neolithic age, spreading across a vast region from today’s southeastern 
Yunnan to western Yunnan, including the borderland in Wenshan, the Xishuangbanna 
                                                 
4 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the 
Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 2004), 1, 2, 178. 
5 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the 
Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 178. 
6Jiang Yingliang (江应梁): Dai Zu Shi 傣族史 [The history of the Dai People] (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu 
chubanshe, 1983), 3-5. 
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valley and the areas near northern Burma. These sites that were found from the 1960s to 
1990s indicated that the ancestors of the Dai people and other indigenous people were 
possibly very active in these areas more than 3,000 years ago. 7 In a later time, art 
historians also pointed out that the Dong-son drums that were initially developed in 
northern Vietnam could be traced back to the late 7th century B.C. and had no connection 
with the Chinese civilization during that time. 8  
 In fact, Chinese historical documents often generalized these native settlers in a 
broad area of southern China and mainland Southeast Asia as the Bai-Yue people and 
Bai-Pu people.  Archeologist Li Kunsheng from Yunnan pointed out that the native 
settlers in southeastern Yunnan and Xishuangbanna were mainly the Bai-Yue people. 
Along the middle Mekong River, the Bai-Yue people were the main settlers. 9 
Bai-Yue means numerous Yue tribes.10 The Bai-Yue tribes were spread in 
southwestern and southern China to the south of the Yangzi River, and Northern 
mainland Southeast Asia as well.11 Individual Bai-Yue tribes were not specifically 
identified and named either by historical documents or current scholars. It is also difficult 
                                                 
7 Li Kunsheng (李昆生): “1949 Nian yi lai Yunnan Renlei Qiyuan yu Shiqian Kaogu de Zhuyao Chengjiu” 
1949 年以来云南人类起源与史前考古的主要成就 [The major contributions of the archeology in the 
origin of the human being and pre-history of Yunnan], in Social Science in Yunnan, Vol.2 (2004): 108-136. 
8 In Northern Vietnam, the Dong-son bronze drums, or Heger I drums, can trace its origin back to the 
Neolithic and Early Metal phase pottery that began approximately a little before 600BC. Around 500 BC, 
Heger I drums have been developed in either Yunnan or northern Vietnam.  Art historians believed that the 
form of the Heger I drums clearly was not borrowed from Zhou or Han China. See Peter Bellwood, 
“Southeast Asia before History”, in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume 1: From Early Times 
to c.1800, edited by Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 121-122. 
9 Li Kunsheng(李昆生): “1949 Nian yi lai Yunnan Renlei Qiyuan yu Shiqian Kaogu de Zhuyao Chengjiu” 
1949 年以来云南人类起源与史前考古的主要成就[The major contributions of the archeology in the 
origin of the human being and pre-history of Yunnan], in Social Science in Yunnan, Vol.2(2004): 108-136 
10 Jiang Bingzhao, Wu Mianji and Xin Tucheng (蒋炳钊, 吴绵吉, 辛土成), Bai-Yue Minzu Wenhua百越
民族文化 [the culture of the Bai-Yue people] (Shanghai: Xuelin Chubanshe, 1986), 5. 
11 Jiang Yingliang (江应梁): Dai Zu Shi 傣族史 [The History of the Dai People] (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu 
chubanshe, 1983), 3-4; see also Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The 
history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: minzu chubanshe, 2004), 1. 
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to know how they addressed themselves because of the lack of indigenous written records. 
But the entire tribal group was recognized by some general and collective characteristics, 
such as pressed mark ceramics, rice cultivation, irrigational skills, tattoos, tooth-dying, 
brass drums and so forth. 12 To be specific, the Dai and Zhuang people were the earliest 
Bai-Yue tribes found in the Yunnan borderlands. 13 
Within the Bai-Yue tribes, the Dai people specifically belonged to a general group 
that began to be identified as the Dan or Shan people in the ancient Chinese documents in 
the year of 97 AD.14 It is highly possible that Shan people also have the same origins as 
the Dai, which could be traced back to the ancient Yue or Bai-Yue people. Fang Guoyu 
plainly stated that the Dai people were the ancient Shan people who settled in a vast area 
that stretched from the west bank of the Red River to the upstream Irrawaddy River, and 
then to Manipur, India. Fang also distinguished the Shan people from the other Bai-Yue 
tribes.15 Lee Chi argued that tattooing was the distinct cultural mark of the Shan people.  
                                                 
12 Jiang Yingliang (江应梁): Dai Zu Shi 傣族史 [The History of the Dai People] (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu 
chubanshe, 1983), 4. 
13 In many Chinese documents, Dai people were given different names due to their outward appearance 
such as the Man Shu (蛮书) compiled during the Tang dynasty. These names included the Black-tooth 
Barbarians, Golden-tooth Barbarians, Silver-tooth Barbarians, Tattooed-foot Barbarians, and Tattooed-face 
Barbarians. Besides that, Dai were also called Mang-Man and Baiyi (there were multiple ways to write 
Baiyi). See Jiang Yingliang (江应梁): Dai Zu Shi 傣族史 [The History of the Dai People] (Chengdu: 
Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1983), 7. Also see Bulang Zu Jianshi Bianxie Zu [The editor group of a brief 
history of the Bulang people]: Bulang Zu Jian Shi 布朗族简史 [A brief history of the Bulang people] 
(Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1984), 7. 
14Fang Guoyu (方国瑜), “Yuan Dai Yunnan Xingsheng Daizu Shiliao Biannian”元代云南行省傣族史料
编年 [The chronicles of the historical documents of the Dai people of Yunnan Province of the Yuan 
dynast], in Yunnan Shiliao Congcan Di San Juan 云南史料丛刊第三卷 [The Historical Documents of 
Yunnan, Vol. 3], edited by Fang Guoyu (Kunming: Yunnan Daxue chubanshe, 1998), 3. Chinese scholar 
He Ping believed that the Shan people in the Chinese documents in during the first and second century 
were the Sham, the ancient Syrian people, instead of the Shan.  See He Ping (何平), Comg Yunnan dao 
Asamu-Dai-Tai Minzu Lishi Zaikao yu Chonggou 从云南到阿萨姆-傣-泰民族历史再考与重构 [From 
Yunnan to Assam: A New Exploration of the History of the Tai Peoples] (Kunming: Yunnan Daxue 
Chubanshe), 88-89. 
15Fang Guoyu (方国瑜), “Yuan Dai Yunnan Xingsheng Daizu Shiliao Biannian”元代云南行省傣族史料
编年 [The chronicles of the historical documents of the Dai people of Yunnan Province of the Yuan 
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This argument has been accepted by quite a few anthropologists.16 In fact, scholars have 
reached a common agreement that the Shan people belong to “the Mongoloid stock of the 
Tai ethnic group who are spread over southwestern China, Hainan, Vietnam, Laos, 
Thailand, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Burma, and northeastern India in Assam.”  At the 
same time, “they also known by a variety of names depending upon the color of their 
costumes, teeth, and tattoos”.17  
The Bai-Pu tribes were a congregation of numerous Pu branches, and they were 
often mixed up with the Bai-Yue tribes in Chinese historical documents. 18 The Bai-Yue 
and Bai-Pu tribes often mingled with other people as they migrated. Later the Bai-Yue 
tribes evolved to the present Zhuang, Buyi, Dai, Shan, Lao, and Ahom people, and the 
Bai-Pu people became the ancestors for the Bulang, Jingpo, and De’ang people. 19  
                                                                                                                                                 
dynast], in Yunnan Shiliao Congcan Di San Juan 云南史料丛刊第三卷 [The Historical Documents of 
Yunnan, Vol. 3], edited by Fang Guoyu (Kunming: Yunnan Daxue chubanshe, 1998), 3. 
16 Jiang Yingliang (江应梁): Dai Zu Shi 傣族史 [The History of the Dai People] (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu 
chubanshe, 1983), 4. See also Herold J. Wiens, China’s March toward the Tropics (Hamden: The Shoe 
String Press, 1954), 113-114. 
17 A variety names are found such as Tai Lam (Dam, black), Tai Kau (white), Tai Leng (Deng, red), and 
Tai Lai (striped waistband) due to their dress styles. The Tai Leng (Deng) settle along the Red River, and 
the Tai Lam (Dam) live along the Black River. J.G Scott has an even more detailed list: Lao, Law, Hkun, 
Lu, Tai-long, Tai-noi, Tai-no, Tai-man, Tai-mao, Tai-hke, Tai-toi, Pu-tai, Pu-nong, (or nung), Pu-man,Pu-
ju, Pu-chei, Pu-en, Pu-yloi, Pu-sui, P’o, Pa, Shui Han or Hwa Pai-I, Pai-jen, Yu-jen, P’u-man, Pai, Hei or 
Hwa Tu-tao, Nung or Lung-jer, Sha-jen, Hei or Pai Sha-jen, Minchia, and Shui-chai-chung-chai. See Sai 
Aung Tun, History of the Shan State: From Its Origins to 1962 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2009), 3. James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia 
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009), 187-188. 
18 It is highly possible that Bai-Yue and Bai-Pu tribes migrated back and forth and mingled in Southern 
China and Mainland Southeast Asia, most through the passages connected Southern China with Northern 
Vietnam. Also, according to Hanshu- Dili Zhi (汉书-地理志), China had frequent maritime trade with the 
Southeast Asia countries dating back to the 1st century AD.  People sailed to other parts of Southeast Asia, 
both mainland and the islands from the coastal areas in Guangdong, Guangxi and Fujian where the Bai-Yue 
and Bai-Pu tribes dwelled. Migration of people thus occurred within same tribal group, a homogenous 
community. See Jiang Bingzhao, Wu Mianji and Xin Tucheng (蒋炳钊, 吴绵吉, 辛土成), Bai-Yue Minzu 
Wenhua百越民族文化 [the culture of the Bai-Yue people] (Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1986), 9. 
19 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the 
Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 11. 
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Around the 7th century B.C., the rise of the Chinese state of Qin and its military 
campaigns forced the southward migration of people that lasted for centuries. The earliest 
victims of the Qin expansion were the Qiang or Di-Qiang tribes. Similar to the Bai-Yue 
and Bai-Pu tribes, the Di-Qiang tribes also included numerous small branches.20 The Di-
Qiang people were pastoralists who found their homeland in the northwest about today’s 
Gansu and Qinghai. It is highly possible that their history of settlement could be dated 
back to the late Neolithic era. It is sure that they remained active in this area at least until 
the 4th century B.C, and gradually expanded to Shanxi.21 Many Di-Qiang tribes also 
shifted between the China proper and the southwest, being considered by many Chinese 
scholars as one of the origins of the Han-Chinese. 22  The expansion of the Qin State in 
the 7th century B.C. pushed those Di-Qiang tribes that settled in Gansu and Qinghai to 
move further into Tibet in the west and also into the southwest. 23  
The forced relocation of the Di-Qiang tribes proved to be a large scale movement 
and a long-lasting process. The largest relocation of the Di-Qiang people that were 
                                                 
20 A few Di-Qiang or Qiang tribes kept their identity as Di-Qiang or Qiang, and were addressed as Di-
Qiang or Qiang by Chinese documents, especially for those who settled in Sichuan, whereas other migrants 
gradually were recorded in Chinese historical documents as the Ji people (棘人), especially in Yunnan. It is 
highly possible that the migrants from the Yue tribes had already settled in Mainland Southeast Asia when 
these new comers arrived in this area. Ji tribes possibly intermarried the Yue tribes, and later evolved into 
various local ethnic tribes especially in the mountains of Southwestern Yunnan and northern Burma. The 
offspring of these mountain dwellers include the Shans, Dai people (or Baiyi), Burmese and many other 
ethnic tribes were spread in Yunnan, Burma, Laos and Thailand. Other famous branches of the Ji people 
included the Bai and Yi people who established Nanzhao Kingdom in the 8th century. 
21 See You Zhong (尤中), Yunnan Minzu Shi 云南民族史 [The history of ethnic people in Yunnan] 
(Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1994), 6. Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di 1 Juan中
国移民史第一卷 [The history of migration in China, Vol. 1] (Fuchou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 
179.  See Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di 2 Juan 中国移民史第二卷 [The history of 
migration in China, Vol. 2] (Fuchou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 229. 
22 You Zhong (尤中), Yunnan Minzu Shi 云南民族史 [The history of ethnic people in Yunnan] (Kunming: 
Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1994), 6. 
23You Zhong (尤中), Yunnan Minzu Shi 云南民族史 [The history of ethnic people in Yunnan] (Kunming: 
Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1994), 8. 
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recorded in the history occurred in the year of 383 B.C.24 A group of the Qiang people 
named Diyuanrong left their native place in the upstream Weihe River delta so as to 
escape from the warfare with the Qin armies. They arrived in Qinghai, passed by the 
headwaters of the Yellow River, and then traveled through the mountains and valleys of 
eastern Tibetan Plateau and western Sichuan. Some of them settled in southern Gansu, as 
well as northern and western Sichuan, while others continued to move to Yunnan and 
Guizhou. 25 Some of them finally arrived at the lowlands of today’s Sino-Vietnamese and 
Sino-Laotian border, and others reached those areas near northern and eastern Burma. 26 
Over time, the Di-Qiang people mingled with the indigenous settlers, and were possibly 
divided by many local regimes and tribes, dating back to at least the 3rd century B.C, 
which were commonly recognized in the Chinese historical documents by the name of 
Yelang, Junchang, Qiongdu, Ranmang, Mimo, Dian, Xi, and Kunming.27   
The Chinese documents from the Han dynasty to the early Ming dynasty also 
used Ji to refer to some indigenous people that had the Di-Qiang origins, such as the Bai 
people. However, the Ji became a common term to address both the Bai people and the 
Dai people since Li Yuanyang compiled the Gazetteer of Yunnan in 1570s. 28 The 
traditions and customs of the Di-Qiang tribes varied due to their geographic settlements. 
Some Di-Qiang tribes had the tradition of burring the dead with stone coffins, which are 
                                                 
24 Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di 2 Juan中国移民史第二卷 [The history of migration in 
China, Vol. 2] (Fuchou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 230. 
25 Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di 1 Juan中国移民史第一卷 [The history of migration in 
China, Vol.1] (Fuchou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 176. 
26 Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di 1 Juan中国移民史第一卷 [The history of migration in 
China, Vol.1] (Fuchou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 176. 
27 Shiji Xinan Yi Lie Zhuan史记 西南夷列传.  
28 Fang Guoyu (方国瑜), “Yuan Dai Yunnan Xingsheng Daizu Shiliao Biannian”元代云南行省傣族史料
编年 [The chronicles of the historical documents of the Dai people of Yunnan Province of the Yuan 
dynast], in Yunnan Shiliao Congcan Di San Juan 云南史料丛刊第三卷 [The Historical Documents of 
Yunnan, Vol. 3], edited by Fang Guoyu (Kunming: Yunnan Daxue chubanshe, 1998), 24-25. 
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still found among some mountain dwellers in Western Yunnan today. 29  Some others 
preferred the tradition of cremation that has lasted until the 20th century. 30 
When the State of Qin expanded to the Sichuan basin, the native Shu people also 
began to migrate southward in 280s B.C. They reached the Jinsha River in Yunnan, the 
headwater of the Yangtze, and then traveled along the Lidujiang River to the Red River 
(Yuanjiang) delta. Over half a century, these Shu migrants continued to move 
southeastward along the Red River, settling in northern Vietnam. By then their 
population probably had reached at least 120,000, with other ethnic groups that joined 
them along the way. Around the 230 B.C., these new comers conquered the indigenous 
people in northern Vietnam, and established the Kingdom of An’yang. 31  
The earliest Chinese migrants arrived in Yunnan in late 3rd century A.D. In 279 
B.C., Zhuang Qiao and his Chu State army conquered the Qielan Kingdom and the 
Yelang Kingdom in Guizhou. Two years later, this Chinese army permanently settled 
down in Northeastern Yunnan and established the Kingdom of Dian near the Lake 
Dianchi.32  In 214 B.C Guangdong, Guanxi and northeastern Vietnam were annexed into 
the Qin State’s territory under the administration of the Nanhai Prefecture, Guilin 
Prefecture, and Xiang Prefecture. War captives, military relocation and state farm 
                                                 
29 Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di 2 Juan中国移民史第二卷 [The history of migration in 
China, Vol.2] (Fuchou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 229. 
30 As the decedents of the Di-Qiang tribes, the Yi people had the tradition of burning the corpse. See Yi Zu 
Jianshi Bianxie Zu (彝族简史编写组), Yi Zu Jianshi 彝族简史  [A brief history of the Yi People] 
(Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1987), 14.  See also Herold J. Wiens, China’s March toward the 
Tropics (Hamden: The Shoe String Press, 1954), 50. 
31 The origin of the Shu people left unsettled, but hey had established their own country around the first 
millennium B.C. and built the capital city in the Chengdu plain. See Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo 
Yimin Shi, Di 2 Juan 中国移民史第二卷 [The history of migration in China, Vol. 2] (Fuchou: Fujian 
renmin chubanshe, 1997), 27. 
32 Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di 2 Juan中国移民史第二卷 [The history of migration in 
China, Vol.2] (Fuchou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 25. 
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recruitment were the main sources of the Chinese migrants who moved into Yunnan. 
However, they mainly stayed in inland Yunnan before the mid-Qing period, and seldom 
appeared in the Yunnan borderlands. 33 Ge Jianxiong estimated that about 10, 000 people 
were forced to migrate into the new colonies in the south during the Qin expansion. They 
settled in the Pearl River delta, the plains along the Dongjiang River, Beijiang River and 
Guijiang River, as well as along the main traffic routes that led to China proper. The land 
to the west of these Chinese settlements were still populated by the indigenous people. 34    
Indigenous cultures emerged and thrived in the Yunnan borderlands and mainland 
Southeast Asia where Chinese administration was absent. Some archeologists identified 
the existence of city states in the area during the first millennium, 35  whereas others 
assert the absence of such state structures. 36 The Chinese recorded evidence that canal 
irrigated rice fields had already appeared in northern Vietnam before 111B.C, with the 
possibility of intensive double-cropping. A Chinese census of 2nd century A.D showed 
that northern Vietnam had accommodated almost one million population, which also 
suggested that the population prior to the Chinese presence had been large enough to 
require an indigenous centralized government.37  
                                                 
33 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the 
Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 180. 
34 Ge Jianxiong (葛剑雄), Zhongguo Yimin Shi, Di 2 Juan中国移民史第二卷 [The history of migration in 
China, Vol.2] (Fuchou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1997), 73. 
35 Miriam T. Stark: “Early Mainland Southeast Asian Landscapes in the First Millennium A.D.”, in Annual 
Review of Anthropology, Vol. 35 (2006): 407-432. 
36 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009), 3. See also Vicent Pigott, “Prehistoric Copper Mining in 
Northeast Thaland in the Context of Emerging Community Craft Specialization,” in Social Approaches to 
an Industrial Past: The Archaeology and Anthropology of Mining, edited by A.B Knapp, Vi.Pigott, and E, 
Herbert (London: Routledge, 1998), 205-25 in James Scott James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: 
An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009), 339, 
quotation from 6.  
37 Peter Bellwood, “Southeast Asia before History”, in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume 1: 
From Early Times to c.1800, edited by Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125. 
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During the mid-first-millennium A.D the scale of some urban centers in the Funan 
region of the Mekong delta and in the Pyu region of northern Burma had paralleled of the 
several world’s better-known cities of Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Late Preclassic.38  
From 1st century A.D to the 11th century, there were more than ten urban centers 
emerging in Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand.39 Some scholars argue that these 
cities were deliberately created to legitimize and constitute political authority.40 
The political, cultural, linguistic, and demographic make-up had hindered the 
Chinese ambition to create a stable unity in the Yunnan borderlands. The control from the 
central Chinese government was diluted even in inland Yunnan. Indirect rule seemed to 
be the most effective way to maintain the communication between China and the 
indigenous communities. However, new emerged indigenous political units frequently 
challenged the Chinese authority and interrupted such connections. 
In the Yongchang Prefecture, the Chinese exercised feeble authority in two 
counties, a vast area stretching from southern Yunnan to western Yunnan near northern 
Burma. 41 The Chinese migrants only gathered in a small town called Tengyue.  The rest 
of Yongchang Prefecture hosted the ancestral the tribes of the Khmer, Dai, Burmese, 
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Jingpo, Min-Pu, Jiu-Liao, Lisu, Luo-Pu and Shendu (Hindu). 42 In the year of 342 A.D., 
the Yongchang Prefecture was permanently dissolved, because the indigenous rebels cut 
off Yongchang’s connection with China proper. This event marked China’s total loss of 
control in Western Yunnan.43  This situation did not change until the 13th century.  
 In the southeast, the Linyi Kingdom, settled mainly by the Chinese, declared 
independence at the end of the Eastern Han dynasty. The Linyi Kingdom kept expanding 
towards the north, and extended its control over the Rinan, Jiude and Jiuzhen Prefectures 
that were previously under China’s indirect rule. 44  Later, the Chinese troops also had to 
fight against the Nan Yue (Nam Viet) Kingdom that emerged in the beginning of the 
Western Han dynasty, and restored the Chinese colonies it occupied around the 180 
B.C.45   In the following centuries, the Chinese did not retain much control over 
southeastern Yunnan. In 938 BC, Ngo Quyen defeated the Chinese army and claimed the 
independence of Vietnam, the Ngo dynasty, which became China’s tributary in the late 
10th century. Thus, China’s control over in these areas stayed at a nominal level.  
Although China’s authority failed to control Yunnan, its expansion in other part 
of southwestern and southern China kept driving large numbers of people to leave their 
homes and move into the Yunnan borderlands during the long second millennium.   
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In the 11th century, the Nong people in Guangxi rebelled against the rule of the 
Northern Song dynasty and fled into southeastern Yunnan. They later became a part of 
the Zhuang people in China, and the Nong people in Vietnam. 46  
Muslims were drafted by the Mongolian army and entered western Yunnan in 
1253. Besides the military officers and soldiers, there were also many Muslim merchants 
who arrived along with the Mongolian army. Usually, the Muslim military officers and 
merchants were called by the names of the Hui people, Semu, Huihu and Huihe (the 
Uyghurs). Muslims were active in the area where the Mongolian armies were stationed.47 
Led by the newly appointed Yunnan governor Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar 
(Saidianchi Shansiding), who had Persian origin, the second wave of the Muslim arrived 
and settled in the Honghe Prefecture of southeastern Yunnan in 1273. 48  In the early 
Ming, a large number of Muslims arrived in Yunnan and also settled in Honghe when 
General Mu Ying and his army conquered Yunnan in the 1380s. 49 After the Ming army 
Luchuan rebellion in the mid-15th century, more than 120,000 Muslim and Chinese 
troops were stationed in southwestern Yunnan. 50 Around the 15th and 16th century, 
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Shadian gradually grew to become a Muslim settlement as more and more Muslims 
rushed in, driving away the original settlers, the Zhuang people (or Sha people). 51 In the 
20th century, the Muslim settlements in southern Yunnan were gathered along the main 
cities and towns in northern bank of the Red River and along the main roads. 52 
The Yao people appeared in Yunnan in the 13th century. But a large scale 
migration of the Yao people towards the Yunnan borderlands and Vietnam began in early 
Qing.  These Yao migrants moved to southeastern Yunnan from Hunan via Guangdong 
and Guangxi, and then kept moving north towards the inner land of Yunnan. 53 In the 19th 
century, the Miao people concluded non-Chinese people’s mass migration into the 
Yunnan borderlands. The Miao people escaped from Guizhou and Sichuan because of the 
military confrontations caused by the gaitu guiliu policy. After entering into Yunnan, 
they were mainly spread out in the Honghe Prefecture and Wenshan Prefecture in the 
southeast, and settled in the mountain ranges as well as valleys in Jinping, Pingbian, 
Qiubei and Maguan. By the early 20th century, the Miao people have concentrated along 
the Sino-Vietnamese border as well as the banks of the Nanxihe River. 54 They were also 
known as the Hmong people in northern Burma and Laos.55  
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A large flow of Chinese migrants also arrived in Yunnan in the 13th century. They 
still primarily settled in inland Yunnan before the mid-Qing era. In fact, the inland 
Yunnan was always the final destination for the conventional Chinese relocation. Besides 
tropical disease like malaria that stopped the southward movement of the Chinese, the 
Ming court initiated clear regulations to forbid them entering into the area that belonged 
to the jurisdiction of the Tusi, the Native Officers. After 1730s, the population boom in 
China proper pushed new waves of people to migrate to the frontiers. 56   
In order to consolidate the newly conquered territory in the southwest, and make 
up the population loss during gaitu guiliu, the Governor General of Yunnan began to 
recruit peasants in China’s hinterland to farm and consolidate Yunnan in 1732.  The Qing 
government intended to settle more Chinese migrants along the military garrisons and 
posts.57 New Chinese migrants would receive moving funds, bulls, seeds, and also twenty 
mu 58of land. The Chinese people who previously settled in other areas of Yunnan also 
responded to the government’s call and were relocated. 59  In Zhaotong, tens of thousands 
previously abandoned fields during gaitu duiliu finally began to yield fruits after the 
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arrival of the Chinese migrants.60  The Guangnan County in southern Yunnan received 
new migrants from Hunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou and Guangdong, despite the threat of 
malaria. Initially, the Chinese migrants only farmed in the plains. As more and more of 
them arrived, fertile lands in the plains depleted, and terracing began to appear in the 
relatively flat valleys and saddles in the mountains.61 Throughout the 18th and 19th 
century, when the migrants from Guizhou arrived, they could only find lands and shelters 
in the deep and high mountains. Besides the fact that malaria was prevalent in the 
lowlands, this could be one of the reasons why the Guizhou migrants occupied the top of 
the mountains in this area. 62 
 During the Jiaqing era (1785-1820), more than one million migrant workers and 
their families had moved into Yunnan. 63 According to a census data from the third year 
of the Daoguang’s rule (1823), more than 24,000 migrant families were registered in 
Wenshan as well as Anping, and 22,000 families in Guangnan.of the Kaihua Prefecture.64 
The Pu’er Prefecture had received migrants from Guizhou, Hunan, Sichuan and Shanxi 
from the 1730s. Chinese schools were built for the migrants’ children, which added much 
“Chinese-ness” in this area. The census from 1836 showed that among all the 88,485 
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families in the Pu’er Prefecture, there were 45% indigenous people, 46% percent troops 
and veterans, as well as 9% merchants and migrant labors. 65  In Yuanjiang, a census also 
from the Daoguang’s rule (1821-1850) showed that13, 182 families were indigenous 
people, 11, 289 families were troops and their families who were stationed in garrisons, 
and 283 families were merchants and migrant labors.66  In Jingdong, it is very highly 
possible that during the Daoguang era, the indigenous population and migrants (including 
militaries) each counted about 50% of the total population. 67  By 1786, in Ning’er county 
of southeastern Yunnan, the Chinese tea merchants as well as migrated labors in the state 
farms had reached 6,470 households, compromising 56.9% of the total population as well 
54.8% of the male population. 68 
However, the Chinese migration into Tusi’s jurisdiction was still not encouraged 
during the Qing era. The Qing court clearly differentiated the Tusi’s jurisdiction from the 
direct dominion of the Yunnan provincial government. In some cases, Chinese miners 
were restricted to enter into the border zones, and in the late 18th century, several silver 
mines in western Yunnan were even shut down by the government. 69   
Over centuries, Chinese migrants created Chinese cultural belts and cultural 
islands in the indigenous territories, radiating limited Chinese influence to surrounding 
areas. Chinese migrants provided advanced technologies and another alternatives for 
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education. In Yongchang, the Qing armies were stationed in Baoshan and Tengyue in 
order to control Southwestern Yunnan. Following the military occupation, new Chinese 
migrants entered into this area for farming and mining.  It was estimated that about 1.3 
million Chinese farmers arrived in the mountains in Yunnan from the late 18th century to 
mid-19th century. 70 During the process of the Chinese migration, the Jinuo people 
learned forging skills from the Chinese blacksmiths during the Qing era.71  However, the 
indigenous people’s adoption of Chinese technologies did not suggest their becoming 
Chinese, or “Sinicized”. For the indigenous political units in the vast area of mainland 
Southeast Asia, including the Yunnan borderlands, “adopting Chinese culture never 
seems to have been viewed as a serious option.”72  
In fact, as soon as the Chinese migrants moved out of the Chinese cultural belts or 
cultural islands and mingled with the indigenous population, they faced the fate of being 
assimilated and becoming a part of the indigenous people. Throughout the history, the 
majority of Chinese migrants were gradually indigenized. 73  A lot of the indigenized 
Chinese people still kept a few traces of their original Chinese heritage. Nevertheless, 
they have become new members of the indigenous people, adding the diversity of the 
non-Chinese population in the frontier.  
For instance, in Jinggu area, the Chinese troops who stayed after the Luchuang 
rebellion in the 15th century adopted the Dai customs and gradually evolved into a new 
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ethnic group, the Han-Dai or Huayao-Dai. The newly formed Han-Dai people usually had 
various last Chinese names that the original Dai people never had. 74 
In Nandian, Chinese migrants married the Jingpo women in order to survive or do 
business. Their children were raised amidst the Jingpo people and became one of them. In 
the following years, they populated in western Yunnan and mingled with other Jingpo 
people. But their Chinese last names and bilingual abilities differentiated them from 
ordinary Jingpo population. 75 
In Longchuan and Husa of western Yunnan, Chinese migrants lived alongside the 
Achang people since the late 14th century. The Chinese people gradually lost themselves 
among the Achang, and became a very important origin of the new indigenous Achang 
population. The family of the Tusi of Husa was indigenized Chinese. 76  According to an 
investigation in 1950s, these new Achang people still kept the tablets for ancestry and 
animist worship, practiced Mahayana Buddhism, and followed some Chinese traditions 
for their wedding ceremonies. 77 
In Menghai, the Muslim migrants settled with the Dai people since the 1850s, and 
they had become the Hui-Dai people, having Dai diet, wearing Dai outfit and living in 
Dai homes. They especially liked sticky rice, and when they were dinning, they also used 
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their hands without bowls. They still went to mosques for worship, and would never eat 
pork. These were characteristics differentiated them from the Dai people.  78 
So far, it is clear that people who moved to mainland Southeast Asia throughout 
history were not necessarily Chinese. In fact, the formation of the Chinese population has 
been a process in which non-Chinese people as well as their cultures and customs were 
absorbed into the Chinese identity. And at the same time, the territory and boundary of 
the Chinese empire also shifted overtime. During the early pre-modern era, the majority 
of the migrants who moved towards mainland Southeast Asia actually came from various 
origins of people who were not recognized as Chinese until the needs for a theoretical 
construction of a united Chinese nation became urgent, especially during the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in the mid-20th century.  
Throughout the long first millennium, many non-Chinese groups lived outside of 
the jurisdiction of the Chinese authority. At a certain time, their homeland were annexed 
into China and they fell into direct or indirect rule of the Chinese authority. However, the 
majority of them were able to keep their distinct identities, and continued to be 
considered barbarians in the Chinese documents. Many of these “barbarians” chose to 
migrate south in order to avoid the Chinese colonial power and the Chinese 
administration.  Even most of the Chinese migrants who moved into this area became 
indigenized, and they were not be able to transform but adapt to the indigenous social, 
cultural as well as economic structure.79 
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With the influx of the migrants from the north, the emergence of indigenous 
political units became the embryo of a unique mainland Southeast Asian social and 
cultural sphere which would gradually absorb influences from China and India, and yet 
remain relatively independent from both regional super powers.  
Linguistic Ties and Intra-regional Migration 
 
From the linguistic point of view, the ancient tribal groups in southern as well as 
southwestern China and the ethnic people of the Yunnan borderlands had close 
connections with specific language families in mainland Southeast Asia. This evidence 
not only suggests the kinship between the indigenous people in these regions, but also the 
possibility of long-term and large scale of intra-regional migration. 
Usually Tai-Kaidai, Mon-Khmer, Sino-Tibetan, Hmong-Mien and Austrian are 
the five main language families that are found not only in mainland Southeast Asia, but 
also southwestern and southern China.80 Generally speaking, people who belong to the 
Tai-Kaidai language family were originated from the Bai-Yue tribes. Members of Sino-
Tibetan language family can usually trace their ancestors to the Di-Qiang tribes from 
northwestern China. The Mon-Khmer language family was comprised by the Bai-Pu 
people, especially those Bai-Pu who settled in the west of mainland Southeast Asia. In 
fact, the Mon-Khmer language family members might have settled in the Yunnan 
borderlands earlier than the Tai-Kaidai family.81 
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Within the Kaidai-Tai language families, speakers of the Kaidai group primarily 
settled in Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangdong. The Tai group are found in 
Guangxi, highland Burma, northeast India, Laos and Thailand. The Hmong-Mien 
language families are found in southwestern China as a broad group of the Miao people, 
as well as their migrants in Laos and Thailand. The Sino-Tibetan speakers are spread in 
highland Burma, southwestern China, northern Laos, and northern Thailand. 82  
Such overlapping language map might have resulted from long-time and constant 
integration among various ethnic groups. One of the channels to facilitate such 
integration was intra-regional migration. Archeological data on the patterns of the kilns 
that were spread in mainland Southeast Asia further suggested the possibility of a 
continued and frequent migration: 1) between southern as well as southwestern China 
with mainland Southeast  Asia; 2) within mainland Southeast  Asia; 3) within the Yunnan 
borderlands, which further pushed the people’s flow into mainland Southeast  Asia.   
At least we can map out the flow of the influence caused by the migrants 
particularly in the first millennium A.D. According to the research that traces the origins 
of different types of kilns and their zones of the influence (map. 3), there were two main 
migration routes that connected China to mainland Southeast Asia through western 
Guangxi and southeastern Yunnan.83  The kiln sites in the Coastal Zone, such as the north 
and central Vietnam and Cambodia (including Angkorian kilns in northeast Thailand), 
could be traced back to a single source of origin around the 2nd century A.D. The 
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technology might have been brought in to this area earlier in the Han dynasty when China 
colonized northern and eastern Vietnam. 84   
At the same time, the traces of Chinese influence suggest that after the new 
comers arrived in Guangxi and the Chinese colonies in northeastern Vietnam, they 
moved along the coastal area in the south and settled in southern Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and southern Thailand.  
The kilns sites in Inland Zone suggest that the technology was possibly brought in 
from kiln sites in Yunnan or Guangxi around the 10th century A.D. 85 Such phenomenon 
could be caused by migrants who emigrated westward from the Yunnan borderlands, or 
even Guangxi,  to Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Northern Thailand. 86  
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    Map.3. Zones of Influence: Ceramic Kiln Lineages in Mainland Southeast Asia 87 
 
Within the Yunnan borderlands, it is highly possible that the people who once 
established the Dian Kingdom moved to the Yunnan borderlands after their country was 
wiped out by the Han armies in the 1st century A.D. As soon as they left, their original 
settlements were occupied by some of the Di-Qiang tribes. 88During the first millennium, 
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some Bai-Pu people also emigrated out of the Yongchang Prefecture. By Tang dynasty, 
they had established many settlements in Xishuangbanna, Jingdong, Lincang, Baoshan 
and even northwestern Yunnan. 89  
The Ailao people in western Yunnan who belonged to the Bai-Yue tribes and Tai-
Kaidai language family90 originally moved from southern China into the Ailao Mountains. 
Some Ailao people then kept moving southward and westward. For those who moved 
southward, they reached today’s Xishuangbanna, Laos and other areas in mainland 
Southeast Asia. They mingled with the Bai-Pu tribes and other Bai-Yue Tribes that 
arrived later, and became the ancestors of a variety of the indigenous people including the 
Dai, Lao and Shan. 91 For those who moved westward, they reached the Yongchang 
Prefecture and submitted to the Eastern Han government. Some continued to move 
westward and settled along the Ruilijiang River delta. Later a few other Bai-Yue tribes 
also arrived in this area and even kept moving towards northern Burma and India.  The 
Dai people in Dehong area, the Shan people in northern Burma as well as the Ahom 
people in India are possibly the descendants of these early migrants. 92 Some Chinese 
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documents often mixed up the Ailao people and other indigenous people in southwestern 
China because of their frequent associations with each other.93   
The emergence of the Nanzhao and Dali Kingdoms as well as their military 
expansions in the 8th and 9th century further facilitated the intra-regional migration of the 
indigenous people in Yunnan. In the mid-7th century, the He-Man people from the Di-
Qiang tribes moved from the Lake Er’hai area to the Red River delta, southern Simao and 
Xishuangbanna. 94 The Bai people were also relocated by the Nanzhao Kingdom from the 
Lake Er’hai area to Tengyue in the south during the 7th century.95 
During the Tang and Song era, people of the Bai-Yue origin had formed a 
crescent shaped settlement area in the Yunnan borderlands, Thailand, Laos and Burma. 
At this time, the Dai people had successfully distinguished themselves from other Bai-
Yue tribes, and were identified as the Mang-Man or Jin-Chi (the Golden Teeth). During 
the era of the Dali Kingdom, the Dai people marched towards the northern Yunnan, and 
occupied Yinsheng Region (current Jingdong County), and Weiyuan Prefecture (current 
Jinggu County) that were under the administration of the Nanzhao Kingdom. 96  
                                                 
93 For example, in some ancient documents, such as Hua Yang Guo Zhi (华阳国志), Hou Han Shu (后汉
书), and Gu Jin Zhi (古今志), the Pu (Bai-Pu) people were often referred to as the Ailao people who settled 
in the same area. But in fact, the Bulang people once mingled with the Ailao people in Nothwestern 
Yunnan.  Bai Pu Kao (百濮考) recorded that the Ailao people were the Pu people who lived in Yongchang.  
Fang Guoyu also pointed out that the Pu people in Yongchang were also called the Ailao people, and 
usually the Pu people had no difference from the Ailao people. See Yang Yuxiang (杨毓骧), Bulang Zu 布
朗族 [The Bulang People] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1988), 4, 7-9. 
93 But in fact, one branch of the Pu (Bai-Pu) tribes called Bulang used to settle in the same area, such as 
Baoshan, Yongping as well as Shidian. They migled with the Ailao people and were often addressed as the 
Pu (蒲) people. In some documents, Pu (蒲) was interchangeable with Pu (濮) people because of their same 
pronunciation. 
94 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the 
Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 22-23. 
95Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the 
Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 23. 
96 Yuanshi-Dili Shi元史-地理史 [The Yuan history- the history of geography] 
54 
The Yi people moved southward from northwestern Yunnan along with the 
expansion of the Nanzhao Kingdom. By the late 14th century in the Ming dynasty, they 
had become very powerful in the Yunnan borderlands, and began to threaten the control 
of the Nong (or Zhuang) people in southeastern Yunnan. In 1385, the Yi people ousted 
the Nong indigenous leaders in Fuzhou (current Funing county), and occupied the 
mountainous areas. 97 At the same time, many lowlands dwellers also left the plains and 
valleys of inner Yunnan to search for new homes in the mountains and borderlands 
because of the influx of the Chinese migrants. During the Qing era, more and more Yi 
people joined this type of migration, and flew into the mountains and the borderlands in 
order to escape the Qing military campaigns in initiating the gaitu guiliu policy. Hence, 
they occupied most of the mountainous areas in southwestern Yunnan. 98 
The Jingpo people in the Gaoligong Mountains in Dehong moved northward to 
Jiangxinpo near northern Burma, and integrated with the native settlers at the beginning 
of the first millennium.99 Their settlements were annexed into the Nanzhao Kingdom in 
the 7th century. Around the Ming and Qing era, some Jingpo tribes moved back to 
Dehong area after absorbing some other indigenous people into their communities. 100  
During the Qing dynasty, Jingpo population in Dehong had already surpassed that of 
other native settlers such as the De’ang, Bulang and Wa people, becoming secondary to 
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the population of the Dai people. 101 They moved from Guangxi to southeastern Yunnan 
in the beginning of the Yuan dynasty, and then moved further southward during the Ming 
dynasty and settled in the vast area near Vietnam. 102 
The Lahu people followed two routes to migrate into the Yunnan borderlands 
after the Mongols conquered the Dali Kingdom in the mid-13th century. Some of them 
moved southeastward and arrived in Jingdong, Jinggu, and Pu’er; others traveled 
southwestward along the Mekong River and arrived in Lincang, Lancang, Menglian and 
mainland Southeast Asia.103  When the Lahu migrants arrived in Burma, they named their 
new homeland with the name of their old settlements in the Yunnan borderlands. In fact, 
before the 7th century, the Jingpo people also named the high mountains in their new 
settlements near northern Burma with the name of the Gaoligong Mountains after the 
hometown in Dehong of western Yunnan. 104 
The Dai tribes and kingdoms in the Yunnan borderlands became the colonies of 
the Mongols in the 13th century, and native officialdoms were established by the Mongols 
to initiate indirect control. The Mongolian appearance in Yunnan brought opportunities 
for the Dai tribes’ military expansion.  The ambitions of the Dai political units was 
unchecked without the threat from previous regional powers that were wiped out by the 
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Mongols, such as the Nanzhao kingdom, Daili Kingdom and the Pagan Kingdom in 
northern Burma Consequently, the Mon-Khmer forces in this area began to shrink.105 
Geographic Settlements, Cultural Zones and 
 Economic Patterns of the Indigenous Communities  
 
From a two-dimensional view, the geographic locations of the indigenous 
settlements in mainland Southeast Asia included those in the coastal and inland zones, as 
well as those in the coastal-flat river deltas and river zones.  From a three-dimensional 
perspective, the indigenous settlements located at various elevations ranged from the 
plains to the mountains. Thus, mainland Southeast Asia and the Yunnan borderlands 
provided homes for various mountain settlers and plains settlers, as well as zones defined 
by their preferred agricultural techniques and economic patterns. Moreover, a 
congregation of different religious and cultural zones also can be found here, such as the 
Confucian Southeast Asia (Vietnam) and Theravada Buddhist Southeast Asia (Burma, 
Thailand, Cambodia and Laos).106   
In fact, the indigenous people’s choice on the location of their settlements were 
influenced by a variety of considerations, such as their religions, traditions, customs, 
climate and etc. The specific location of the settlements further determined and shaped 
the characteristics of the cultural and economic patterns of the indigenous communities. 
However, each individual religious and cultural zones, including the Chinese and Indian, 
were not absolutely exclusive. This vast area has the most diverse and mosaic religious 
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and cultural landscape, due to frequent interactions of different indigenous groups as well 
as intra-regional and trans-national migration.  
From a larger picture, the indigenous settlements in Yunnan borderlands and 
mainland Southeast Asia received the influences from China and India in varying degrees. 
The coastal areas in the east and south of mainland Southeast Asia were more effected by 
foreign cultures and religions due to the commercial and cultural exchanges, whereas the 
same degree of integration was difficult to find in relatively isolated inland areas.  
 Furthermore, John R McRae divided mainland Southeast Asia into two major 
regions: the region of the river systems and the coastal zone. The region of the river 
systems included the relatively narrow Irrawaddy/Salween zone (the Irrawaddy Zone), 
the Chao Phraya zone, and the Mekong zone. To the east of the Mekong zone lies the 
coastal zone, “which came to be controlled by states whose cultural and political 
identities developed in contact and competition with the Chinese to the north”. In the 
regions of three major river systems, Chinese influence was limited because the Chinese 
model basically was not an option for the development of the indigenous political units, 
such as Nanzhao and later kingdoms of Yunnan.107 
In fact, the relatively flat deltas of the river system in mainland Southeast Asia 
overlap the coastal areas as the narrow and mountainous ranges of the headwaters overlap 
some of the inland areas. This suggests that the influence from South Asia would be well 
retained and spread along the river system from the northwest to the south and southeast 
coasts. At the same time, the influence from China could be primarily spread from the 
northeast along the coastal areas as well as the river deltas where it was less difficult to 
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access. The relatively flat central and southern mainland Southeast Asia might have seen 
most frequent integrations and clashes of the influences from China and India, while 
other areas might be distinctively more “Indian” or more “Chinese”. 
During the early time of the first millennium, both Mahayana and non-Mahayana 
Buddhist inscriptions were found in the coastal and Mekong zones. Mahayana Buddhist 
elements could be found in the Chao Phraya and Irrawaddy zones. In fact, different sects 
of Buddhism were not distinctly recognized, and often mixed with together. Besides the 
influence of Buddhism, Vaisnavism, Saivism, and other Hindu religions were also 
prevalent in mainland Southeast Asia.108  
 “While some of the inscriptions at Angkor refer to Mahayana Buddhist doctrines 
such as sunyata, emptiness, there is only a single known inscription that actually quotes a 
Mahayana text in mainland Southeast Asia.”109 By the end of the first millennium, 
inscriptions showed that “a range of texts from various sections of the Pali cannon had 
been transmitted to Mainland Southeast Asia.”110 In fact, the Liang Emperor Wu of China 
(Xiao Yan, 464-549 AD) once ordered the translation of the Buddhist scriptures and 
requested translators from the Funan court in the late 530s AD. Although some of the 
scriptures among all the translated texts were certainly introduced from Southeast Asia, 
“there is no way to tell which ones!”111 
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During the first millennium “cities contained large brick temples, and smaller 
brick shrines located throughout the hinterlands marked localities with specific meanings. 
These monuments held sacred statuary, were sponsored by the region’s elite, and 
reflected a syncretism of indigenous and Indic ideologies. Buddhism seems to have 
predominated in settlements and regions to the west (in central Myanmar and in 
central/western Thailand), and Hinduism predominated in areas further to the east in 
central Thailand, Cambodia, Laps, and Coastal Vietnam. Yet the co-occurrence of 
Buddhist and Hindu deities and architectural styles throughout mainland Southeast Asia 
suggests a selective adoption of Indic ideas that did not precisely duplicate their origin 
areas in South Asia.”112  In the Mekong delta, “the Chinese considered Funan a great 
center of Buddhism, yet its pre-Angkorian statuary tradition is largely Hindu in 
content.”113 Although the indigenous political units in mainland Southeast Asia also felt 
the influence from China, they “chose to identify themselves as ‘foreign’ to its cultural 
realm.”  For example, the Linyi kingdom used a ‘barbarian’ script, possibly Sankrit, 
instead of Chinese, to communicate with the Chinese court in the late 3rd century. 114 
Also, ancestor worship and animism had a dominant role throughout all sorts of 
indigenous settlements in mainland Southeast Asia. Both plains people as well as 
mountain people, and both the coastal as well as inland zones more or less had the 
tradition and commitment to these two earliest forms of native religion. In the mountains, 
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people who practiced animism sometimes had rituals that were primitive and brutal in the 
eyes of the plains dwellers, such as human head hunting.  
Most of the Dai people in Honghe Prefecture believed in animism, and only those 
who settled three villages in Jinping County became devoted Theravada Buddhist 
believers. 115 In Lujiang area, the Chinese settlers in the mountains believed in Mahayana 
Buddhism or Taoism, while the Lisu people in the surrounding settlements were animist 
believers and were converted to the Catholic Church in the early 20th century. 116 
The Dai Native Officers in Xishuangbanna began to send sangha to the Bulang 
settlements to preach Buddhism in the beginning of the 16th century.117 Many Bulang 
people became Buddhist believers although animism and ancestor worship continued to 
play a significant part of their religious beliefs. More than ten kinds of ghosts, the god of 
the village, holy trees, fire, earth, god of water, Chinese bamboo rats, toads and both 
female and male ancestors  were worshiped in their daily life. 118  Besides that, the 
Bulang people learned to speak and write in the Dai language. They adopted the Dai 
calendars and followed Dai moral rules. 119  
                                                 
115 Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi Bianxie Bangongshi (红河哈尼族彝族自治州民族志编
写办公室), Yunnan Sheng Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi 云南省红河哈尼族彝族自治州民
族志 [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Honghe Hani and Yi People’s Ethnic Autonomous 
Prefecture of Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1989), 189-190. 
116 Cheng Ke (陈柯), “Lujiang Anfu Si- Xian Guangyu Kou Shu” 潞江安抚司: 线光宇口述 (The Native 
Officer of Lujiang: oral record of Xian Guangyu), in Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, di shi ji (Dehong 
Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑  (德宏州土司专辑 ) [selections on the historical 
documents of the Dehong Prefecture, or the special Volume on the native officers, Vol. 10], edited by 
Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1997), 288. 
117 Bulang Zu Jianshi Bianxie Zu (布朗族简史编写组), Bulang Zu Jianshi布朗族简史 [A brief history of 
the Bulang People] (Kunming: Yunnan remin chubnshe, 1984), 76-77. 
118 Bulang Zu Jianshi Bianxie Zu (布朗族简史编写组), Bulang Zu Jianshi布朗族简史 [A brief history of 
the Bulang People] (Kunming: Yunnan remin chubnshe, 1984), 70-73. 
119 Cang Ming (苍铭), Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the 
Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 168. 
61 
In Dehong, the De’ang people often cohabitated with the Dai. They were 
converted to Buddhism. Without their own written language, the De’ang people found a 
great convenience to read and chant Buddhist scripture in the Dai language. Moreover, 
the acceptance of the Dai norms promised the De’ang people higher social and economic 
status in the local community.120 The Wa people who settled in Dehong completely 
dissolved into the Dai and Chinese population by 1950s.121 The Achang people in 
Lianghe and Xiao Longchuan also have become Dai.122 
The co-habitation or co-existence of different indigenous groups were not 
necessarily permanent, partially because of the highly mobility of some groups. Besides 
that, people often moved together for mutual assistance, and also moved away from each 
other for religious and cultural conflicts.  For instance, the De’ang people gradually 
moved away from their native place in Longchuan as soon as the Jingpo people arrived. 
This withdrawal resulted from the De’ang people’s intolerance toward the Jingpo 
migrants’ tradition of animal sacrifice for ghost worship. As Buddhist believers, the 
De’ang people were reluctant to butcher animals, and they automatically moved away in 
order to avoid conflicts.123  In Ximeng, the Dai settlers were still found in 1940s, under 
the protection of a Wa tribe called Banqing. However they later moved to Menglian and 
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Mengsuo in the south when another Wa tribe called Yongbulao began to frequently 
attack their villages as human head hunters. 124 
Besides the religious practice and cultural traditions, migrants’ adaptation to the 
local climate was another major concern when they settled down. In fact, the majority of 
migrants who entered into the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia before 
the Qing dynasty gathered in the mountainous areas, while a small number of them 
settled in the lowlands. 125 Avoiding malaria and other tropical diseases that were spread 
over the river delta, valleys and plains was the primary reason that the mountains people 
chose to stay away from the lowlands.  
Malaria and other tropical diseases prevented a great number of migrants who 
were not native to the Yunnan borderlands from building their homes in the plains and 
valleys. In fact, the Di-Qiang, Miao-Yao and especially the Chinese migrants who settled 
in the Yunnan borderlands always moved from one mountain top to another, and rarely 
entered into the lowlands. 126 The Di-Qiang tribes were used to the cold weather in the 
north, and they naturally preferred the mountains where it was cooler and less effected by 
malaria.127 Over generations, indigenous people’s choice on the location of their 
settlements gradually became a habit. In his investigation among the indigenous tribes in 
the early 20th century, Eric Von Eickstedt discovered that “many Miao in taking to him 
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raised their hands in horror at the very thought of settling on the plains.” Eickstedt also 
pointed out that “the Miao, Fan and Chiang (Qiang) belong on the cold mountain heights, 
in contrast to the Wu-man (Yi) and Liao (Lao and Dai) on the warm slopes, with the Tai 
people in the hot, steaming valleys.” 128 
In Luxi of southwestern Yunnan, areas below 1100 meter’s elevation were always 
threatened by the highest death rate caused by malaria. Areas at 1600 meters’ elevation 
and higher were less effected, which attracted the Chinese, Jingpo and Lisu settlers. 129  
The Miao settlements were wide spreading from Guangdong to Yunnan and mainland 
Southeast Asia; all these settlements were also in the mountains. 130 The Hani people 
were found in the entire Yunnan borderlands and some other areas of mainland Southeast 
Asia, however only in the mountains.131  
In Mengmeng and Mengku valleys, outbreaks of malaria began to rise in summer, 
reached a peak in fall, and gradually disappearing by winter.  Only the Dai people who 
seemed to have developed the right immune system as well as medical techniques felt 
safe enough to dwell in the valley. Usually, people from other tribes would be infected 
and lost their lives if they stayed in the valley for a few days. Overtime, the surrounding 
mountains were crowded with non-Dai settlers who simply wanted to avoid malaria.  132  
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In the river deltas and valleys in Jinping of southeastern Yunnan, even the 
indigenous people had to move away during the late summer and early fall. 133  Most 
often, the rice paddies left by Dai people in the valleys remained abandoned because the 
new comers had great fear of contracting malaria at the rice paddies. 134 In Ruili, by the 
mid-1950s, the Jingpo people still would not stay long in the valley. The Lisu and 
Chinese people who lived in the mountains would not even dare to drink the water from 
the valley when they came down for the market day. 135 
People who dwelt in the mountains largely counted on the natural environment in 
order to survive, though their dependent relationship with the natural environment varied, 
depending on specific agricultural techniques. Many mountain communities in Yunnan 
borderlands relied on game hunting and food gathering, and put less effort in farming as 
well as the refinement of farming technologies. They seldom tried rice cultivation, and 
often used slash-burn and dry-land farming techniques to sustain food supplies.   
For example, the Kucong people usually chose a fine corner in the forests during 
winter when it was dry, and then chopped down all the trees. For small and medium sized 
trees, they were cut down from the height that was thirty to sixty centimeters away from 
the ground; and for tall trees, they were cut down right in the middle. After that, the 
Kucong people let the logs sit and dry until the following March. When March came, 
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they lit a fire according to the direction that the wind blew. The fire often started from the 
foothill, and began to encroach the dry logs. 136 Usually the newly burnt forests were 
called the virgin forest. A few years later when the trees and bushes recovered from the 
initial burning, the land became the juvenile forest. After the burning, no plowing was 
needed, especially on the newly burnt virgin forests, because the ashes of trees and 
bushes had provided a plenty of nutrients. Planting was also very casual. One person 
would dig small holes with sticks, toss the seeds in, and finished by covering the hole 
with dirt. 137 During May and June, some people might come back to the corn fields to 
pull the weeds, and some people never. When the corn plants began to ripe, the entire 
family would move to a shelter built right next to the fields, consuming while 
harvesting.138 Besides corn, they also planted wheat. When there was nothing to harvest, 
they collected fruits as well as vegetables during the dry season and stored them for the 
rainy season. Most Kucong families constantly face food shortage, and suffered 
averagely three to four months’ hunger each other. 139 
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People who relied on the slash-burn agriculture had to move periodically and 
frequently due to the speed with which the natural resources were exhausted. For 
example, some Yao, Miao, Lahu, Lisu, Hani and Kemu people moved every two to five 
years. Some Yao, Miao and Hani people might move every ten to twenty years. For those 
who settled in one place for a long time, they rotated the fields for slash-burning. There 
were also seasonal migrants who moved to different areas due to the seasonal natural 
resources they could obtain. 140   
For the Kucong people, the juvenile forests they farmed could only sustain three 
to four rotations. Each rotation had a farming period which lasted about three to four 
years, and a break period about four to five years. Usually they explored virgin forest 
while the juvenile forest was still under use or abandoned. In this case, they moved quite 
often within a small range, and then made a long distance move when all the juvenile 
forests were depleted. 141 However, there were also some Kucong families constantly 
exploited virgin forests, abandoned the land next year, and would never return. 142 
At the same time, mountain dwellers always tried to maintain their way of life and 
economic patterns by staying in the mountainous settlements.143  In fact, before the 
mountain dwellers moved into Yunnan, they had already been relying upon similar 
agricultural techniques. For example, some Di-Qiang tribes were nomads before they left 
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Northwestern China. The slash-burn agriculture was particularly popular among the Di-
Qiang tribes.144  The mountain dwellers would not easily change their agriculture pattern 
even when they moved to the plains. In Ximeng area, the Da Pingzhang valley (now in 
Burma) used to host the Dai people, the plains dwellers.  When the Wa people moved 
into this area, they drove away the Dai people. After that, the Wa people let the Dai’s rice 
paddies sit and never farmed on them. 145 
Usually those who relied on dry-land farming with slash-burn agriculture as the 
supplementary had more stable sources that sustained a stable life, and thus would 
develop a more sophisticated social structure. As a matter of fact, dry-land farming and 
slash-burn mountain people had to live on whatever was provided by the nature, and their 
interaction with the natural environment tended to be more adaptive rather than 
transformative. Mountain people learned to limit their acquisition, and keep a subtle 
balance between acquisitions from nature and contribution to nature in a long run. They 
preferred to grow native crops, and sometimes would save extra food as well as crops for 
trade. Mountain people were also interested in cash crops that yielded quick cash in order 
to relieve poverty. This became an important reason why opium cultivation became 
popular among the mountain people after the 1870s.146  
The plains dwellers, such as the Dai people, made up the majority of the 
population in the Yunnan borderlands before 1950s and had advanced into a higher level 
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in terms of agriculture, and social institutions. They were generally rice cultivators just as 
their kin tribes in mainland Southeast Asia. They hunted animals and gathered fruits only 
to supplement their food supply. It is very obvious that rice cultivation was not the 
specialty of the Chinese migrants. Thus, it seems to be very arbitrary to consider that the 
Chinese were the indigenous people’s sole origin of rice cultivation and diverse 
agricultural practices.147 In fact, considering the frequent trans-regional and intra-regional 
between southern China and mainland Southeast Asia, there was a possibility that the 
Chinese adopted rice cultivation from the mainland Southeast Asian influence.   
As rice cultivators, the plains dwellers were not only relying on daily farming. 
They also had some techniques that took the advantage of the natural environment and 
reduced the input of labor. One common technique was stamp-plow, which was still 
found among the Dai settlements in Yunnan as well as Thailand by 1990s. 148  These 
people farmed on wetlands that were stamped by elephants, deer or particularly oxen at 
present day.  The weeds in the wetlands were usually stamped into the dirt, which 
accelerated its decomposing process, adding more nutrients to the soil. Moreover, animal 
stamped fields were especially welcomed by those who were terracing in the mountains, 
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for the dirt became solid after being stamped by animals, which would prevent the loss of 
water. 149 The vast area of southern China, southwestern China, Vietnam, and southern 
Thailand were the areas where the stamp-plow technique first appeared. 150 In Yunnan, 
some of these stamp-plow wetlands were called oxen-stamped fields.151  
Another technique was bird-plow. Indigenous people who settled in the Red River 
and Xijiang River delta liked to grow rice on the wetlands that were grazed by bird 
migrating from the north.152 Sometimes, indigenous people also drove their poultry into 
the fields. While the poultry were digging, running, looking for worms and also excreting, 
the fields were plowed and fertilized.153 Some wet rice cultivators in southern China and 
Vietnam also used burn-flood techniques since the Western Han era. Burning was the 
main method for the burn-flood farmers to get rid of weeds. The process of plowing and 
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the cultivation of seedling were often skipped. Seeds were directly planted in the burnt 
fields. Fields were then flooded for irrigation and the preservation of nutrients.154 
From a vertical view in terms of the indigenous people’s geographic settlements, 
as well as their economic patterns, in southeastern and southern Yunnan, the Dai and 
Zhuang people settled in the river deltas, relied on rice cultivation, and lived in bamboo 
homes. The Hani and Yi people lived in the middle of the mountains, farming on terraced 
rice paddies, dinning on rice and grains, and living in brick and wooden homes. The Yao, 
Miao, and Kucong people settled in the cool and high mountains, relying on grains and 
living in very simple shelters.  
In southwestern Yunnan, the Dai, Zhuang, Chinese, and Hui people settled in the 
river deltas, plains and valleys that of 500-800 meters altitude. The Hani and Lahu who 
belonged to the Di-Qiang tribal system settled in the mountainous areas around 800~1200 
meters elevation. Jinuo people are found in the mountains of 800-1000 meters elevation. 
As for the people from the Bai-Pu system, the Bulang people were found in the 
mountains of 800-1300 meters elevation. The Wa people settled in lower mountains 
about 600 meters; and the Yao people were found in the mountains from 600 meters high 
to 1600 meters. The settlers in the river delta, valleys and plains were usually wet rice 
cultivators and skillful merchants. And the mountainous people often kept slash-burn 
agriculture, while growing grains like corn. 155 
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In western Yunnan, the Dai people and a very small population of Chinese 
migrants lived in the river deltas and the lowlands. In the mountains around 800~1500 
meters high, there were larger numbers of Chinese and the De’ang people. The Jingpo, 
and Achang lived in mountains from 1500~2000 meters high, and they grew rice and 
grains. In the mountains that were higher than 2000 meters, there were the Lisu people 
who were the last group to migrate in. 156   
The relatively unstable economic pattern, as well as food and resources shortages, 
prompted the mountain people to acquire supplies from the plains dwellers, and 
sometimes, even in a confrontational way. In Jinghong of Xishuangbanna, Hani and Yi 
tribes sometimes attacked the Dai tribes in order to gain more resources. As a result, the 
plains dwellers were chased away by the mountain people. Compared with the mountain 
people, the plains dwellers had more opportunity to be exposed to the influences from the 
Chinese, Indian and other civilizations. With such advantages, they often acted as the 
mediators between the mountain people and the outsiders at the market place.157   
Although there were differences between the mountain and plains dwellers, 
overtime, the integrating force of the growing inter-dependence between the lowlands 
and mountain cultures created local political and cultural hegemonies that were alien to 
the Chinese, and more akin to other mainland Southeast Asian communities.158 
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Sometimes, the distinctions between the plains dwellers and mountain people became 
blurred because of high level of mobility and integration between these two groups.  
First of all, many mountain people have proved to be seasonal migrants, who 
shifted their residence between valleys and mountains. They usually lived and farmed in 
the valley in spring, and then moved into high altitude mountainous homes to avoid 
malaria in the early summer. When the harvest season came, they moved back to the 
valley and stay until the next summer. Some of them owned rice paddies in the valleys 
but chose to live in the mountains. 159 Second, although mountain dwellers were reluctant 
to settle on the plains, a number of plains dwellers often escaped into the mountains and 
changed their life style. For example, wars and conflicts with the Mongols in the 13th 
century forced the Prince of Mengmao and his people to move into the Wa Mountains 
and intermarry the Masan tribes in Ximeng area. 160  When the Dong people moved from 
the coastal areas into the mountains in the corner where Hunan, Guangxi and Guizhou 
meet, they gave up rice cultivation and began to mainly rely on slash-burn agriculture. 
They also tried to keep limited wet rice paddies for rice as well as fish farming.161 
So far, it is clear that the distinctions between people were not necessarily marked 
simply by ethnic identities, or any single element that cross-classified people. Although 
indigenous people were different in many ways, they were closely connected and 
similarly shaped by common social, cultural, religious as well as economic institutions 
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and forces. Intra-regional migration, intermarriage, religions, wars, trade and other 
practices tied and integrated different ethnic or linguistic groups into several big 
homogenous groups.  Newcomers were indigenized, and their traditions were also 
absorbed into different hosting communities. At the same time, the indigenous 
communities were homogenized based on the commonalities they shared as well as the 
reconciliations they made in order to maintain their co-existence. Despite differences and 
political confrontations that never ceased to end in this area, the interactions among the 
indigenous groups gradually mold the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia 
into a dynamic unity, with considerable degree of similar cultural practices, mutual 
communication, acceptance, cooperation and interdependence. 
For example, when the Achang people moved into the Husa valley of 
southwestern Yunnan, they used to live along the slopes of mountains and were not 
familiar with wet rice cultivation. And yet, they did not totally separate themselves from 
other migrants such as the Chinese, Tai, Muslim as well as the Lisu. Usually, most 
Achang people lived in the same villages, and others mixed with the Chinese, Tai and 
Lisu, and developed close cultural and economic interactions with each other. Gradually, 
Achang people in the Husa valley became rice cultivators. Rice became their main staple 
food.  They also developed many common characteristics that were the same or similar to 
the Dai and Chinese. For example, they adopted the same or similar cooking methods 
with the Chinese and Tai living in the same valley. Both the female and female Achang 
dress style in Husa resembled that of the Dai. Sometimes, male clothing was similar to 
that of the nearby Chinese. The language of Achang absorbed many Chinese, Jingpo, Tai 
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and Lisu elements.162  Here, Chinese migrants gradually became Achang people. In fact, 
the Tusi of Husa were of indigenized Chinese origin. 163 Mahayana Buddhism and 
Chinese rituals became common in this area.  164 
Chinese blacksmiths in the military garrisons in Husa and Lasa passed their 
techniques to the Achang people.165 The Achang blacksmiths incorporated the Chinese 
techniques with their own cultural elements and began to produce iron tools that were 
loved by the Dai, Jingpo, Lisu, De’ang and even the Chinese people. The Achong long 
knives were particularly popular among the mountain dwellers. During the late Qing era, 
Husa became an area center of hand craft economy that was supported by a commercial 
network composed by the caravans, raw material providers from nearby towns, as well a 
broad range of consumers of various ethnic backgrounds.  
 In fact, by the 1920s, Achang ironsmiths still relied on the Chinese mills in 
Tengyue and Yongchang to provide iron materials, for they did not master the iron 
forging techniques. Iron materials exported into China became their major resources in 
the 1920. After the WWII, the Achang blacksmiths mainly relied on abandoned vehicles 
and iron gas pipes for raw material. At the same time, other mountainous dwellers 
provided them with charcoals and coals for fuels. Because of constantly food shortage, 
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food stuffs were transported in from Yingjiang and Longchuan. Usually, Chinese 
migrants were those who owned caravans and shops and some Achang people also 
engaged in the business.  Besides them, merchants and caravans from outside were also 
very active. Fang Wenming, a famous Chinese merchant in Husa had business in 
Burma166 that drew the seasonal Achang labor migrants.  An Achang merchant named 
Wengban opened his business in Burma and became the agent who introduced local 
Achang laborers to work in Burma. He owned a car and achieved great success as an area 
distributor of iron wares by the early 1950s.167  
In Jinghong and Menghai of Xishuangbanna, the plains dwellers, mountain 
dwellers and Chinese merchants formed a trading system that incorporated various 
indigenous communities, particularly in the 20th century before the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). The plains dwellers, such as the Chinese and Dai 
were mainly responsible for trade as well as the supply of salt, rice vegetables, fabrics, 
garments and pottery. The mountain dwellers, such as the Jinuo people, Bulang people 
and Lahu people, usually provided specialties from the mountains. The Bulang people 
always traded their bamboo utensils, tea and firewood with the Dai people for food, 
fabrics, salt, iron pots, felt blankets, needles and yarns. The Jinuo people traded those 
items with firewood, dye, chili peppers and tobacco. On the other hand, the Lahu people 
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mainly relied on opium to trade for their daily necessities with other tribes. Over time, 
frequent interactions among various tribes contributed to the emergence of many local 
markets, such as Gasa, Galong, Galan, Menghun, and Mengzhe. 168 Same pattern of co-
habitation and local market place also could be found in Zhefang, the Wa mountains, and 
many other areas throughout the Yunnan borderlands. Further in Chiang Mai, although 
settlers from different origins lived separately, the Chinese, Siamese and others have 
cultivated a harmonious environment to cohabitate and trade with each other. 169 
Through frequent corporations and confrontations, many indigenous societies 
have developed many common traits that bounded them together, as well as common 
grounds that they integrated with each other at a broad level. They spoke each other’s 
language, practiced each other’s religion, adopted each other’s customs, and lived each 
other’s lifestyle. This is not to argue the existence of a common Southeast Asian identity, 
for such a common regional identity never existed. And even a relatively narrower 
identity, such as the Yunnanese identity, would not come into being until the 20th century 
because of the mosaic ethnic and political landscape. However, the non-existing common 
regional identity does not deny the possibility of co-existing homogenous groups that do 
not conform to a higher level of collective identity.  
Admittedly, there were still many obvious differences between the indigenous 
communities, or even within the same group of the indigenous people. In fact, if two or 
three indigenous groups are randomly put together as shown in figure 1, the overlapping 
parts indicate those people who actively interacted with another group, and have 
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developed many commonalities. These people might not necessarily stand for the 
mainstream culture or occupy the core of the indigenous leadership. On other end, there 
are those who might not interact with people from another group at all, and thus might 
have kept their cultural traditions largely in conformity with the original way.  
Figure.1. The integration and alienation of different indigenous groups. 
 
 
Overtime, those who stay in the hot-spots of inter-group communication and 
integration gradually differentiated themselves from those who do not, causing the subtle 
cultural alienation within the same indigenous group. Nevertheless, there is still a clear 
line between different indigenous groups, which can be cultural, political or religious, 
and distinguishes them from one another. However, either the differences within the same 
group or between different groups would not essentially alien these indigenous groups 
from each other because of various bonds that tie them together one way or another. For 
example, in the 13th century, many Bulang people who settled in the lowlands to the west 
of the Mekong River in Yongchang Prefecture already adopted a lot of Chinese norms, as 
a result of frequent interactions with each other. They learned rice and bean cultivation, 
spoke Chinese and engaged in trade as most Chinese people did. On the opposite, those 
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Bulang people who lived in the mountains still relied on hunting, collecting, as well as 
tribal wars to obtain food. This situation did not change during the Ming dynasty. 170 
Traditional approaches that used to categorize indigenous people by their distinct 
identities such as that of tribes, kingdoms or nations overemphasized their differences 
and underestimated their common characteristics. Any discussion based on this 
traditional paradigm is inadequate, failing to explain situations such as the antagonistic 
segregation existing within the same ethnic group or harmonious co-habitation between 
two different ethnic groups. 
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CHAPTER 2    THE INDIGENOUS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
AND ITS TRANSFORMATION 
 
China’s effort to incorporate the indigenous societies into its direct bureaucracy 
has never been very successful until the establishment of the PRC. During the long first 
and second millennium, Chinese authority was slowly established in some areas within 
the range of the Yunnan borderlands, and frequently challenged and even overthrown by 
the local powers.  
The power and authority of the indigenous political units had their local roots. In 
other words, the indigenous societies did not need the approval of the Chinese or other 
colonial powers to establish a validate rule for their own people. The capability to obtain 
and monopolize natural resources was the key for the indigenous leaders to gain their 
influence. The structure of the indigenous authorities often overlapped with the leaders’ 
family and clan network. At the same time, secular authority was often intertwined with 
religious authority, especially Buddhist authority after the 9th century AD.  
In reality, limited resources and manpower as well as similar social structure 
determined that most of the indigenous communities heavily relied on trade and military 
expansion. Thus, cooperation with other local alliances as well as regional powers 
seemed necessary in order to survive or compete with peers. As a result, the indigenous 
people’s connection with China or other larger powers could often be a practical and 
deliberate choice rather than a loyal submission. On one hand, the power structure of the 
indigenous society and its aloofness from China determined that the upward circulation 
of the indigenous elites would reach its top within the indigenous society, and would 
never mingle with the Chinese domestic politics.  On the other hand, the indigenous 
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authority also shielded the penetration of the Chinese authority and prevented it from 
reaching down to the bottom of the local communities. This strong localism explains why 
the efforts to incorporate the indigenous societies into the direct bureaucracy of the 
Chinese empire always seemed feeble. 
And yet, China was not the only larger power that the indigenous political units 
could count on, especially after the 1850s when new colonial powers from the West 
entered in the Yunnan borderlands. Although sticking to the Chinese authority remained 
as the expediency for most indigenous communities, China’s offer of direct rule was still 
not a practical option. The indigenous authorities retained a relatively high-level of 
autonomy within the Chinese system. It was not until the establishment of the PRC that 
the power structure of the indigenous society was completely destroyed and the roots of 
the indigenous authority unplugged.  
The Power Structure of the Indigenous Societies 
 
In the Yunnan borderlands, the very basic societal structure of the indigenous 
communities was built on family and clan relationships, especially for the mountain 
settlements. More complicated social institutions might develop on this basis, and exact 
conditions varied, depending on the specific agricultural patterns.  
Usually, the rudimentary organizational structure were often found in the slash-
burn centered communities. The slash-burn practitioners usually drifted around and tried 
to avoid fierce competitions over natural resources.  As a result, the ownership of 
properties was not fixed, and it changed every few years. The population of each 
settlement was also very limited. People learned to pay respect to each other’s territory, 
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and automatically avoided the land that had been marked by others clans. Therefore, a 
very organized social structure that could sustain ad manage a large population seemed 
unnecessary. And at the same time, it was hard for a local authority to locate and organize 
all the “drifted” families and clans units into a highly centralized community. 
The patriarch of the family or the clan often became the head of these slash-burn 
indigenous communities who did not have distinct social hierarchies. Leaders were 
elected by the community members based on their prestige and reputation within a family, 
a clan, or a small village. For example, before the establishment of the PRC 
administration, the Kucong people in the Jinping area of southern Yunnan (currently 
identified as a branch of the Lahu people) were organized under the Ka. Ka was 
originally formed by three to four generations of immediate family members, with a 
maximum of twenty to thirty people. Most of the new Ka during the early PRC era were 
organized merely via marriage relationship.1 Members of each Ka worked together and 
shared food with each other. The patriarch of the family naturally became the highest 
leader, judge, and priest of the Ka.  His specific rights included but was not limited to: 
choosing the fields, coordinating farming and moving, listening and solving family 
conflicts, approving and disputing marriages, as well as organizing and conducting the 
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rituals and ceremonies for ancestor worship. 2 In southern Yunnan, the Lahu people in the 
mountains of Yuanjiang also only had a family or clan patriarch who organized farming 
and hunting.3  The Miao settlements in the mountains of Yuanyang usually elected the 
most respected senior male to be the village leader, who took charge of the sacrificing 
rituals, farming management, forest and irrigation maintenance, civil and criminal cases 
as well as the connections with other villages and tribes. 4   
As the indigenous settlements incorporated more dry-land farming and became 
more settled, they also became subjected to more centralized social structures. The 
functions of the indigenous leadership tended to be more diversified and specialized. In 
the early 1950s, the Yao people in Honghe of southeastern Yunnan were still governed 
by a collective village leadership, the Zhailao system, which was composed by a Zhailao, 
Zhaizhang and Danglongshi (the priest). The Zhailao was the ultimate leader of the 
village. Zhaizhang was the main administer, and Danglongshi was the highest priest.  
They were elected by all the community members, taking charge of all the economic, 
religious, political, economic and diplomatic issues. 5 In the 1930s, the Chinese 
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Republican government began to launch the baojia system in the frontier, and yet it did 
not change the social status of the Zhailao leadership in Yao communities. 6  
In fact, there were often more than one organizational systems within the same 
group of the indigenous people because their combined agricultural patterns. For example, 
the Jingpo people in Dehong had two distinct forms of social structure: the Kumsa system, 
meaning the old ways, and the Kumwong system, meaning the rebellions. The Kumsa 
system had a longer history, and was more common as well as highly advanced in Longxi, 
Luxi and Ruili. The less popular Kunwong system dominated in Yingjiang and a few 
areas.7  The Kumsa system initially emerged in the Ming dynasty and began to mature in 
the Qing dynasty. The history of the Kumsa system in specific Jingpo settlements may 
vary. Under the Kumsa system, the Jingpo people were governed by the Mountain 
Officers (Shan Guan). By the mid-20th century, some mountain official positions in 
Dehong area had been passed along for twelve generations, while some of them only 
lasted for five to six generations. 8  The less popular Kumwong system dominated 
Yingjiang and a few other areas. The Kumwong system was evolved from the Kumsa 
                                                                                                                                                 
志  [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Honghe Hani and Yi People’s Ethnic Autonomous 
Prefecture of Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1989), 193. 
6 Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi Bianxie Bangongshi (红河哈尼族彝族自治州民族志编写
办公室), Yunnan Sheng Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi 云南省红河哈尼族彝族自治州民族
志  [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Honghe Hani and Yi People’s Ethnic Autonomous 
Prefecture of Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1989), 194. 
7 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 
[The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai 
Yanjiu中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of 
China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou 
Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 56. 
8 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 
[The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai 
Yanjiu中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of 
China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou 
Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 111. 
84 
system, and was considered more advanced, in terms of land property and the rights of 
the commoners. The emergence of the Kumwong system was not clearly dated. But it is 
highly possible that this system appeared during the late Qing and the Republican China 
era when Jingpo people engaged in a higher volume of interactions and trade with the 
outsiders. In fact, by the early 1950s, many Kumsa communities were under the 
transformation into Kumwong communities.9 
The Kumsa communities had very strict social hierarchy that was based on the 
purity of the bloodline. All the members were segregated into three classes: the nobles, 
commoners, and slaves. Particular prefix must be added to people’s names in order to 
manifest their specific class status. Even ghosts were classified and specifically 
connected by different rituals. The intermarriage among different classes were strictly 
forbidden. Mountain Officers built temples in every village to symbolize their authority, 
and ordinary people were required to worship inside. Landed property was not allowed to 
be transferred, and only the Mountain Officer had the authority to distribute and re-
arrange the land property. Usually the youngest son was the only legitimate heir of the 
house. The Mountain Officer’s jurisdictions had clear boundaries, and divided the most 
of the Jingpo population into numerous segments. The trespass of the boundaries often 
caused military conflicts between different Kumsa tribes. In Zhefang County alone, there 
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were twenty-three Mountain Officers in the East Mountains, and forty in the West 
Mountains. In Longchuan, there were ninety-eight Mountain Officers. 10 
The Kumwong communities were free of the control of Mountain Officers. 
Community leaders were elected by members or sometimes taken by the wealthy families. 
The class segregation was not clear, and even disappeared sometimes. People usually 
worshiped their own ancestors. In general, in the Kumwong system, people had less 
restrictions but enjoyed the freedom to handle their land property, intermarriage among 
different social classes, no class-segregational prefix for their names, and all the sons 
were eligible as heirs of the house. 11  
Some of these mountain communities were also under the administration of other 
nearby indigenous political units, especially those highly organized and advanced 
indigenous political units on the plains.  In Xishuangbanna, the Miao communities were 
also ruled by the indigenous leaders in Mengla and Mengding.12 Before the establishment 
of the PRC, the Miao people in the Caishanping village belonged to the jurisdiction of the 
Tusi of the Hani people. 13  The Jingpo Mountain Officers submitted to the control of the 
                                                 
10 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 
[The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai 
Yanjiu中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of 
China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou 
Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 54-57, 78-94. 
11 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 
[The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai 
Yanjiu中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of 
China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou 
Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 53-56. 
12Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi Bianxie Bangongshi (红河哈尼族彝族自治州民族志编写
办公室), Yunnan Sheng Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi 云南省红河哈尼族彝族自治州民族
志  [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Honghe Hani and Yi People’s Ethnic Autonomous 
Prefecture of Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1989), 108. 
13Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi Bianxie Bangongshi (红河哈尼族彝族自治州民族志编写
办公室), Yunnan Sheng Honghe Hani Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Zhou Minzu Zhi 云南省红河哈尼族彝族自治州民族
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Dai indigenous leaders. The Dai Tusi often assigned their confidants to oversee the 
Jingpo settlements. New Jingpo Mountain Officers had to present gifts to the Dai 
authority, and as in return, they received a recognition letter from the latter. In fact, the 
control of the Dai Tusi often stayed at the nominal level. First of all, the Dai authority did 
not have direct contact with the Jingpo commoners. Second, the Jingpo Mountain 
Officers declared their loyalty to the Dai authority, but they rarely obeyed the orders and 
requirements from the latter. 14 
On the plains, a system that was similar to the centralized mountainous 
communities was possibly the earliest form of government until Buddhist authority 
arrived. John R McRae also pointed out that “the earliest forms of political organization 
were tribal chieftaincies, whose authority came from charismatic ‘men of prowess.” 15 
Besides that “the individual or at most family-based rulers exercised military power in 
part by their control of wealth and trade, which allowed them to win loyalty by the 
distribution of gifts and the delegation of local authority.”16 
                                                                                                                                                 
志  [The gazetteer of the ethnic minorities of the Honghe Hani and Yi People’s Ethnic Autonomous 
Prefecture of Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 1989), 109. 
14Quanguo Remin Daibiao Dahui Minzu Weiyuanhui Bangongshi (全国人民代表大会民族委员会办公
室), Yunnan Sheng Dehong Dai Zu Jingpo Zu Zizhi Zhou Shehui Gaikuang: Jingpo Zu Diaocha Cailiao Zhi 
2 云南省德宏傣族景颇族自治州社会概况景颇族调查材料之二  [Introduction to the society of the 
Dehong Dai and Jingpo Ethnic Autonomous Prefecture of Yunnan: the 2nd investigation report of the 
Jingpo people] (Beijing: Quanguo Remin Daibiao Dahui Minzu Weiyuanhui Bangongshi, 1957), 2, 15. 
15  John R McRae, “Comparing East Asian and Southeast Asian Buddhism”, in Chung-Hwa Buddhist 
Journal, Vol. 22, (2009): 97-124. 
16The kings of the Funan regime introduced above might be taken as an example of this style of rule, but 
their adoption of Chinese forms of administration meant they were able to establish a lineage that lasted for 
several generations- the next step beyond simple tribal chieftaincy. Subsequent centuries witnessed the rise 
and fall of numerous ruling lineages in various locations throughout continental Southeast Asia, the details 
of which need not detain us here. In the ninth century, however, a distinctly new stage of governance 
emerged with the formation of two powerful ‘charter states’, referred to in this way because they 
established memorable precedents that were often appealed to in later centuries. These were the kingdoms 
of Pagan (c.849-1287) and Angkor in Burma and Cambodia, respectively. Pagan and Angkor were both 
established in the ninth century, both entered their greatest phases of institutional brilliance in the eleventh 
century, both underwent crises in the fourteenth century, and both collapsed in the mid-fifteenth century. ” 
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In the Yunnan borderlands, Buddhism and animism were successfully 
incorporated into the local power structure at least since the 9th century A.D, especially 
on the plains and among the rice cultivators. Religious and secular authorities was often 
intertwined and inter-dependent. But the basic framework of the local power structure 
was actually more religious-oriented than secular. 
In Xishuangbanna, Baiba and Baisun were two major Buddhist sects, representing 
different values, life styles as well as relationship with the secular authority. Baiba means 
those who were from the forest. Baisun means those who were from the rice fields. 17 
This was quite similar to the general situation in mainland Southeast Asia where the 
distinction between the Buddhist schools was not identified as Theravada or Mahayana, 
but defined by a schools’ relationship with the secular society. 18 Generally, Baiba monks 
were dedicated ascetics, whereas the Baisun monks were more secularized. In the social 
and political centers of Xishuangbanna, Baisun monks were closer to the heart of the 
secular authority, and their temples were found in economically advanced cities and 
                                                                                                                                                 
See John R McRae, “Comparing East Asian and Southeast Asian Buddhism”, in Chung-Hwa Buddhist 
Journal, Vol. 22, (2009): 97-124. 
17 According to the ancient Buddhist legend, Baiba and Baisun originated from the same Buddhist master. 
Among his followers, there were three monks and one nun. When the night approached, they all rested 
under a big tree. Two of the monks rested with their back against each other; however, the other monk and 
nun rested facing each other. The next day, when the master proceeded into the mountains, and the monk 
and the nun were not allowed to follow. After the death of the master, the two monks who were allowed to 
study with him became the masters of the Baiba monks, and the monks and the nun became the masters of 
the Baisun monks. See Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu 
Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材
料 [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in 
Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 13. 
18 The distinction between Theravada Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism is more of a modern term to 
address the difference between different factions of the Buddhism. During the first millennium, there were 
mainly two models of Buddhism in Mainland Southeast Asia: “one based on the management of royally 
approved estates as ongoing religious and economic foundations, and the other based on the propagation of 
Buddhist religious values and ritual practices to communities of lay followers.” See John R McRae, 
“Comparing East Asian and Southeast Asian Buddhism”, in Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal, Vol. 22, (2009): 
97-124. 
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towns such as Jinghong, Menghan, Mengla, Mengwang as well as Mengpeng. The head 
Baisun monk of the Grand Buddhist Temple was the Grand Head Monk (Huba) in 
Jinghong area, and also the head of all the religious leaders in Xishuangbanna. 19  
The cooperation between the Dai secular leaders with the Buddhist authority, 
especially with that of the Baisun sect, established a stable political and social structure 
with strong emphases on civilians’ loyalty to both the secular and religious authorities, as 
well as their obedience to the moral laws.  Furthermore, the Buddhist monastic education 
provided a stable pool of social elites, the patriarchs, who led civilians to strictly follow 
the secular and religious rules. Not only Dai boys, but also Bulang, and sometimes Haini 
boys, left home at a young age of seven or eight to dwell and study at the Buddhist 
temples. When these boys grew to adulthood, they could choose to leave the temple or 
stay and advance to higher ranks of the sangha. For those who returned home, daily 
worship was a common practice. For those who decided to stay, religious dedication 
alone did not promise higher rank positions.  
In fact, the sangha’s relationship with indigenous leaders often became the 
deciding factor in their religious career. Monks needed a sponsor from the secular sector, 
                                                 
19 They both shared same Buddhist scriptures, but their ways of worshiping and chanting varied.  The 
Baisun monks owned beautiful temples, and frequently associated with secular society. They provided 
services such as removing ghosts and healing the sick. They dedicated themselves to persuading villagers 
for donation, from which they would take 2/3 as personal income. They owned servants who were usually 
lower rank monks in the temple. These servants as well as tenants worked on the private farms of the 
temple, and brought a fair amount of revenue each year. With multiple income resources, the Baisun monks 
also run business, owned horse farm and even became money loaners. Baiba monks originally built shelters 
in the forests, and then gradually moved to temples in the villages. Mendicancy was the only approach for 
the Baiba monks to keep the one-meal-a-day tradition, which lasted until 1960s in some areas. Usually, 
Baiba monks never return back to their families once they left home to become a monk. Both rivals had 
their own faithful believers, and yet, the Baisuns has closer connection with the secular leaders. See 
Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi 
Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao 西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation report 
on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: 
Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 11-14. 
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Bowo, meaning a father in the belief, who was capable of providing political 
endorsement, financial support, and the establishment as well expansion of the monks’ 
public and religious networks. Bowo played crucial roles especially when the monks 
returned back to the secular life.20  For higher ranking monks, such as Huba and above, 
only the indigenous leaders were eligible candidate to be his Bowo.21  For lower ranking 
monks, their Bowo could be any senior man in the family, or the village head. 
Furthermore, the promotion of higher ranking monks needed approval from the 
secular authority. Lower ranking monks were found in every village, but the population 
of higher ranking monks was very limited. For example, there were only four Huba 
monks in each Meng in Xishuangbanna. 22 New Huba monks were chosen by both the 
religious and secular authorities together.23 The ceremony of the new Huba monk’s 
                                                 
20 Li Wenhai, Xia Mingfang and Huang Xingtao (李文海, 夏明方, 黄兴涛), Minguo Shiqi Shehui Diaocha 
Congbian Shaoshu Minzu Juan明国时期社会调查丛编少数民族卷 [Compilations of the social surveys 
of the Republican China Era, the Volumes on ethnic minorities] (Fuchou, Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005), 
249.  Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji 
Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation 
report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: 
Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 11. 
21 Bowos were also responsible to prepare ceremonial clothing and devices that their monks needed. When 
a monk became a Huba, his expenditures became unaffordable for ordinary Dai families. In fact, as the 
Bowo of higher rank monks, indigenous leaders did not have to pay the bill out of his own pocket. Usually, 
the area council calculated the potential expenditure in advance. Later, in the name of the indigenous leader 
and the area council, an announcement of fund drive would be passed leaders of lower level of 
administrative units. Then, lower rank indigenous officials, such as the village leaders, would gather money 
from the civilians, who were also Buddhist believers. The area council would examine the fund when it was 
all collected, and then sent officials to purchase necessities for the ceremony and gifts as well. The quantity, 
quality, amount as well as the weight of the equipped items rise as the ranks of monks goes higher. What’s 
more, the items on the list are basic requirement, and the more the better. Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo 
(云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao
西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism 
and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 11. 
22 Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji 
Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation 
report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: 
Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 11-12. 
23 When there was a vacancy for a new Huba, the area indigenous leaders, Zhaomeng (召勐) or even the 
head of indigenous officials, Zhao Pian Ling (召片领), would hold a council to choose a new one. Current 
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promotion required the presence of both the religious as well as secular leaders, 
indicating the approval from both authorities.24 In reality, the Huba monks were often 
relatives or even family members of indigenous officers, 25which implied a high level 
concentration of the secular and religious authority. The concentration of both authorities 
maintained the stability of the aristocracy within the Dai communities.  
On other hand, the secular leaders also depended on the support from religious 
authorities to establish their legitimacy. The judicial authority of the Buddhist temples 
was superior to that of secular judges. Moral laws were also commonly recognized 
supreme, and higher than any civil laws. The highest-ranked monk had the authority to 
sustain the legitimacy of indigenous leaders even when challenged by the civilians. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Huba and other representatives from various temples and indigenous officials carefully examined the Huba 
candidates, who were knowledgeable and faithful senior monks with good reputation. See Yunnan Sheng 
Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de 
Diaocha Cailiao 西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料  [The investigation report on the 
Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi 
yanjiusuo, 1979), 12. 
Ironically, not many senior monks were willing dedicate their whole lifetime to higher rank sangha. For 
most adult men, receiving the candidacy of Huba meant more of a disaster than glory, and some of them 
might escape to other Meng and even foreign countries. In this case, when the new Huba was chosen by 
indigenous leaders and the religious council, it became confidential information to everyone. After the 
preparation, the indigenous leader sent representatives, one from the council, one from the village that the 
new Huba came from, and another one from the Temple that the new Huba dwelled, and greeted the new 
Huba with gifts. Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng 
Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao 西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The 
investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] 
(Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 12. 15. 
24 Ceremony usually is held on the date of the 15th on January, April, June or August. But on the 14th, 
celebrations has already started with drummers, fireworks, and peacock dance that last until the second day. 
Before the down, people are sent out to fetch all kinds of holy water, herbs, wood as well as beans. Pots are 
prepared according to the number of the new Hubas. Senior dressed in whites put all these holy items in the 
pot, boil them and make the holy water for the ceremony. All kinds of gods and ghosts are invited to the 
ceremony by setting up flags, and tablets with their names on. See Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省
历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao西双版纳
傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料  [The investigation report on the Theravada Buddhism and 
primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 15. 
25 Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji 
Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation 
report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: 
Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 15. 
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indigenous leaders who irritated the civilians often sought refuge in the Buddhist temples, 
relying on the head monk of the temple to appease the opposition and restore his 
authority.26 It was a tradition in Xishuangbanna that each year, at the Kaiguan Men 
Festival (December 15th, Dai calendar), lower level indigenous leaders swore allegiance 
towards their head leader in the Wanlong temple with the head monk present. 27 
The monks were exempt from the punishment by any civil law. For monks who 
committed crimes, they would be expelled from the temple before the civil judge became 
involved. The head temple and the head monks had the privilege of issuing exemptions 
from punishment to people who violated civil laws. It was common that some lower 
ranking indigenous leaders or nobles who committed crimes would secretly bribe higher 
ranking indigenous leaders and the head monks in order to avoid the punishment. After 
receiving the bribe, the head temples would dispatch high ranking monks to rescue the 
suspects or even prisoners. Monks covered the suspects or prisoners with robes to show 
protection, so they would be free from any trials or punishments.28 
Hence, the roots of the indigenous authority stayed within the indigenous society. 
Restricted to limited resources and population, most indigenous political units possessed 
                                                 
26 Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji 
Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation 
report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: 
Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 16. 
27 Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji 
Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation 
report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: 
Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 15. 
28 Yunnan Sheng Lishi Yanjiusuo (云南省历史研究所), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Xiaocheng Fojiao ji 
Yuanshi Zongjiao de Diaocha Cailiao西双版纳傣族小乘佛教及原始宗教的调查材料 [The investigation 
report on the Theravada Buddhism and primitive religion of the Dai People in Xishuangbanna] (Kunming: 
Yunnan lishi yanjiusuo, 1979), 15. 
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similar capacity on local control. Thus, numerous equivalent indigenous political units 
gradually sprouted in the Yunnan borderlands.                                    
Militarization and the Remedies for Local Competition 
 
It was not surprising that most indigenous political units largely relied on 
exchange and wars in order to seize more resources. As a result, they were often highly 
militarized and trade oriented. In order to adapt to the constant wars over on lands, wealth, 
and labor forces, indigenous communities trained their own militias, and developed self-
defense systems. Simultaneously, it was crucial to form alliances and gain support from 
regional powers in order to overpower their peers. Thus, the entry of the Chinese colonial 
power in Yunnan was not only the result of China’s one way expansion, but also of a 
deliberate invitation of some indigenous political units. Since the 19th century, the rise of 
the European colonial powers and the Japanese in the 1930s provided the indigenous 
people different alternatives outside submission to the Chinese. Although indigenous 
people’s attitudes towards these alternatives varied, depending on their practical needs, 
the alliance with the Chinese seemed to be for expediency.  
On the plains, the 13th century marked the large scale militarization of the Dai 
tribes. Silunfa, the Tusi of Mengmao, initiated military campaigns and annexed most 
indigenous tribes in the Yunnan borderlands into the Luchuan kingdom. Constant wars 
engaged not only the standing army, but militias composed of more than 80% of local 
civilians. 29  Militarization became a long-standing characteristic of the Dai communities.  
                                                 
29 Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi 
Shilve” 从勐卯果占壁到勐卯安抚司: 勐卯傣族土司史略 [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the 
Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in 
Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, di shi ji. (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑 
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In the early 20th century, it was not difficult at all for the Native Officers to raise all the 
capable men and organize a military force over a night or within a day. 30 
When the Jingpo people expanded into the plains of the Dehong area in the early 
15th century, they launched large scale attacks on the Dai and Benglong people. The 
Benglong people chose not to take the chance to resist the Jingpo forces. As for the Dai, 
on one hand, they cooperated with the Jingpo tribes, utilizing the Jingpo military 
expansion as a way to establish the Dai’s indirect control over other small tribes. The Dai 
tribes even set aside a specific area for the Jingpo Mountain Officers and allowed them to 
collect taxes. 31 On the other hand, wars between the Jingpo and Dai broke out often, and 
lasted for centuries. In the early twentieth century, the Jingpo tribes initiated a war 
against the Longchuan Tusi for three years. The Dai Tusi’s army burnt down villages in 
the jurisdiction of the Bangwa Mountain Officer.  A while later, the Jingpo people took a 
revenge. They did not hesitate but wiped out several Dai villages. 32 
                                                                                                                                                 
(德宏州土司专辑) [selections on the historical documents of the Dehong Prefecture, Vol. 10 or the special 
Volume on the native officers], edited by Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 
1997), 35. 
30 Li Zhengcai (李正才), “Tantan Situo Tusi” 谈谈司陀土司 [On the native officer of Situo], in Yunnan 
Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji 11Ji云南文史资料选辑 11辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan 
Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao 
Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 
1979), 73. 
31 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 
[The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai 
Yanjiu中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of 
China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou 
Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 141. 
32 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 
[The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai 
Yanjiu中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of 
China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou 
Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 139-142. 
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In the mountainous communities, conflicts over on wealth and land were frequent 
among the individuals, families, clans, villages and even indigenous leaders. Unceasing 
military operations were organized to seize oxen and land and to seek for revenge. In the 
mountainous Jingpo settlements, villagers were also militias whose major responsibilities 
included farming and fighting. Animist rituals were necessary in the military operations 
in order to achieve victory. 33 “After many wars, some Mountain Officers’ land expanded, 
some shrank, and some combined”. 34 However, the social structure of the Jingpo society 
still remained unchanged.  
Gradually, well-structured defense systems were developed, especially in the 
mountainous settlements. For example, defensive structures of the Wa tribes in Lancang 
of Western Yunnan served the purpose to protect their people from two for two major 
threats: first, constant wars with other tribes; and second, the notorious tradition of 
“Human Head Hunting”. Human Head Hunting was a common practice of the Wa people, 
which lasted until the 1950s. The Wa people cut off and collected their enemies’ heads to 
make human sacrifice, and pray for good harvest in the following year.35   
Among all the Wa tribes in Lancang, Da Masan was considered as the mother 
village of surrounding settlements. The Da Masan’s model of defense system, Awali, 
                                                 
33 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 
[The mountain officer system of the Jingpo People], in Zhongguo Nanfang Shaoshu Minzu Shehui Xingtai 
Yanjiu中国南方少数民族社会形态研究 [The study on the social structure of the ethnic communities of 
China’s south], edited by Guizhou Minzu Xueyuan Yanjiu Suo (贵州民族学院研究所) (Guiyang: Guizhou 
Renmin chubanshe, 1986), 130-137. 
34 Gong Peihua and Shi Jizhong (龚佩华, 史继忠), “Jingpo Zu de Shanguan Zhidu”景颇族的山官制度 
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became the standard for constructing new Wa settlements. 36 Da Masan were situated at 
the place of the highest elevation among all the mountainous Wa settlements, with the 
advantage to oversee the entire area. At its peak, Da Masan was the top authority for 
forty-five Wa settlements. The original Da Masan village was composed of three sections 
spreading in a fan-shaped structure.37 The village was surrounded by solid wooden fence, 
or thorns of three to four meters height.  Trenches were dug along the defense wall, 
wherein, sometimes, sharp bamboo sticks were placed. The village gate was closely 
watched by people who lived near the gate. Six drum towers were responsible for sending 
signals and stood as the icon of the village. 38   
According to the recollections of the elderly villagers from Da Masan, ordinary 
people had to equip themselves with long knives, iron javelins, crossbow, fire-lances and 
rifles. With an efficient military defense system to reduce the casualties and deaths, Da 
Masan dominated military confrontations with other villages even in the early 20th 
century. Militias from Da Masan kept the record for killing fifty-six enemies at the 
expense of ten people.  Da Masan was thus considered as the mother village of 
surrounding villages, and the Da Masan’s model, Awali, became the standards for 
establishing new Wa settlements. 39 
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Forming alliances was another effective way for the indigenous political units to 
overpower others or survive. On the plains in Xishuangbanna, it was very common for 
the Dai tribes to reach mutual military assistant agreements. Generally, these mutual 
assistant agreements had written forms that specified the liabilities that the indigenous 
political units, leaders and Buddhist temples committed to each other. Each of the parties 
was required to be honest and accountable. They also needed to respect, trust and care for 
each other. Mutual cooperation was essential to stay in the alliances. The violators of the 
agreement were usually fined a financial punishment (see, table 1).  
Table 1.  Financial Punishment for the Violation of the Mutual Assistant Agreement 40 
Close tribal cooperation undoubtedly existed beyond physical boundaries such as 
the mountain-plain division or national boundaries. The fact is that the physical boundary 
between tribes or even larger political entities, such as state, was envisioned differently 
by the tribal leaders as well as the tribal members. The complexity of the tribal 
understanding of the boundary was demonstrated by various choices as well as their 
shifting loyalty to different regional political powers throughout history. As the reward 
                                                 
40 Xibian Gongwei Diachaozu (西边工委调查组): “Xishangbanna Daizu Fengjian Lingzhu de Falv” 西双
版纳傣族封建领主的法律 [The laws of the Dai feudal landlords in Xishuangbanna], in Yunnan Sheng 
Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, di 11 Ji云南文史资料选辑第 11辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan 
Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao 
Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 
1979), 6. 
Rule/Fine 
liang, Silver 
Kingdoms Banna High Rank 
Leaders 
Lower Rank 
Leaders 
Buddhist Temples  
1 106,560 416 105 32 Wax bars 
2 7,140 416 70 6 Wax bars 
3 35,200  416 35 3 Wax bars 
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for their allies, the exchange of the tribal land and intermarriage were common. For 
example, the Native Officer of Xishuangbanna, Sanbaolidai, married a princess from one 
of the mountain tribes in order to consolidate his control. 41 Even during the 19th and 20th 
century, land properties were often transferred between the indigenous leaders of 
different tribes that belonged to two different states.  
The alliances and divisions between various indigenous political units remained 
local issues unless a serious threat towards the Chinese authority was posed. In the 19th 
century, the Tusi of Guangnan married his daughter to the Tusi of Baole whose 
jurisdiction was considered in the boundary of Vietnam. As a part of the dowry, the Tusi 
of Guangnan transferred his right to collect taxes from the Sanpeng area to his daughter.  
This caused border disputes between China and French in late 1880s when the two 
countries began to draw the boundary between Yunnan and Tongkin. The French claimed 
Sanpeng a part of Tonkin, whereas the Chinese believed that the property right 
transferred by the Tusi of Guangnan did not change China’s sovereignty and boundary. 
After a forty-day quarrel between the two countries, French took 90% of the Sanpeng 
area, and China occupied five villages. 42 
Besides the competition with other indigenous political units, there were frequent 
factional conflicts within the indigenous political units themselves over the position of 
the leadership. Therefore, gaining the support from regional powers seemed very 
practical not only for the indigenous leaders to dominate domestic politics, but also to 
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overpower their area rivals. Not surprisingly, their loyalty towards the regional powers 
was connected to their practical needs for survival and competition.  
The submission to regional powers, such as China and Burma, was a main option 
for the indigenous political units in the Yunnan borderlands. In fact, indigenous leaders’ 
eagerness to seek external support opened the channel for the colonial forces to enter. In 
order to obtain protection in constant tribal wars, the indigenous political units began to 
submit to the Han dynasty as early as the last half of the 1st century B.C. 43 At the same 
time, the Chinese also initiated policies to coerce the indigenous political units to join the 
Chinese empire, by the threat of its overwhelming military power or the reward of rich 
endowments such as lands, wealth and authority over the newly established colonies.44 
Five hundred years later, the politics among the Yi and Bai tribes in the Lake 
Er’hai area that later established the Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms was a continuation of 
such a pattern.  The difference was that China was not the only force that could extend its 
military and political influence in this region. They were challenged by the Tibetans. 
Likewise, the indigenous communities in Xishuangbanna also swore equal loyalty to 
Thailand and Burma after the 13th century. Chinese dominance was not reestablished 
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until 1910s.45  In the 1860s, Louis de Carne observed that the coexistence of “the Burman, 
Laotian and Chinese mandarins” in the same area was not a rare phenomenon. However, 
“as tributaries to two rival states”, the indigenous political units in Xishuangbanna 
enjoyed a considerable degree of self-government in reality. 46 
The Chinese empire provided several alternatives for the indigenous political 
units in The Yunnan borderlands: first of all, to become a part of China’s directly ruled 
frontier; second, to be indirectly ruled by the Chinese authority within the Chinese 
influenced frontier; third, to become a tributary of China. Within the Chinese frontier, the 
majority of indigenous people were still governed by their own leaders who submitted to 
the Chinese colonial authority.47 Li Fuyi pointed out that indigenous communities in 
Xishuangbanna were not reconciled to the rulers from China proper until the Mongolian 
armies conquered them on their way to northeastern Vietnam in 1296. 48  It is true that 
along the Yunnan frontier, Chinese authority initiated a dual system that combined direct 
rule in a limited area and indirect rule over the majority of the land. Historically the tusi 
system only had a history of seven hundred years when indigenous leaders were 
recognized as Native Officers and granted the title of tusi in the Yuan dynasty.49    
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Initiating direct rule over the Yunnan borderlands was always the preference for 
the Chinese empire, but this goal was not achieved because of the inability of access to as 
well as management of the frontier. Since the Yuan dynasty, indigenous leaders who 
cooperated with or forced to submit to the Chinese by threat or military forces were 
granted the title of tusi, meaning the Native Officer.50  
During the Ming dynasty, the tusi were classified into two types: the civilian-rank 
tusi and the military-rank tusi. Civilian-rank tusi oversaw the areas “where the economic 
infrastructure was productive enough to support a large bureaucratic staff, and where Han 
Chinese in-migrants had established sizable settlements alongside the indigenous 
population.” On the other hand, the military-rank tusi enjoyed a very high level of 
autonomy in the areas with fewer Chinese population.51  In the Ming period, 1,608 
indigenous leaders received the title of tusi, and 1,021 of them were in Yunnan, Guizhou 
and Sichuan, with a predominant percentage of military-rank positions.52  
In the Ming and Qing era, the attempt to transform the indigenous leadership into 
the direct administration by the Chinese bureaucracy, namely gaitu guiliu, was 
challenged by unceasing rebellions. The gaitu guiliu policy was originally initiated in the 
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Ming dynasty, and intensified during the Yongzheng era of the Qing dynasty. 53 
Throughout Yunnan, the Chinese armies encountered the indigenous resistance.  In 
northeastern Yunnan, more than 30,000 Yi people were slaughtered in a small town 
called Mitie. In Wumeng, Dongchuan and Zhenxiong, not only ethnic people but also the 
earlier Chinese migrants were killed by 20,000 troops led by Ortai.  A large number of Yi 
people escaped into the Liangshan Mountains in Sichuan.54  
 In the 1730s, in his report to the Yongzheng emperor, Ortai pointed out that the 
indigenous people were loyal towards Native Officers, not the Chinese authority. Another 
document from the Department of Military also confirmed that in southeastern Yunnan 
such as the Pu’er and Xishuangbanna valley where tropical diseases prevailed, Chinese 
authority was feeble, and the indigenous people were too difficult to “tame”. 55 The 
governor general of Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi stressed the necessity to keep the tusi 
system because it would be too difficult to station adequate Chinese troops in the Yunnan 
borderlands. Therefore, local Chinese bureaucracy had to cooperate with the indigenous 
leadership, through which the Chinese were able to maintain indirect control over the vast 
area of the Yunnan borderlands. 56 
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By the mid-19th century, the tusi system still dominated Nujiang, Dehong, 
Xishuangbanna, Zhenkang, Gengma, Shuangjiang, Cangyuan, Ximeng, Lancang, 
Menglian, Honghe, Lvchun, Yuanyang, Jinping, Malipo and other indigenous settlements, 
covering almost the entire the Yunnan borderlands. 57 Heavy taxation of the Chinese as 
well as the indigenous authorities often caused riots organized by both Chinese and 
ethnic civilians. The tension between Chinese authority and the Muslims as well as 
Chinese migrants and the Muslims intensified in western Yunnan. And yet more conflicts 
between the Chinese migrants and the indigenous people surfaced.  The newly emerging 
Chinese landlords’ pursuit of land annexation, in particular, violated the interests of both 
the indigenous people as well as the indigenous nobles.58  
For example, in the 1840s, the newly assigned Chinese official who oversaw the 
Jingpo and other indigenous people in Tengyue occupied a large area of land for his 
private farm, which irritated the Jingpo nobles. Soon many Jingpo Mountain Officers in 
Tengyue collaborated together and initiated a war against the Chinese official.59  
During the last quarter of the 19th century, as the European colonial forces rose in 
the mainland Southeast  Asia and gradually occupied the Chinese tributaries, the Yunnan 
borderlands was at the risk of being encroached upon. The British warred against with 
Burma in 1820s and 1850s, and secured its control in the southern lowlands. In 1885, as 
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the upper Burma fell into the hands of the British, Burma was entirely annexed into the 
British Empire in mainland Southeast Asia and South Asia.60   
In the same year, the French also approached to the Yunnan borderlands near 
Vietnam. Three years ago, they occupied Hanoi. From 1884 to 1885, the French involved 
in military confrontations with the Qing army as well as indigenous forces in Vietnam’s 
border with Guangxi and Yunnan. Its ambition to control Mengsuo, Menglai and 
Mengpeng in the Yunnan borderlands was frustrated by the indigenous resistance. At the 
same time, as the French took over Laos, it also annexed Mengwu and Wude, two 
indigenous Dai political units in Xishuangbanna near Laos. 61 The influence of these 
colonial powers challenged and surpassed China’s dominance in this area, which 
provided the indigenous political units another option better than the submission to China.   
Generally, the indigenous leaders’ attitude towards other colonial forces varied.  
Among two or three factions within one indigenous polity, those who received Chinese 
support and remained in power usually felt reluctant to accommodate to the new colonial 
powers. Not only would they organize resistant forces to fight, but also they sometimes 
actively invited the cooperation of the Chinese military to purge the new colonial 
influence out of their territories.  For example, in 1843, the British army fought the 
Jingpo braves in Longchuan, and suffered a loss of no less than 1,000 people. 62 Later, 
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when the Sino-Vietnamese border was initially drawn in the 1880s and 1890s, the 
indigenous people refused to submit to the governance of the French, and organized their 
own resistance forces.  
In Maguan, the French army engaged more than ten battles with a joint force of 
Miao, Yao, Zhuang and Chinese militia, and eventually gave up these lands for “it was 
impossible to rule”.63 Around the same time, after Wude and Mengwu were occupied by 
the French, the Native Officers and local Chinese landlords organized a resistant force 
that remained active for nearly two decades. 64 In western Yunnan, Dao Anren, the Tusi 
of Ganya, organized a joint resistance force including the Dai and Chinese troops, and 
launched military campaigns against the British for eight years.65  Numerous 
confrontations occurred between the indigenous and colonial forces after the mid-19th 
century and persisted during WWII.  In western Yunnan alone, various indigenous tribes 
organized the Zhanxi Anti-Japanese guerilla forces and remained active over a large area 
extending from Zhanxi to the upstream area of the Salween River. 66 
However, indigenous leaders’ cooperation with China did not suggest their deep 
loyalty towards the latter. There were cases that the indigenous leaders took the initiative 
to gain the support from the French or the British instead of staying under China’s 
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protection. The reasons that the indigenous leaders became reconciled to new colonial 
powers also varied. They might simply have cooperated in order to survive. Besides that, 
those who were not favored by the Chinese and lost power in the local factional conflicts, 
as well as those who were dissatisfied with the Chinese, tended to seek connection with 
the Europeans, or later the Japanese, in order to restore their authority.  
During the Panthay Rebellion (1856–1873), both French and British ambassadors 
tried to negotiate with the Muslim regime in Dali in order to resume the trade between 
Yunnan and mainland Southeast Asia in the 1850s.67  In fact, the Muslim caravans that 
stayed in active in the trade between western Yunnan and Burma were under the 
protection of the Dali regime. 68 In 1868, Louis de Carne received the permission from 
Dali to enter into Yunnan and even visit the city of Dali. 69 1870, Dali dispatched an 
ambassador named Liu Daoheng to visit Great Britain. After his return, Liu Daoheng 
proposed to Du Wenxiu to seek the assistance from the British and French in order to 
overthrow the Qing government. 70  In 1872, in the name of the son of Du Wenxiu, Liu 
Daoheng appealed to the British government for aid to Dali, and expressed the 
willingness to submit to the rule of the British. 71   
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At the same time, in order to fight against the Muslim troops, the indigenous 
political units in Simao of southern Yunnan received assistance from Burma as well as a 
good amount of European arms, including a musket from a Russian manufacture.72 
In the Pianma area near Burma, the heavy taxation of the Denggeng Tusi who was 
supported by the Chinese governor caused lower rank indigenous leaders to defect to the 
British. In 1910, two indigenous leaders Wu Jiayuan and Xu Linxiang persuaded other 
indigenous leaders to contact the British army in Myitkyina, declaring that Pianma was a 
part of the British territory and requesting the presence of the British army for protection. 
In response to the request from the indigenous leaders in Pianma, the British government 
later sent the Consul of Tengyue to Pianma for investigation. The Denggeng Tusi, 
Maozhao Tusi and Luzhang Tusi immediately reported to the Governor of Yongchang, 
and requested the Qing army to be stationed in Pianma area.  However, the Governor of 
Yongchang ignored their petition, and concealed this incident. Later, more than 2,000 
British troops arrived in the Pianma area. This incidendt further inflamed border disputes 
between China and Burma. 73 
In 1908, the Menghai-Mengzhe War broke out in Xishuangbanna because of the 
factional conflicts within the indigenous leadership. One of the indigenous noble named 
Bakangliang fled to Menggen and seek the protection from the British after he lost in the 
factional conflicts.  Around the same time, a local leader named Zaisan who was expelled 
by the Tusi of Damenglong in the first place, organized a military force to overthrow the 
                                                 
72 Louis de Carne, Travels on the Mekong, Cambodia, Laos and Yunnan: The Political and Trade Report of 
the Mekong Exploration Commission (June 1866-June 1868), (Bangkok and Cheney: White Lotus Co., Ltd, 
1995), 
73  Liu Bokui (刘伯奎 ), Zhongmian Jiewu Wenti 中缅界务问题  [The Sino-Burmese Border Issues] 
(Shanghai: Zhengzhong shuju, 1946), 43. 
107 
tusi, and then was pacified by the Chinese authority. In 1914, with the military supplies 
aided by the British supported Menggen authority, Bakangliang and Zaisan cooperated 
with each other, and entered into Damenglong to mobilize civilians to rebel. However, 
the Chinese authority soon pacified this revolt, and put Damenglong directly under the 
jurisdiction of Jinghong (Cheli), in order to closely watch the interactions between the 
indigenous people in Damenglong and the British across the border.74 
During the WWII, after the Japanese took over Mengmao, Tengyue and Longling 
in Western Yunnan in 1942, the Chinese authorities that were established at the county 
level in the 1910s by Republican Yunnan provincial government abandoned this area. By 
bribery and coercion, the Japanese controlled the indigenous leaders. Native Officers 
collected taxes for the Japanese authority. Japanese assisted the Native Officers to train 
their army, and also sent a language teacher to teach them Japanese. 75  
In fact, the specific situation might be far more complicated, and the indigenous 
politics often involved the conflicts of various factions of the Chinese, indigenous and the 
new colonial powers. The indigenous political units developed their own strategy, and 
often took the initiative to survive and even thrive under the influences of different 
colonial powers. Among different alternatives, the Chinese remained the best and 
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economic option, for it was conventional, and handy, and of lower cost (China had strong 
desire to cooperate with the indigenous leaders, making more compromises than the 
Europeans and Japanese).  For example, when China and French drew the boundary 
between Yunnan and Laos in the late 20th century, Mengxing became a part of the 
French-Annam. In 1914, when the Tusi of Mengxing had a disagreement with the French 
officials, he escaped back into Yunnan and asked for the protection of Chinese authority. 
With the interference from the Governor of Xishuangbanna, the Tusi of Mengxing and 
his families were relocated to Jinghong and placed under the protection of China.76 
In fact, in the Yunnan borderlands, China’s influence was restricted to the 
Chinese cultural islands that were based on the Chinese settlements and military garrisons, 
or as Chinese cultural belts that overlapped trade routes or military supply lines. The 
presence of the Chinese influence changed the political landscape in the areas that were 
directly under its control. Nevertheless, it did not change the dynamics of the entire the 
Yunnan borderlands as well as the Yunnan borderlands’ connection with Mainland 
Southeast Asia, but only added more diversities to the indigenous societies.  
The Chinese Way 
 
In the early 20th century, the indigenous political units in Yunnan might have 
developed a more distant connection to the central Chinese government than an indirect 
rule because of the prevalence of the localism and militarism. The nature of localism 
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during this time period was not substantially different compared with previous centuries. 
In fact, it developed into at least three faces especially after the 1911 Revolution: first of 
all, the dominance of the indigenous authorities who were aloof from both the central 
Chinese government and the provincial government; second, the unsatisfied and 
expanding local military men who became threats to the current provincial authority; and 
third, the independence or at least semi-independence of the provincial warlords of 
Yunnan from the central Chinese government. Thus the direct rule by the Chinese 
government needed to break through at least three layers of localism, in order to harness 
these local military forces. Consequently, conflicts existed and persisted at the central 
Chinese government level, the provincial level, and the local level.   
First, throughout the history, there were layers of local powers lying between the 
smallest indigenous political unit on the bottom of the power hierarchy and the provincial 
government on the top. Leaders of larger local powers were possibly supported by 
provincial authority, and thus closer to the Chinese bureaucrats. These local leaders also 
often acted as brokers between the provincial authority and leaders of smaller local 
powers. In fact, the intermediate area powers could possibly be indigenous77, and 
sometimes, indigenized Chinese (in an earlier time), 78  or actual Chinese officials, 
especially in the 19th and 20th century. Thus, the intermediate area powers actually 
“shielded” smaller indigenous political units from the penetration of the provincial 
authority as well as the upward movement of the indigenous people, acting as the de facto 
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ultimate local authority. As a result, this not only escalated the prevalence of localism, 
but also caused the emergence of aristocracy at the local level.   
As the representatives of the provincial government as well as intermediator 
between the indigenous societies and Chinese state, the Chinese governors had to foster 
close social connections at the local level in order to establish their authority. This made 
it impossible for them to stay out of the factional conflicts among the indigenous leaders. 
In this case, the Chinese authorities’ interactions with the indigenous leaders usually had 
two results. On one hand, Chinese officials who were less diplomatic and ambitious 
participated in indigenous factional conflicts that would escalate or trigger further 
confrontations involving other Chinese officials, Native Officers, and even the provincial 
government. On the other hand, those who were able to coordinate and balance the 
interests of different indigenous parties, regardless of political background, could easily 
manipulate the area politics and even establish the dominance of their own faction. The 
dramatic power struggles in the Xishuangbanna valley during first three decades of the 
20th century well demonstrated this pattern.   
In the early 20th century, Xishuangbanna was still under the jurisdiction of the 
Pu’er Prefecture that was established during the Yongzheng’s rule of the Qing dynasty 
(1722-1735).79 The twelve indigenous political units made up of the Mengs or 
Xishuangbanna were independent administrative units that were governed by their own 
tusi, who then submitted to the head tusi, or the Pacifying Commissioner residing in 
Jinghong (Cheli). At higher level, the Chinese governor in Pu’er only interfered when 
revolts occurred. Thus, the indigenous leaders at the prefecture level usually had no direct 
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connections with the provincial government, let alone the Qing court. The Mekong River 
divided Xishuangbanna into the north valley where Chinese migrants almost equaled the 
size of indigenous population, and the south valley where indigenous population 
outnumbered the Chinese.80  In 1908, the Menghai-Mengzhe Wars broke out because of 
the factional conflicts within the Menghai indigenous officials over the inheritance of the 
tusi’s position. Eventually, the war evolved into military confrontations involving the 
Pacifying Commissioner, indigenous officers, Chinese governors and merchants. 81 
Zhao Xiangyong, the Tusi of Menghai, married the princess of Mengzhe, and 
raised three sons in the late 19th century. Before Zhao Xiangyong passed away, he 
designated his younger brother Zhao Yamai to succeed his position. However, his 
nephews rebelled, with the additional support from their grandfather, the Tusi of 
Mengzhe. Zhao Yamai thus fled to Burma and found shelter in Kengtung. After a while 
he returned and reached a peace agreement with his nephews in the presence of the head 
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monk of the Grand Buddhist Temple in Menghai. However, he was attacked by the rebels 
the next day and escaped to Menghun. Later, with the assistance from the Tusi of 
Menghun and some old royal connections in Menghai, Zhao Yamai was restored to his 
power and resided in the Grand Buddhist Temple for protection. 82 
At the same time, the Pacifying Commissioner, the head of all the Tusi in 
Xishuangbanna, dispatched a military officer from Jinghong with 200 troops to Menghai 
to organize negotiation between the two sides. In fact, the Tusi of Mengzhe, the 
grandfather of the rebel leader, harbored deep resentment of the Pacifying Commissioner, 
because his lands were annexed by the latter years ago. Soon after the army from 
Jinghong arrived in Menghai, they encountered troops sent from the Tusi of Mengzhe and 
were defeated. As the Pacifying Commissioner’s army withdrew, Zhao Yamai lost 
protection, and had to flee into Burma again. 83 
 The Pacifying Commissioner immediately gathered all the other tusi at the 
Buddhist Temple in Mansa and discussed further military operation against the rebels, the 
Tusi of Mengzhe, as well as their new allies, the Tusi of Liushun and the Tusi of 
Dingzhen.  At the same time, the Pacifying Commissioner also sent messages to the 
Chinese governors in Simao and Pu’er, pleading for military intervention from the 
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provincial government. But there was no response. Later, the Pacifying Commissioner 
was informed by possibly a Muslim merchant that the governor of Simao had already 
become an ally of the Tusi of Mengzhe and the Tusi of Liushun and blocked messages 
intended for the governor of Pu’er. 84 This dilemma was solved when a Chinese merchant 
named Zhang Tangjie broke through the Governor of Simao’s blockade and delivered the 
message. Zhang Tangjie was a prominent Chinese merchant in Xishuangbanna. Zhang’s 
Burmese wife was the adopted daughter of the Pacifying Commissioner. Years ago, 
Zhang’s caravans had been robbed by an indigenous noble from Mengzhe. Therefore, 
Zhang Tangjie considered an opportunity for revenge. 85 
When the Governor of Simao was eventually informed about the rebellion, he 
mistakenly ordered the Tusi of Liushun and the Governor of Simao to organize the peace 
negotiation, having no idea about the divisions among his lower rank officials. After a 
very unpleasant meeting with the Pacifying Commissioner in Jinghong, the Governor of 
Simao proceeded to Menghai and joined the rebels. This triggered the beginning of large 
scale military campaigns that for years between the Pacifying Commissioner (the head 
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tusi), other Native Officers who subjected to the Pacifying Commissioner and the 
provincial army that involved in later. 86 
In January 1910, Ke Shuxun, a Chinese warlord originally from Guangxi 
Province, received the order from the Yunnan provincial authority to solve the conflicts 
in Xishuangbanna. About four months later, Ke Shuxun pacified the rebellion with his 
Guangxi army, assisted by indigenous troops, and the provincial army from Kunming. 
After pacifying the rebellion, Ke Shuxun hired an interpreter in order to communicate 
with the Pacifying Commissioner and other indigenous officials in order to establish 
direct Chinese administration in the Xishuangbanna Valley, which did not exist before. 87 
After the 1911 Revolution, the new republican provincial government continued 
to transform the indirect administration in the borderlands into direct rule, but at a slow 
and mild pace. The tusi system still dominated the Yunnan borderlands, and coexisted 
with the Chinese bureaucracy that was established by the provincial government at the 
county level. In order to gradually undermine the control of tusi, the newly founded 
Chinese Pacifying Committees only took charge of the local court, schools, business and 
police forces. The provincial government hoped that the establishment of these 
institutions would subtly transform the social environment of the borderlands into that of 
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the China proper. And in fact, these solutions did not provoke the antagonism of the 
indigenous leaders by dramatically change their social and economic control.88 At the 
same time, from the 1910s to 1920s, the provincial officials were otherwise occupied by 
their own factional conflicts, which allowed the local authorities a high level of autonomy.  
Ke Shuxun naturally became the General Administrative Director of 
Xishuangbanna, a new post appointed by the provincial government of Yunnan. This 
marked the beginning that the Pacifying Commissioner was not the sole ultimate 
authority of all the Native Officers in Xishuangbanna anymore, but had to share the 
authority with his Chinese counterpart.  With very limited control from the provincial 
government, Ke gained a considerable room to establish his followers. 89  In 1918, some 
Native Officers attempted to rebel against Ke Shuxun as well as his Guangxi officials and 
troops for their cruelty and heavy taxation. In fall of 1921, these Native Officers were 
invited to Kunming where they met Tang Jiyao, the governor of Yunnan. The provincial 
government granted these indigenous leaders military positions under the leadership of 
Ke Shuxun and the Pacifying Commissioner, and also instructed them to “listen and 
assist Ke to govern the area well, and not to violate (such obligation)”.90   
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In reality, Ke Shuxun turned Xishuangbanna into his own an independent 
kingdom.  Although Ke still received orders from the provincial government, he had the 
supreme authority in Xishuangbanna, and was eager to forge alliances in order to 
consolidate his control and also prepare his son to inherit his position the future. His son, 
Ke Xianghui, became the “adopted” son of the Pacifying Commissioner. After Ke 
Shuxun’s death, the Pacifying Commissioner and other indigenous officers requested the 
Yunnan provincial government to appoint Ke Xianghui as the new governor in 
Xishuangbanna. However no response was given and the governor’s position was left 
open for more than eight months.  Seeing this as an opportunity to control 
Xishuangbanna, the Governor of Pu’er placed his confidant Sun Tianlin in the 
governorship. 91  At the same time, the Governor of Pu’er had a major dispute with the 
new provincial governor, Long Yun. 92 Taking advantage of this, Ke Xianghui received 
the support from Long Yun to oust the new Governor of Xishuangbanna. The Pacifying 
Commissioner in Xishuangbanna made it clear that he wanted to stay out of the “the 
conflicts between the Chinese”, and he refused to cooperate with Ke. 93 Ke later 
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purchased weapons, gathered his father’s old troops from Guangxi, mobilized some Tusi 
to join his force, and expelled the governor in November 1928.94   
Over the following months, Ke Xianghui executed a few more Chinese officials 
in Zhenyuan County, Linjiang County and Jinghong County in order to consolidate his 
control. Three months later, after solving the disagreement with Long Yun and receiving 
the support from the provincial army, 95 the Governor of Pu’er occupied Jinghong.96  This 
marked the beginning of a series military confrontations that last for years.  
Localism also prevailed in the Dehong valley of western Yunnan, where Chinese 
authority had been feeble and the local aristocracy remained within the leadership of the 
Native Officers. The provincial government of Yunnan organized two new institutions in 
1911 in order to coordinate the indigenous affairs with the tusi. In March 1912, Li 
Genyuan, a provincial military officer, organized a conference in Tengchong, and 
attempted to persuade all the tusi in southwestern Yunnan to submit to the authority of 
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the newly established County government of Tengchong. Not surprisingly, Li was 
strongly opposed by the indigenous leaders.  
Indeed, the Pacifying Committee had become a nominal institution. It was tusi 
who still wielded the ultimate authority. In the same month, the Pacifying Committee was 
dissolved and replaced by the Administration Committee of Five District, with a very 
small impact on the tusi’ local control. In the following years, the committee chairs were 
replaced frequently, and all of them often requested the provincial government to grant 
them more control over the local politics as well as economy.97 
In the 1930s, the provincial government of Yunnan led by Long Yun established 
the First Colonizing Office in Tengchong in order to strengthen control over the Native 
Officers in this area. At the same time, the provincial government also initiated the baojia 
system in Yunnan borderlands, intending to tighten its direct social control. And conflicts 
did not stop but escalated between the local Chinese authority and the indigenous leaders 
because the latter refused to cooperate. In 1933, a Chinese official named Liao Bin 
proposed that the provincial government give life time stipends to the Native Officers, 
and remove their administrative and financial authority. 98 This proposal triggered more 
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quarrels between the indigenous leaders and the provincial government. The Tusi of 
Mengmao, Dao Jingban, pointed out that it was necessary for Native Officers to handle 
native affairs in the border area.  As a result, the Native Officers needed to keep 30% of 
the indigenous revenue for the use of the local Chinese government. 99 
As the provincial government of Yunnan pushed its control into the Yunnan 
borderlands, it also faced the military confrontations with the indigenous people. In the 
mid-1930s, more than two hundred militia men from the mountain villages in Longchuan 
attacked the provincial army stationed in the area, engaging in three days’ battles.100  
Second, with the ambition to overthrow and replace the current authorities, or at 
least expand their control, local military men sought for opportunities to rebel against the 
provincial government and local Chinese authorities as well. The majority of this type of 
confrontations were often caused by the factional conflicts and peer competitions within 
the Yunnan Army. This became more frequent after 1920s, when different factions within 
the leadership of the provincial Yunnan Army collaborated their followers at the local 
level and divided the military forces in Yunnan into various segments. 101  
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In November 1st 1911, led by the revolutionists from Tongmenghui and military 
men, Yunnan declared independence and established a militarized administration titled 
the Great Chinese Yunnan Military Government (Yunnan Military Government). 
However, the Yunnan Military Government was not the first regime that declared 
independence in Yunnan after the 1911 Revolution. A few days ago on October 28th, the 
Western Yunnan Military Government was established in Tengyue, and received the 
recognition from the British Burma. 102   
In 1905, the Tongmenghui became active in Tengyue of western Yunnan, and 
recruited people from various background, including local merchants, leaders and 
members of the Gelaohui (the Elder Brothers Society), soldiers from the Qing army that 
stationed in Tengyue, as well as indigenous leaders. Right after the 1911 Revolution, the 
Western Yunnan Military Government (WYMG) based in Tengyue became the first 
independent revolutionary regime in Yunnan. Zhang Wenguang, a local merchant who 
donated his assets to sponsor the Tongmenghui, was elected the governor general.  
 Soon, the WYMG dispatched armies to control other areas of western Yunnan, 
and took over Longning, Yongkang, Shunning, Yunzhou, Mianning, Yunlong and the 
jurisdiction of the Native Officers in this area. With the participation of the secret 
societies and defected soldiers from the Qing army, the total population of the WYMG 
army soon reached 30,000. However, this army was not under the unified command from 
the WTMG government in Tengyue. In early 1912, the WYMG army encountered the 
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Qing army in Dali that recently declared its loyalty to the new provincial government of 
Yunnan. The conflicts were not solved until the provincial government dispatched 
representatives to hold the peace negotiation.  Zhang Wenguang was granted the assistant 
governor general of Yunnan, residing in Dali and commanding the local armies in 
Tengyue, Yongchang and Shunning.103 
Overall, the provincial military garrisons that represented the authority of the 
provincial government were thinly spread in the Yunnan borderlands. Even by the mid-
1930s when the provincial army reached 25,000 including the militia units, there were 
only three battalions stationed in a few major cities and towns in the Yunnan borderlands, 
including Tengchong, Hekou, and Guangnan.104 This in turn, allowed the thriving of 
various local military forces including defensive forces controlled by local governments, 
armed gangs, secret societies, bandits as well as private armies and guards organized by 
local gentries. In fact, the provincial government required the local governors to organize 
and led their own standing armies and militia for the local security, crisis management, 
and supplement the provincial armies when necessary. Usually these local defensive 
forces were bounded to their own areas. However, this rule was not always followed by 
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the local military men. They also collaborated with the bandit forces and posed threats 
not only to the provincial government but local civilians. 105 
From May to August 1926, three local military officers of Yongbei, Baoshan 
rebelled against Tang Jiyao, the governor of Yunnan. In May, 1926, Luo Shuchang, a 
military officer who was stationed in western Yunnan to oversee Lijiang, and Weixi 
rebelled. This incident was triggered by Luo Shuchang’s dissatisfaction towards Tang 
Jiyao, as well as his disputes with Li Bingyang, Tang’s confidant who recently became 
his new superior. By May 1926, Luo Shuchang recruited a large number of local militias, 
bandits and gangs, assembling close to 10,000 troops. In August, 22nd, another military 
officer named Yang Zhenhuan declared war against Tangyao in Baoshan.  In August 26th, 
Yang Zhenhuan, a military officer who was stationed in Tengchong, declared 
independence. Yang Zhenhuan was also not satisfied with Li Bingyang, and at the same 
time had close connection with Luo Shuchang. These three military forces soon 
combined and reached a total population of more than 10,000 people. In mid-August the 
rebels fought Tao Jiyao’s provincial army stationed in Yongbei and suffered defeat. In 
the following months, the provincial army dominated the battle field and penetrated the 
rebel’s bases in Baoshan and Tengchong by December. 106  
The bandits, in particular, plagued almost everywhere in Yunnan after the winter 
of 1943 when a great number of military were gathered in Western Yunnan to resist the 
Japanese, as well as an influx of war refugees. After 1944, when the provincial 
                                                 
105 Yunnan Sheng Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui Bangongshi (云南省志编纂委员会办公室), Xu Yunnan 
Tongzhi Changbian Zhong Ce 续云南通志长编中册  [The continued Yunnan Chronicles, Vol. 2] 
(Kunming: Yunnan Sheng Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui Bangongshi, 1986), 3-7. 
106 Yunnan Jindai Shi Bianxie Zu (云南近代史编写组), Yunnan Jindai Shi 云南近代史 [The Modern 
History of Yunnan] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1993), 385-390. 
123 
government discharged all the guerrillas, militias, scouts and other self-defensive forces 
that were under the command of the 20th Corps of the KMT army in Western Yunnan, 
many military officers and soldiers became bandits, robbing the civilians and even 
attacking the government. 107These “floating” non-governmental military forces were 
often mobilized by those warlords who wanted to challenge the current provincial 
authorities. Later, they also became the targets both the KMT and CCP intended to recruit 
and tame during the civil war.  
Third, the independence, at least the semi-independence of provincial warlords 
like Tao Jiyao and Long Yun formed strong obstacles for the central Chinese government 
in incorporating the provincial government of Yunnan, let alone the Yunnan borderlands, 
as a part of a unified China. 
After the 1911 Revolution, Yunnan was independent from the control of the 
Beijing government. The Yunnan warlords recruited a large number of soldiers, and 
dispatched armies to aid the revolutionaries in Sichuan and Guizhou.108 Gradually, the 
Yunnan Army began to occupy Sichuan and Guizhou. However, Sichuan and Yunnan did 
not directly integrated into a unified Republican China, and instead, they were annexed 
into territory of the Yunnan warlords. In 1915, Yunnan became the base for the military 
campaign against Yuan Shikai. In February 1916, as the conflict escalated, southeastern 
Yunnan became the battle fields for conflicts between the Beiyang Warlords, Guangxi 
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Warlords and the Yunnan Warlords. 109 At the same time, the Yunnan Army traveled to 
Tibet. Thus, the degree that Yunnan warlords as well as indigenous leaders in Yunnan 
participated in Chinese domestic politics increased more than ever before.  In the 1930s, 
Chiang Kaishek relied on the Yunnan army to eliminate the CCP during the Long March. 
The downward penetration of the Chinese authority was halted as local forces in Yunnan 
moved upward and participated in China’s domestic politics, especially during the WWII.  
Taming Local Forces 
 
From the mid-18th century to the mid- 19th century, the Yunnan border lands had 
been plagued by unceasing military confrontations, ranging from large scale wars to 
small confrontations. Various military forces were constantly active in the Yunnan 
borderlands, such as the Tusi’s armies, provincial army, and warlords in Southern China, 
indigenous guerrillas, bandit forces, gangs, the private forces of the merchants, and 
towards the 1940s, the CCP’s militia and guerrilla forces, mobilizing the indigenous 
populations and bringing outside military forces into the Yunnan borderlands.   
An opportunity to settle the localism seemed to have arrived in the 1940s, 
especially after WWII.110 Both the KMT and CCP had their own blueprint for 
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incorporating Yunnan into a greater Chinese nation.  The attempt to harness, utilize or 
even tame regional and local military forces had been a major challenge not only for the 
KMT but also for the CCP. 
Basically, the Yunnan warlords and the indigenous forces’ desire to remain 
relatively autonomous violated Chiang Kai-shek’s determination to unify China. Chiang 
tolerated the existence of the Yunnan warlords as well as the indigenous forces so as to 
utilize them to oppose their common enemies, such as the Japanese and later the CCP.  
Before WWII, the Native Officers in the Yunnan borderlands led small militias 
that were lacking in training. In 1941 and 1942, the standing army of Yunnan led by 
General Lu Han withdrew from the south bank of the Red River when the Japanese 
defeated the French Army in Vietnam and Laos, and posed a major threat to 
Xishuangbanna. Facing the retreat of the provincial standing army, the Native Officers 
decided to organize a joint military force in order to protect their own land. After a brief 
meeting with Lu Han in Mengzi, indigenous leaders received Lu’s support for the 
expansion of their local military forces. Later, eighteen Native Officers who controlled 
the south bank of the Red River in southern Yunnan received military ranks from the 
Yunnan provincial army, and turned their troops into guerrilla forces that were under the 
overall command of the provincial army of Yunnan.111    
Taking advantage of the high mobility of people in the Yunnan borderlands 
during WWII, the indigenous forces were made up of troops from various backgrounds. 
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The expansion of military forces during WWII brought high conscription and frequent 
harassments of the local population. For example, the militia of the Tusi of Situo used 
troops from outside of their jurisdiction because local troops had too much compassion 
for fellow villagers and were unwilling to fulfill missions, like forcibly collecting taxes. 
Thus, gangsters and delinquents from Yuanyang, Guanting, Anpingmia, and Ayong 
Mountains rushed into Situo to join the army 112   
After WWII, Chiang Kai-shek seized the opportunity to separate the Yunnan 
warlords from their military power at the provincial level, and transform them into 
professional bureaucrats.113 Gradually, the provincial warlords who had shielded the 
indigenous leadership were removed, which allowed Chiang to exercise more control at 
the local level. This eventually opened the channel for the upward movement of 
indigenous elites.  When Chiang was in danger of losing mainland China to the CCP, 
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cooperation between the central and local forces was necessary. However, this strategy 
also dramatically undermined the Yunnan’s warlords’ local power and directly caused 
their defection to the CCP.  
In 1948, Li Chengxiang, who was then the Tusi of Situo, represented the ethnic 
minorities in Yunnan and attended the National Congress in Nanjing. After the meeting, 
Li Chengxiang was granted a position in the Pacifying Committee, with the responsibility 
of eliminating the CCP forces in Yunnan.  In late 1948, Li welcomed the 93rd Division of 
the National Army to be stationed in Sayi of the Honghe Prefecture. Later the Native 
Officers in twelve towns nearby organized a joint defense force in order to resist the CCP 
militia. 114 In the spring of 1949, the 26th Corps of the National Army also organized the 
Thirteen Joint Forces Defense Army led by Native Officers and Chinese landlords in this 
area.115 As the PLA gradually took over China, the KMT forces in Southwest China and 
Southern China fled into Yunnan and joined the indigenous forces before retreating 
further into mainland Southeast Asia.116  
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troops. The rest of the AASA entered into Yunnan from Guangxi, with the purpose of fleeing into Vietnam. 
Shortly after the AASA entered Yunnan, they were joined by more indigenous anti-CCP forces; in 
confronting the PLA army deployed from Guangnan. In the following week, this resistant force suffered 
deadly damage especially in the Battle of Tiechang where he lost 8,000 troops. By early May, this 
resistance force was eliminated. See Hu Xingyi (胡兴义), “Tiechang Zhandou”铁厂战斗 [The Battles in 
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Within indigenous military forces mobilized under the command of Chiang 
Kaishek, the CCP agents were also very active, not only along the Yunnan borderlands 
and Vietnam, but also in northeastern China where the Yunnan Army was stationed.  
Early communist organizations in the Yunnan borderlands were concentrated near 
the Sino-Vietnamese border as well as Tengchong County in Western Yunnan. The area 
along the Yunnan-Vietnam railway especially accommodated a considerable number of 
active Communist agents. In late 1948, the CCP also established bases as well as schools 
in the Ha Giang area of Vietnam. More than 400 cadres were recruited and trained in 
semi-military schools for the communist mobilization in Yunnan. 117  
The initial communist units were developed based on the communist agent’s 
social connections and family kinship.  The CCP was open and welcoming to any forces 
that were useful. The party gradually absorbed gangsters, KMT troops, students as well 
as government officials.  Although labeled as a party that stood for the working class and 
the peasants, in the Yunnan borderlands, the CCP had to cooperate with the traditional 
indigenous leaders and local landlords, and grant them high ranking positions within the 
communist organization. 
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For example, in early 1947, the CCP Pu’er and Simao Branch dispatched two 
agents to the Yixiang and Mengzhu areas of the Jinggu County.118  Under disguise, one 
of them appeared as a journalist and another as a teacher. With the help from relatives as 
well as students and teachers from the Mohei Middle School, these communist agents 
soon got in touch with many local patriotic intellectuals and a few local elites. In 
September, 1948, the CCP Mengzhu Branch was officially organized.119  By the end of 
the year, the CCP had developed military forces in Jinggu and a nearby town called 
Langcang.120  In January 1949, Pu Shipmin, a former KMT government official as well 
as the self-defense force commander of Jinggu decided to join the CCP and prepare for 
the military operations to occupy the county of Shuangjiang. In February, Pu assisted the 
CCP in recruiting a 150-man militia. In March, after the CCP militia occupied 
Shuangjiang, Pu became the vice director of the temporary military and civilian joint 
committee that oversaw the city of Mengmeng.121  
In the Daping area of Malipo County, Yang Xingguo, a local landlord was 
approached by the CCP agents in the late 1948. Considering the fact that Yang Xingguo 
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Shuangjiang Lahu, Wa, Bulang and Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin 
chubanshe, 1995), 864. 
130 
was the former governor of the three nearby counties, the communist agents invited him 
to join to United Front of the CCP and offered him the position of honorable commander 
of the local self-defense force. In the following months, the CCP received more than 20 
guns and food supplies from Yang Xingguo. After the establishment of the CCP 
government in Daping County, the CCP wanted to borrow more weapons from Yang. 122 
Although Yang was not eager to cooperate, he had no choice and handed in more than ten 
rifles.123 This incident made Yang lost his control in this area and resentful of the CCP. In 
the spring of 1949, Yang Xingguo not only resumed his connection with the KMT forces, 
who were secretly hidden in Wenshan, but  he also became an ally of anti-CCP forces in 
the South Mountain of Guangnan led by Nong Tingzhang. In the mid-June, Yang openly 
rebelled, and executed a few CCP cadres.  In late July, Yang’s forces were 
counterattacked by the CCP militia and surrendered in late September.  124 
Besides the work of communist agents, the CCP also began to form military units 
in the Yunnan Borderland. In 1947, the CCP Bianzong forces emerged as a hybrid 
standing army, guerrilla and militia force that actively engaged in military operations 
against the KMT. Before the PLA arrived in Yunnan in late 1949, they successfully 
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pinned down about five corps of the KMT troops and occupied fifty-eight towns.  Before 
the PLA landed in Yunnan in late 1949, the Bianzong forces successfully pinned down 
about five corps of the KMT military and occupied fifty-eight towns. 125   
The approaching CCP military forces caused panic among the public. 126 At the 
same time, the CCP agents hastened the pace to urge the KMT troops to defect or 
surrender to the PLA. With the cooperation of the local CCP agents, the propagandas 
from Yan’an swept through the KMT armies stationed in Southern Yunnan.127  Soldiers 
and officers began to consider and debate about the possibility of defection. 128 In 
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northeastern China where the Yunnan Army was stationed, more than one hundred 
soldiers and officers defected to the CCP each day by September, 1948. The total number 
of defectors reached 120,000 within six months. 129  On October 15th 1948, the 60th Corps 
defected to the CCP in Changchun, and was then reorganized as the 50th Corps of the 
PLA. This significantly undermined the Yunnan warlord’s powers. 130 At the same time, 
the 93rd Corps was also eliminated in Jinzhou. Thus, already unhappy with Chiang 
Kaishek for stripping his military power, Lu Han lost all hope of gaining his army back 
and was left with defection as the most expedient move. 131 
In the 1950s, the CCP carefully entered into the Yunnan borderlands and 
continued the project to bring the indigenous communities under the direct administration 
of the newly established PRC. The CCP initially approached the indigenous elites, and 
provided them a channel to participate in Chinese domestic politics as long as they were 
willing to share their social control with the CCP and eventually submit to the latter. 
However, the militarization of the Yunnan borderlands was not ceased. The 
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overwhelming PLA forces literally became the highest authority in Yunnan well into the 
mid-1950s, and served as the intermediary between Yunnan and the central 
government.132  The military power deeply penetrated into every social and political 
fabrics at the local level. 133 Frequent military operations to pacify the anti-government 
forces ensured the elimination of any non-governmental or non-CCP organizations.  The 
organizations that had connection with foreign forces or the KMT suffered deadly strikes. 
In the 1950s, the establishment of militarized state farms in the Yunnan borderlands 
continued a two thousand year Chinese tradition of border consolidation, and introduced 
a dual administration system to the Yunnan borderlands.  
Initially, the CCP dispatched cadres to Southern Yunnan, as part of the 
Southwestern Service Regiment, in order to win the indigenous population’s cooperation.  
Although the CCP cadres were of various ethnic identities, they were all seen as the 
“Chinese” in the eyes of the indigenous people. 134   The CCP initially connected the 
Native Officers, and through them, built further connections with the local population.135  
Before the socialist movement campaigns in 1956, the CCP relied on indirect rule to 
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maintain control over the Yunnan borderlands. The Native Officers were still in control, 
although at the county level communist governments had already been established.  
Usually the relationship between the PRC local government and the Native 
Officers was facilitated by the CCP Working Committees or Working Teams.136 The 
indigenous traditional leadership had various attitudes towards the CCP. A small number 
of indigenous elites misunderstood regional autonomy as meaning restoration of the Tusi 
system. Under such misconceptions, they were very active in cooperating with the CCP. 
However, the majority of the indigenous leaders became indifferent and suspicious 
towards the CCP, and some of them still believed that the CCP’s policy of ethnic 
autonomy had no difference with the indirect rule of the Chinese government during the 
Ming and Qing era. The indigenous leaders’ greatest fear was the elimination of the Tusi 
system and land reform. 137 Some ordinary Dai civilians thought that regional autonomy 
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meant that the Chinese would move out of Dai settlements. Others feared that they would 
not be allowed to donate to Buddhist temples any more.138  
On the other hand, some CCP cadres from the Working Teams were planning to 
completely destroy the Native Officer’s authority as part of the process of establishing 
regional autonomies.  They especially emphasized the rule of the people in the 
propaganda. 139 And yet, the prestige and the de facto control of the Native Officers stood 
in the way for the CCP to fundamentally unify the country. The existence of the Native 
Officers provided hope for the organization of the anti-CCP forces. The CCP also highly 
suspected that the Native Officers were the potential alliances with non-CCP forces, such 
as the KMT forces hovering along China’s border with mainland Southeast Asia, as well 
as the French and British powers that remained active in this area in the 1950s. 
Gradually, the CCP found ways to fundamentally uproot the power of the 
indigenous elites. By 1956, before land reform swept the Yunnan borderlands, the 
indigenous elites had already been separated from any effective social control that would 
enable them to form organizations or armed force that might threaten the CCP’s authority.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员
会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 21-22. 
138“Yunnan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Di’er Minzu Gongzuo Dui Minzu Gongzuo Gaishu” 云南省人民政府
第二民族工作对民族工作概述 [A brief summary of the work of the 2nd ethnic working team of the 
Yunnan Provincial government], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 45 Ji云南文史资料选辑第 45
辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi 
Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员
会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 22. 
139 “Yunnan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Di’er Minzu Gongzuo Dui Minzu Gongzuo Gaishu” 云南省人民政府
第二民族工作对民族工作概述 [A brief summary of the work of the 2nd ethnic working team of the 
Yunnan Provincial government], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 45 Ji云南文史资料选辑第 45
辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 45], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi 
Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员
会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 22. 
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In the early spring of 1950, as the PLA forces entered Yunnan, providing food 
supplies became the priority for the newly established provincial government of Yunnan. 
The province-wide effort at grain collection echoed the national movement, and triggered 
large scale rebellions throughout the province. By means of mandatary grain collection as 
well as the pacification of the anti-grain collecting forces in Yunnan, the CCP achieved a 
number of goals, including: the termination of the indigenous elites’ privilege of 
exemption from paying grain taxes, and the termination of the indigenous elites’ privilege 
of receiving grain taxes from the local population, thus reducing their monopoly over 
local resources. Consequently, the indigenous leaders’ monopoly over local resources fell 
into the hands of the CCP. Moreover, military operations against the anti-grain collecting 
forces in fact destroyed the anti-CCP forces, which were considered part of the anti-
“bandits” military campaigns in Yunnan. 140 
In 1950, Working Teams successfully converted the Native Officers in Mengmao 
in western Yunnan. Indigenous leaders gave up their military forces and firearms and 
were given government jobs, thus attaining a living standard that was slightly better than 
                                                 
140 For example, in the Wenshan Prefecture, the PLA engaged in nine battles with the anti-grain collecting 
forces from June 1950 to August, 1950, eliminating 65 people, injuring 24, capturing 60 and receiving the 
surrender of 270.  From September 1950 to November 1950, more peasants’ councils were held throughout 
Wenshan Prefecture, mobilizing 120,000 peasants to become the cadres of the party. This directly 
contributed to the successful collection of 27 million jin grains by the end of 1950.  In 1951, the Southern 
Yunnan Defense District particularly dispatched more troops into the Wenshan with Chen Geng as the 
overall commander. From July 1951 to September 1951, the PLA had 137 battles with the rebels, 
eliminating 25 groups of the resistant forces, killing 306, capturing 106, and injuring 975 people. In the late 
fall of 1951, more than 700 CCP cadres arrived to assist in the grain collecting, with the propaganda theme 
of “Anti-American and Aid the Korea”.  This time, they obtained 72.73 million jin of grains. At the same 
time, towards the end 1951, the majority of anti-CCP forces in Wenshan were almost wiped out.  By 1953, 
with continuing effort, the PLA had already eliminated 2438 people, captured 4425, received the defection 
of 8213, and re-educated 12,289. See Wenshan Zhou Dangqun Zhi Bianzuan Lingdao Xiaozu (文山州党群
志编纂领导小组), Wenshan Zhuangzu Miao Zu Zizhi Zhou Dangqun Zhi (03, 1927-03, 1996) 文山壮族苗
族自治州党群志 (1927.3-1996.3) [The gazetteer of the democratic parties of the Wenshan Zhuang and 
Miao Ethnic Autonomous Prefecture (03, 1927-03, 1996)] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2008), 
209-215. 
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before.  Some of these indigenous leaders were organized for tours and traveled around 
China, which significantly opened their perception towards life and politics. 141  
Generally, most of the Native Officers received a government position that was higher 
than their rank during the Qing dynasty and the Republican China era. The Chinese 
government issued special regulations to ban discrimination against the ethnic minorities. 
The indigenous elites’ social status as well as their public recognition in the Chinese 
communities as well as the domestic politics also exceeded that of before. Some of them 
were given the position of the governor or vice governor of ethnic autonomous 
administration. Some were selected to serve as officials at the provincial level, and some 
even served as representatives to National Congress, which seldom happened before. 
Those Native Officers who were willing to cooperate with the CCP were also given jobs 
and monthly stipends that were no less than before.   
Hence, the CCP skillfully increased the indigenous elites’ satisfaction with the 
political participation in a unified China. This proved to be a crucial step for the 
transformation of the local power structure along the frontier. It would be an exaggeration 
to say that indigenous leaders lost all power after the establishment of the PRC. In fact, 
many indigenous leaders and their families and clans stayed in power at the local level. 
However, the differences were that their authority was now given and sanctioned by the 
CCP, an external power, instead of being rooted in the indigenous society; they were 
                                                 
141 Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi 
Shilve” 从勐卯果占壁到勐卯安抚司: 勐卯傣族土司史略 [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the 
Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in 
Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 10 Ji (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑 
(德宏州土司专辑) [selections on the historical documents of the Dehong Prefecture, Vol. 10 or the special 
Volume on the native officers], edited by Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 
1997), 48. 
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separated from military control; and their social influence was also largely from their 
prestige within the local communities. The social and political movements initiated by 
the CCP would thoroughly destroy the soil that foster an independent indigenous power.   
At the mass level, the CCP eliminated the influence of religion and religious 
organizations. There were signs showing that some religious groups, such as the Yi Guan 
Dao, a Taoist sect, were unwilling to cooperate with the CCP and associated themselves 
with the former KMT military units.142 The removal of the local religious institutions 
proved to be an essential move to not only cut off the KMT’s connection with local 
civilians, but also to eliminate the possibility for the civilians to be organized by any non-
government organizations. 
The Southern Yunnan was swept by the anti-Yi Guandao campaign in early 
1950s. In Kaiyuan, all the 179 Yi Guan Dao service centers were dissolved. Seventy 
three believers claimed to have dropped the Yi Guandao. More than 52 leaders were 
executed or sentenced. Some of the leaders who were arrested collaborated with the 
government and provided channels for the government to catch more believers as well as 
leaders. 143  In Xinping County of the Honghe Prefecture, the government identified 37 
Yi-Guandao leaders, 121 service leaders, and 3,308 believers in December 1952.144 
                                                 
142 Yi Guan Dao appeared in the early 1940s in Yunnan and was gradually spread to the major cities and 
towns. In 1950, Yi Guandao failed to cooperate with the newly established PRC government and was 
charged for having with former KMT military units, and other anti-CCP forces. Some Yi Guan Dao 
believers hid the anti-revolutionaries from the PRC authority; and some believers spread anti-government 
rumors Li Zhengcai (李正才), “Tantan Situo Tusi” 谈谈司陀土司 [On the native officer of Situo], in 
Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji 11Ji 云南文史资料选辑 11 辑 [The historical documents of the 
Yunnan Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi 
Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会 ) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin 
chubanshe, 1979), 223. 
143Li Zhengcai (李正才), “Tantan Situo Tusi” 谈谈司陀土司 [On the native officer of Situo], in Yunnan 
Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji 11Ji 云南文史资料选辑 11 辑 [The historical documents of the Yunnan 
Province, Vol. 11], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao 
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The government also eliminated another Taoist sect named Qing Jing Dao. Qing 
Jing Dao appeared in Yunnan during the late 19th and early 20th century. Qing Jing Dao 
was accused to organize provincial-wide anti-CCP activities since 1946.145 
In Yuanjiang, the government arrested formal KMT official Ding Guangfu and 
Ma Wende, gang leader Dao Xinjian as well as more than ten people for organizing an 
anti-CCP religious group called People Believe in November 1951.  In 1952, the 
government identified nine major Taoist organizations with 230 members in Yunnan. In 
October, several leaders of these organizations were arrested and a small number of them 
went underground. In May 1953, the government mobilized civilians to report and 
denounce the Taoist groups as anti-government Taoist organizations, causing a dramatic 
decrease in membership. Soon, all Taoist organizations were outlawed in Yunnan. 146  
In the Xishuangbanna valley and Dehong valley, the Buddhist monks were 
required to receive secular education and attend patriotism workshops. Regular religious 
activities were discouraged and eventually banned.147 Thus, the religious authority was 
separated from the indigenous secular authority that was replaced by the CCP or has 
reconciled to the CCP.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 
1979), 223-224. 
144 Xinping Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Minzu Shiwu Weiyanhui (新平彝族傣族自治县民族事务委员会) 
Xinping Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Minzu Zhi新平彝族傣族自治县民族志 [The gazetteer of the Xinping Yi 
and Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1992), 13. 
145 Yunnan Sheng Yuanjiang Haini Zu Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xianzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省元江哈
尼族彝族傣族自治县志编纂委员会), Yuanjiang Hani Zu Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xianzhi元江哈尼族彝族傣
族自治县志 [The gazetteer of the Yuanjiang Hani, Yi and Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous Prefecture] 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993), 558 
146 Yunnan Sheng Yuanjiang Haini Zu Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xianzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省元江哈
尼族彝族傣族自治县志编纂委员会), Yuanjiang Hani Zu Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xianzhi元江哈尼族彝族傣
族自治县志 [The gazetteer of the Yuanjiang Hani, Yi and Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous Prefecture] 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993), 558-559. 
147 Chapter 4 engages a more specific discussion on this topic. 
140 
Furthermore, other policies such as land reform and ethnic classification also 
contributed to the termination of the 700-year-old Tusi system148. Land reform broke the 
commoners’ basic economic bonds with their local leaders. At the same time, ethnic 
classification eliminated and reconstructed the indigenous people’s group identities. All 
these strategies destroyed the social, political and cultural dynamics of the indigenous 
communities, turned the indigenous people into individuals of a socialist country, and 
reorganized them under the CCP leadership. While the indigenous authority was uprooted, 
the CCP followed the traditional Chinese strategy of the frontier consolidation and 
organized militarized state farms along the border.  
The state farm system was established in the early 1950s in Yunnan, with the 
mission to consolidate the borderlands like all the historical state farms as well as military 
farms that were organized in China’s peripheries since the Han dynasty.  Since the 1950s, 
Yunnan’s state farms received migrants from cities in and outside Yunnan. A great 
number of relocated farmers and soldiers dramatically changed the demographic make-up 
and the social organizations.149 At the same time, the increasing needs to accommodate 
                                                 
148 Yang Changsuo (杨常锁), “Cong Mengmao Guozhanbi dao Mengmao Anfusi: Mengmao Dai Zu Tusi 
Shilve” 从勐卯果占壁到勐卯安抚司: 勐卯傣族土司史略 [From the Guozhanbi of Mengmao to the 
Pacifying Commissioner of Mengmao: a history of the Native Officer of the Dai people in Mengmao], in 
Dehong Zhou Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 10 Ji (Dehong Zhou Tusi Zhuanji) 德宏州文史资料选辑第十辑 
(德宏州土司专辑) [selections on the historical documents of the Dehong Prefecture, Vol. 10 or the special 
Volume on the native officers], edited by Zhang Guolong (张国龙) (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 
1997), 48. 
149 For example, in 1959, 9,227 migrant workers were relocated from Hunan and arrived in Xishuangbanna 
valley. In January of 1960, these new comers were appointed to thirteen state farms. In October 1960, 12, 
712 arrived in Xishuangbanna and joined the state farms. Throughout the years, the family members as 
well as the friends of these workers gradually arrived Xishuangbanna to look for jobs.  See Xishuangbanna 
Zhou Nongken Fenju (西双版纳州农垦分局), Xishuangbanna Nongken Zhi 西双版纳农垦志  [The 
gazetteer of the State Farms of Xishuangbanna] (Jinghong: Xishuangbanna Zhou Nongken Fenju, 1998), 9. 
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the fast growing population caused large scale of deforestation and the danger of the 
depletion of natural resource in the Yunnan borderlands.150 
Not surprisingly, the Dai people were not the dominant population anymore as the 
makeup of the local population was quickly altered.  Over years, veterans, technicians, 
returnees from the overseas Chinese diaspora, the educated youth and relocated peasants 
of various ethnic backgrounds joined the state farms in Yunnan. In southern Yunnan and 
western Yunnan, forty state farms were established in twenty-eight counties and cities, 
occupying 1.96 million mu land and accommodating 290,000 workers. 151At the same 
time, state farms always stood as the model of higher level of technology as well as living 
and educational standards for the local people. 152   
As the scale and number of the state farms kept expanding under the state planned 
economic system, local people were gradually sucked into a common state-oriented 
economic, political and cultural sphere. Local populations were reorganized into different 
institutions that functioned as the appendix of the state farms so as to cooperate and 
satisfy various needs of the state farm bureaucracy, workers and their families.   
Ironically, the tradition of the militarization of the Yunnan borderlands did not cease 
when the CCP finally “tamed” the indigenous powers. The difference was that the local 
population was strictly organized under a centralized military system, instead of under 
local military authorities. Throughout history, the indigenous people were mobilized and 
                                                 
150 Judith Shapiro, Mao’s War against Nature Politics and Environment in Revolutionary China (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 182. 
151Wang Bin (王彬), Nongken Jianjie农垦简介 [An introduction to the state farms], the Yunnan State 
Farm website, 
http://www.ynnk.com.cn/detail_content.action?contentId=4dd2e65f40cc499eab447d1450daceaa, accessed 
on 02/19/2015. 
152 Xishuangbanna Zhou Nongken Fenju (西双版纳州农垦分局), Xishuangbanna Nongken Zhi 西双版纳
农垦志 [The gazetteer of the State Farms of Xishuangbanna] (Jinghong: Xishuangbanna Zhou Nongken 
Fenju, 1998), 3.  
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organized to serve the needs of local military powers.  After 1950s, the indigenous people 
were mobilized and organized to in order to fulfill the requirements and expectations of a 
vast Chinese nation. 
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CHAPTER 3   DEFINING THE BORDER OF THE TRADING EMPIRE: 
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES SHAPED BY TRADE AND WARS 
 
The Yunnan borderlands thrived as the corridor to connect China with mainland 
Southeast Asia as well as South Asia and was increasingly dependent on both sides 
particularly in the 19th and early 20th century. 1 It was about the same time that the 
boundary between China and the adjacent Southeast Asian states was drawn, when the 
European powers annexed China’s surrounding tributaries, and began to encroach on the 
Yunnan borderlands. The confrontation between China and the European colonial forces 
did not cut off the ties between Yunnan and mainland Southeast Asia. Regional and 
trans-national trade as well as migration acted as an overarching force that overcame 
confrontations and national boundaries. Cities and towns in the Yunnan borderlands and 
mainland Southeast Asia were closely connected. They formed a vast trading empire and 
thrived as commercial centers for regional and the international markets. Transnational 
commercial networks multiplied and expanded, moving laborers, merchants, 
commodities, and capitals around in the Chinese, mainland Southeast Asian and South 
Asian markets via the Yunnan borderlands.  
 It was not until the establishment of the PRC and the division between the 
capitalistic camp and the communist camp that Yunnan changed from a corridor of 
transnational trade to a remote cash crop cultivation base of the PRC political economy.  
                                                 
1 During the first millennium, the indigenous settlements in the inland and coastal Mainland Southeast Asia 
had already been connected by a transportation network formed by roads, river, seaways, and even canals. 
Some scholars believed that the ancient canal traces found in Satingpra area (peninsular Thailand), were 
more likely designed for transportation than irrigation. See Miriam T. Stark: “Early Mainland Southeast 
Asian Landscapes in the First Millennium A.D.”, in Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 35 (2006): 407-
432. 
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The drawing of the state boundaries in mainland Southeast Asia reflected power 
struggles among various colonial forces, not the agency of the indigenous people. As a 
matter of fact, the boundaries between states were often blurred or sharpened, especially 
when the confrontations of international powers were regionalized. The indigenous 
people suffered through the process and learned to adapt to the changes to their lifestyles 
and social relations as a consequence of the destruction as well as the traumas brought 
about by the interference of the external powers.  
A Trading Empire without Boundaries 
Before the 1950s, the connection between the Yunnan borderlands and mainland 
Southeast Asian states was hardly influenced by the newly drawn boundaries.2 Numerous 
big and small routes closely tied various regional and area markets in Yunnan to a broad 
transnational and trans-regional commercial network, especially after the late 19th 
century.3 Before the construction of the Yunnan-Vietnam railway, the route along the 
                                                 
2 During the first millennium, the indigenous settlements in the inland and coastal Mainland Southeast Asia 
had already been connected by a transportation network formed by roads, river, seaways, and even canals. 
Some scholars believed that the ancient canal traces found in Satingpra area (peninsular Thailand), were 
more likely designed for transportation than irrigation. See Miriam T. Stark: “Early Mainland Southeast 
Asian Landscapes in the First Millennium A.D.”, in Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 35 (2006): 407-
432. 
3 Among many regional trade routes, the Yinan Route and the Shendu Route (Hindu Route) were two well-
known land routes that connected Southern and Western Yunnan with Mainland Southeast Asia and South 
Asia. The records of these two routes could be found in the Chinese documentaries that dated back to the 
first millennium. The Yinan Route connected Southern Yunnan to Chiang Mai, and the Shendu Route 
(Hindu Route) connected Southwestern China to India via Northern Burma. The branches of these two 
routes, such as the Five-Feet Path and the Yongchang route, further involved China proper and other parts 
of Yunnan into a vast trade net-work.  Besides that, the Red River combined with caravans provided the 
most convenient access to the nearest sea port in coastal Vietnam. Lu Ren (陆韧), Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong 
Shi云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 
1997), 36-37. A thorough examination on the trade routes and their history see Xia Guangnan (夏光南), 
Zhong Yin Mian Dao Jiaotong Shi 中印缅道交通史 [The history of the Routes and Communication of 
China, India and Burma] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1948), 6-46, 57-62, 67-70. See also Yang Bing, 
Between Winds and Clouds: the Making of Yunnan (Second Century BCE to Twentieth Century CE) (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
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Irrawaddy River that connected Yunnan with Burma, India and Europe was considered 
superior to other routes in facilitate the flow of merchandise. 4 
In fact, scholars often neglected the fact that the expansion of Chinese as well as 
that of the indigenous regimes in this area also served the purpose of seizing the trade 
routes as well as the sea ports in order to control regional communication, trade, and 
politics. Military campaigns since the 1st century B.C., had aimed to establish garrisons 
along the “secret passage” that led to India via Yunnan in order to guarantee China’s 
smooth communication with South Asia as well as Central Asia. 5   
Throughout the history, whoever controlled this corridor and was open to 
transnational communications gained prosperity. However, such prosperity always 
needed the guarantee from a highly militarized local power to resist constant external 
harassments, and to harness the competition of various internal political and cultural 
rivals. The Nanzhao Kingdom was a good example.6 
                                                 
4 Louis de Carne, Travels on the Mekong, Cambodia, Laos and Yunnan: The Political and Trade Report of 
the Mekong Exploration Commission (June 1866-June 1868), (Bangkok and Cheney: White Lotus Co., Ltd, 
1995), 195. 
5 Prior to the 1st century, B.C., the Chinese connection with Central Asia was cut off by the Huns who 
occupied the Western Region. However, the appearance of the Chinese commodities in the Central Asian 
markets indicated the existence of another alternate route, and then triggered the Chinese curiosity.  Around 
the year of 122 B.C., China launched a military campaign in Yunnan in order to locate the Shendu (Hindu) 
Path that connected Yunnan to Northern Burma, India and Central Asia. However, the Chinese armies 
failed to locate the path and were stationed in the Kingdom of Dian for over a year. About ten years later, 
the Chinese army turned the Kingdom of Dian into China’s Yizhou Prefecture, and established indirect rule 
in this area by authorizing the previous indigenous king as the governor of Yizhou.  In a few years, the 
territory of the Yizhou Prefecture had expanded to Western Yunnan, and eventually reached the areas the 
Shendu Path passed through. Soon Chinese towns, Xitang (current Baoshan) as well as Buwei were 
founded, and Chinese migrants were relocated to settle there. Hence, the Chinese control over Western 
Yunnan insured the security of China’s communication with South Asia and Central Asia without the same 
interruptions that they encountered in the Western Region.  In the Southeastern Yunnan, the Chinese had 
built and controlled the area along the Five Feet Path, and along the Yinnan routes that led to Northwestern 
and then Coastal Vietnam. See Lu Ren (陆韧), Yunnan Duiwai Jiaotong Shi云南对外交通史 [Yunnan’s 
history of foreign communications] (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 21-25. 
6 Xia Guangnan (夏光南), Zhong Yin Mian Dao Jiaotong Shi 中印缅道交通史 [The history of the Routes 
and Communication of China, India and Burma] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1948), 40, 53-56. 
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Gold, silver, copper, jade, salt, tea, opium as well as labor were common 
commodities that circulated from the Yunnan borderlands to China proper, mainland 
Southeast  Asia, and South Asia as well.  Since the late 13th century, Chinese laborers and 
merchants began to gather along the mining areas in the Yunan borderlands and mainland 
Southeast Asia. 7 Small-scale area trade centers thus began to grow. The flow of capital 
and laborers became increasingly frequent especially when the Qing army finally pacified 
the harassments from the indigenous Burmese tribes in 1769. 8  These trade centers not 
only provided raw products for markets outside; they also processed raw materials 
shipped in from other places and sent the products back to those markets. Overall, the 
number of the migrant laborers in the mining areas outnumbered that of the merchants.  
The tea business particularly played a predominant role in trans-regional and 
transnational trade. Tea cultivation centers naturally became regional retail and trade 
centers, and mainly seasonal business migrants and small number of migrant laborers.   
During the Yuan dynasty, the gem mines in northern Burmese mountains near 
Myitkyina, Mogaung, Mongmit, and Mogok had already drawn Chinese merchants and 
laborers who wanted quick cash or big fortunes, despite of the danger of contracting 
malaria. 9  Further away to the east of these mines, Tengyue became a nationally known 
                                                 
7 Xia Guangnan (夏光南), Zhong Yin Mian Dao Jiaotong Shi 中印缅道交通史 [The history of the Routes 
and Communication of China, India and Burma] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1948), 64-65. 
8 Xia Guangnan (夏光南), Zhong Yin Mian Dao Jiaotong Shi 中印缅道交通史 [The history of the Routes 
and Communication of China, India and Burma] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1948), 2. 
9 Zhang Zhubang (张竹邦), “Dianxi Bianjing de Zhongyao Maoyi----Yushi Ye” 滇西边境的重要贸易----
玉石业 [The Jade business: an important trade in the border of the Western Yunnan], in Yunnan Sheng 
Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji, Di 28 Ji云南文史资料选辑第 28辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan 
Province, Vol. 28], edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiy Yunnan sheng Wenshi Ziliao 
Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 
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gem processing center especially for jade in the 15th century. 10 The governorship of 
Tengchong was considered one of the most lucrative positions in the country.  
During the Wanli Era of the Ming dynasty (1570s -1620s), local population were 
often driven to explore the gem mines by the government. The military officers and 
troops stationed in Tengchong area actively participated in business and farming.  In 
order to oversee the security of the jade business, the Ming government later regularly 
stationed more than 400 troops in Manmo, a town near Bahmo.11  From 1830 to 1840, 
merchants from the Shan tribes as well as the Kachin tribes also frequently brought 
ambers to Mogaung and traded with the Chinese merchants. The jade rocks that were 
shipped out from Mogaung were sometimes so heavy they needed three men to carry 
them.12  After the 1850s, more Chinese fled into northern Burma in order to avoid wars 
caused by the Panthay Rebellion, and also participated in the jade mining as well. They 
married indigenous Burmese women and Dai women and engaged in jade business. At 
the same time, northern Burma largely relied on the Yunnan market for grocery and raw 
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materials. Thus, jade trading for grocery and raw materials had become a common 
protocol for the merchants.13   
Table 2.  Jade Rocks Imported from Burma via Tengchong Custom14 
 1902 1906 1915 1917 1925 1931 
Jade rocks  
dan (about 50 kilograms) 
271 216 628 801 376 182 
 
In the 1920s, the British began to lease jade mines to the Chinese and collected 
taxes. In October 1929, fierce competition occurred among the Chinese merchants in 
order to obtain the leases, which in turn stimulated the British to raise the taxes.  Each 
year, the jade mines yielded around one million dollar’s revenue, with close to 200,000 
dollar’s taxes. 15 Before the outbreak of the WWII, there were forty-one jewelry shops 
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and companies in Tengchong, producing all kinds of jade jewelries for the markets in 
Kunming, Shanghai, Hong Kong and other areas. 16  
The silver mines in this area also attracted migrant workers from Guizhou, Jiangxi, 
Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan, causing a dramatic increase of Chinese population. The 
Chinese arrived in the Bowtwin Mountains of the northwestern Lashio in the early 1500s 
for silver mining. The local authority allowed the Chinese to mine and pay taxes, because 
indigenous people were not proficient in mining and alchemy. In the 17th century, no less 
than ten thousand workers and merchants from Dali, Yongchang, Jiangxi and Huguang 
relied on the Bowtwin silver mines for living. 17  
In the late 18th century, there were more than 40,000 regular Chinese workers in 
the Bowtwin Mountains. 18 Moreover, the Maolong and Munai silver mines in the 
Banhong area in the Eastern Wa Mountains opened in the 1740s, and accommodated no 
less than 20,000 to 30,000 migrant labors. By the year of 1751, the population of the 
Chinese laborers in the Bowtwin Mountains reached no less than 100,000. 19 
The mining areas were very highly organized and militarized, under the order that 
was possibly a mixture of military organization and traditional Chinese secret societies. 
Chinese laborers were responsible for mining and protecting the mines under the 
                                                 
16  Dong Mengxiong (董孟雄 ), “Kangzhan Shiqi de Miandian Huaqiao”抗战时期的缅甸华侨  [The 
Chinese diaspora in Burma during the Anti-Japanese War], in Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Xuanji Di 32 Ji
云南文史资料选辑第 32辑 [The historical documentaries of the Yunnan Province, Vol. 32], edited by 
Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Yunnan Sheng Wenshi Ziliao Weiyuanhui (中国人民政治协
商会议云南省文史资料委员会) (Kunming, Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1988), 322. 
17 Wu Fengbin (吴凤斌), Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese 
diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 178. 
18 Wu Fengbin (吴凤斌), Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese 
diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 180. 
19Wu Fengbin (吴凤斌), Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese 
diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 180. Also, Cang Ming (苍铭), 
Yunnan Biandi Yimin Shi 云南边地移民史 [The history of the migration in the Yunnan periphery] (Beijing: 
Minzu chubanshe, 2004), 170. 
150 
command of the mine owners. Many miners were very brave and good at combating.20  
In the early 18th century, Gong Liyan was the most influential Chinese merchant in the 
Bowtwin Mountains. In order to protect the silver mines, he cooperated with other 
prominent Chinese families as well as the local Shan indigenous tribes, and organized 
Chinese miners into military units. 21   
In mid-18th century, the Maolong and Munai mines encountered a series setbacks 
and eventually shut down in 1800. In Lashio, the Bowtwin mines were placed restrictions 
by both the Burmese and Chinese government. They were shut down in 1760s, and 
restored back to full function in the late 19th century when the British occupied Burma 
and reinvested in the mining business. From 1900 on, Chinese migrant workers gradually 
returned, mainly from Yunnan and Guangdong. During the WWI, Indian workers were 
also arrived to work alongside with the Chinese. 22  
Many Chinese miners married local Wa women, and raised their next generations 
in the War norms. 23 When opium cultivation became popular in the Wa Mountains in the 
19th century, Chinese migrants once again moved back to facilitate the trade. 24  Besides 
that, the sugar plantations in the Wa Mountains of northern Burma produced the raw 
sugar whose quality was as good as the best raw sugars from Cuba. 25  
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In the late 1870s, the Burmese independent movement and the corresponding 
chaos hampered the British trade in Burma. In the mid-1880s, the British tried to put an 
end to the Burmese rebellions, and initiated a larger scale of trade with China via 
Yunnan.26 In 1884, Britain and China sighed the first convention that ensured the British 
exertion of a greater level control in Burma. In 1890, the British established a consul in 
Tengyue. In 1894, the two sides signed a treaty to regulate the Sino-Burmese trade, 
which opened a free overland trade period for six years. After that, China had the right to 
apply the general tariff of the Chinese Maritime Customs.27 In 1897, China and Britain 
signed a treaty to ensure the smooth flow of the cross-border mining business. It was 
agreed that the Irrawaddy River should be freely opened for ships coming in and out of 
Yunnan.28 In the next a few years, Western Yunnan’s connection with the transnational 
trading network in Burma was accelerated as the railways that connected Myitkyina, 
Lashio, and Rangoon were constructed.29 Even remote areas in western Yunnan 
increasingly involved in trans-regional and trans-national trade since the late 19th century. 
For example, a small town called Longling became the transition center for commodities 
to travel either to Yongchang or Tengyue.30  
In the southeastern Yunnan, Chinese migrants also arrived for copper, silver, and 
salt mining after the Mid-Qing era. In Jinping County of southeastern Yunnan, the silver 
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mines had been exploited by the Yi people since the first millennium. During the Ming 
and Qing era, silver mining in Jinping attracted not only the local Yi people, but also 
Chinese and Muslim workers who brought new silver forging and jewelry making skills. 
31 By 1850s, there were seven silver mines that were open. 32  
Across the border in Northern Vietnam, the Chinese laborers were recruited by 
the Vietnamese authority for gold, silver, copper and tin mining in the early 18th 
century.33 Before the Panthay Rebellion, “there was a good deal of commerce, especially 
in metals, between Yunnan and Tonkin.”34  Zinc, one of the most important metal for 
exports, was used by the Vietnamese to manufacture the sapeques.  Caravans from 
Yunnan brought Zinc to the markets in Tonkin and trade for silver. This trade was 
seriously affected by the Muslim wars, but was not completely ceased. 35 
Besides, gold mines were also found across the Yunnan borderlands, mainly 
along the Irrawaddy River, Mekong River and Red River. Chinese miners periodically 
arrived to look for gold since the 12th century. In Yunnan’s peripheries, major gold mines 
were located in Tengchong, Wenshan, Mojiang, Yuanyang and Baoshan. The first wave 
of the gold rush appeared after the mid-17th century. Another wave was triggered during 
the WWII era. From 1939 to 1940, more than twenty merchants and companies requested 
                                                 
31 Xinping Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Minzu Shiwu Weiyanhui (新平彝族傣族自治县民族事务委员会) 
Xinping Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Minzu Zhi新平彝族傣族自治县民族志 [The gazetteer of the Xinping Yi 
and Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1992), 72. 
32 Xinping Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Minzu Shiwu Weiyanhui (新平彝族傣族自治县民族事务委员会) 
Xinping Yi Zu Dai Zu Zizhi Xian Minzu Zhi新平彝族傣族自治县民族志 [The gazetteer of the Xinping Yi 
and Dai People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1992), 74-75 
33 Wu Fengbin (吴凤斌), Dongnan Ya Huaqiao Tongshi 东南亚华侨通史 [The history of the Chinese 
diaspora in Southeast Asia] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 84. 
34 Louis de Carne, Travels on the Mekong, Cambodia, Laos and Yunnan: The Political and Trade Report of 
the Mekong Exploration Commission (June 1866-June 1868) (Bangkok and Cheney: White Lotus Co., Ltd, 
1995), 248. 
35See Louis de Carne, Travels on the Mekong, Cambodia, Laos and Yunnan: The Political and Trade 
Report of the Mekong Exploration Commission (June 1866-June 1868) (Bangkok and Cheney: White Lotus 
Co., Ltd, 1995), 248 
153 
the Yunnan government to open gold mines, including Mengzi, Maguan, Jianshui, 
Mojiang, Jinping and Pingbian in the borderlands. From 1938 to 1939, gold mines yield 
170,000 liang, making 1/15 of the total gold production of China that year. 36 
Facilitated by the tea business, towns in southern Yunnan including Simao, Yiwu, 
Menghai, Jinghong, Mengzhe, as well as Jinggu became regional and area center for the 
tea trade and retail in Pu’er and Xishuangbanna. The tea from Jiangcheng and Yiwu was 
very popular in Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines. 37 Merchants from 
Jiangxi, Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangdong and Guangxi province brought foodstuffs 
and cotton to Simao. Yunnan merchants were often from inner towns such as Shiping, 
Jianshui, Tonghai, Hexi and Yuxi. The Merchants Association of Shiping owned the 
biggest building among all the merchants’ associations in Simao. Merchants from 
Shiping also monopolized most tea shops and factories. 38 
Simao reached its peak as a regional business center from the 18th to the mid-19th 
century, but lost its advantage during the Panthay Rebellion (1856-1873). However, even 
during this period, the market in Simao was still of a good size with commodities from 
both China and Burma.39 The caravans did not fail to come in spite of wars. 40 Simao 
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gained a brief recovery when the Simao customs began to function after the Sino-French 
War in late 1880s. However, soon the spread of malaria in 1900 gave Simao a deadly 
blow, and the prosperity of the Simao city was not resumed until the late 1910s. 41 
The golden age for the tea merchants in Simao finally arrived in the 1920s. The 
Heng Yuan Hao tea company sold more than 1,700 dan various kinds of tea in the year of 
1920. From the fall of 1920 to the spring of 1921, merchants and their caravans rushed to 
Simao, with thousands of mules and horses coming in and out of the city daily. In the 
market place, more than twenty pigs were easily sold out each day, with a total amount 
up to two thousand kilograms.  And yet, another wave of malaria swept Simao in 1922. 
From 1923 to 1924, the population in Simao suffered deadly losses, with a high 
percentage at 90% in some areas. Some tea companies relocated their factories and 
workers in the county of Menghai to continue their business with merchants in Burma, 
India and Tibet. Simao thus lost its position of the Pu’er as well as the regional tea trade 
center and became a “dead city”.42 
In Simao, the caravans from Western Yunnan were usually called the Houlu 
(back-street) Caravans. They often traveled from Xiangyun, Zhennan, Midu, Menghua, 
and Jingdong with local specialties. After these commodities were sold in Simao, they 
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would purchase gypsum and salt and then travel southward to exchange tea in 
Xishuangbanna.  Each year, the Houlu Caravans arrived in Simao around Shuangjiang in 
the late fall, with more than 3,000 mules and horses. These merchants would be very 
active in transporting and exchanging commodities between Simao and Xishuangbanna 
until the next spring. They often left Simao and returned home after the Qingming 
Festival in the late spring, loading their mules and horses with spring tea or cotton. 43 
The caravans from northern and northeastern Yunnan were usually called Qianlu 
(front-street) caravans. They were from Yuxi, Tonghai, Hexi, Mengzi, Jianshui, Shiping, 
Xinping, Yuanjiang and Mojiang. The Qianlu caravans dominated the trade route from 
Kunming to Simao, with thousands of mules and horses traveling back and forth each 
year. They often purchased groceries and local specialties from Kunming and hauled 
them to Simao where they could trade for tea and then shipped back. The caravans from 
Yuxi especially favored jasmine tea. The number of the mules and horses active in the 
jasmine tea business was no less than 1,000 per year. 44 
The caravans from northwestern Yunnan were usually managed by the Tibetans 
from Weixi, Zhongdian and Deqin.  Their major purpose was to make the trip to Simao 
and then bring tea back to Tibet. As the main player in the Simao tea trade market, the 
number of Tibetan caravans decided the revenue yield each year.  During winter, the 
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Tibetan caravans arrived with more than 1,000 mules and horses, and during spring, the 
number of their cattle could easily reach 3,000. Not surprisingly, the number of the Weixi 
caravans directly affected the Simao market.45  
Further south, hundreds of the tea merchants from Xuanwei would usually walk 
twenty to thirty miles a day to go to Xishuangbanna valley in the 20th century. The 
workers they brought to carry the tea packages often fainted on the road because of the 
intense workload. 46 In Menghai, thousands of caravans arrived in Menghai during winter. 
The three-hundred li route from Menghai to Kengtung was often crowded with people, 
cattle, and tea packages. Tents and stoves were seen everywhere along the way, 
indicating the density of frequent travelers on the road. When the tea packages arrived in 
Kengtung, they were loaded onto trucks and sent to the train station right away.47 
In Yiwu, wealthy migrants opened tea factories and shops, whereas others leased 
lands for rice and tea cultivation. Chinese migrants often intermarried the Yi and Dai 
people, and the population in Yiwu reached over 150,000 in the 19th century. 48   By 
1850s there were more than nine tea companies in the town of Yiwu, providing close to 
10,000 dan tea each year. 49 These tea companies kept growing and formed their own 
sales network that extended outside southern Yunnan. For instance, in 1912, the business 
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of the Heng Feng Yuan Tea Company founded by Ji Xiangting opened tea shops in 
Kunming. By 1925, Chinese and Muslim merchants from Tengchong, Yuxi, Heqing, 
Liuzhou, Jinggu, Mengzi, and Tonghai operated more than twenty-two tea companies and 
thirty-seven tea processing mills.50  
Jinggu provided supplies for nearby counties such as Mianning (Lancang), 
Yunxian, and Zhenyuan.51 Merchants and caravans from southwestern, northeastern and 
central Yunnan gathered in Jinggu in spring to wait for the spring tea harvest. They 
usually brought fabric, foodstuffs and the local commodities from other areas when they 
arrived. After being fully loaded with the spring tea, these merchants and caravans set out 
to Kunming, Xiaguan, Zhongdian, Weixi, Xuanwei and other places, and began another 
business cycle.52 In 1934, Jinggu’s raw tea production had reached 2,000 dan, and yield a 
revenue worth of 40,000 silver dollars. By 1937, Jinggu was able to produce 11,000 dan 
raw tea worth of 220,000 silver dollars.53 
Besides the tea business, the Jinggu area also provided salt and in a later time, 
opium. In the year of 1724, the Qing government established authority in Baomu Jie in 
Weiyuan to regulate salt mining and processing. 54  In the year of 1940, forty-one 
                                                 
50Yunnan Sheng Mengla Xianzhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省勐腊县志编纂委员会), Mengla Xianzhi-
Chaye Zhi 勐腊县志-茶业志 [The gazetteer of the Mengla County- the tea business gazetteer] (Kunming: 
Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 1997), 1997. 
51 Yunnan Sheng Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省景谷傣族彝族自治
县志编纂委员会), Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi 景谷傣族彝族自治县志 [The gazetteer of the 
Jinggu Dai and Yi People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chubanshe, 1993), 340. 
52 Yunnan Sheng Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省景谷傣族彝族自治
县志编纂委员会), Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi 景谷傣族彝族自治县志 [The gazetteer of the 
Jinggu Dai and Yi People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chubanshe, 1993), 340. 
53 Yunnan Sheng Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省景谷傣族彝族自治
县志编纂委员会), Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi 景谷傣族彝族自治县志 [The gazetteer of the 
Jinggu Dai and Yi People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chubanshe, 1993), 340. 
54 Yunnan Sheng Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui (云南省景谷傣族彝族自治
县志编纂委员会), Jinggu Dai Zu Yi Zu Zizhi Xian Zhi 景谷傣族彝族自治县志 [The gazetteer of the 
Jinggu Dai and Yi People’s Ethnic Autonomous County] (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chubanshe, 1993), 337. 
158 
merchants in Mengzhu Jie of Jinggu organized the Yiqing Gang, dedicated to opium 
business. The Yiqing Gang’s caravans were well equipped with weapons to ensure that 
opium safely reached the markets in Yuxi and Xinping areas. Mengzhujie soon 
developed into an area center for the exchange and distribution of opium, foreign 
commodities and local products, and was granted the title “Little Kunming”. Merchants 
in Mengzhu accumulated their wealth in a relatively short time. By the early 1940s, in 
Mengzhujie, two merchants owned more than 100,000 silver dollar’s capital, eight 
merchants owned more than 50,000 silver dollars, and fifteen merchants owned more 
than 10,000 silver dollar worth of capital.55  
In fact, as opium cultivation reached its peak in Yunnan among many indigenous 
people from the 1920s to 1940s, many other opium cultivation and distribution centers 
appeared in the Yunnan borderlands, including  Kaihua, Guangnnan, Fushi, Xichou, 
Maguan, Shiping, Suijiang, Weixin, Tengchong, Baoshan, Zhenkang, and Longling. 56 
Opium cultivation and trafficking gradually overwhelmed the Sino-Vietnamese 
and Sino-Burmese border. Hekou became a well-known major port for opium trafficking. 
In the Hekou area, opium poppies grew in the eastern and western areas, but production 
was due to the hot weather. The bulk of opium that went through the Hekou port usually 
came from Mile, Luxi, Wenshan and Maguan. 57 Hekou especially thrived when opium 
trade became public and legalized by the government during the late Qing and the 
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Republican China era. Opium was sold on the street, with increasing numbers of addicts 
each day. Sailors, boatmen, road workers as well as those who engaged in other physical 
labor were the most frequent consumers.  In 1933, a devastating fire broke out when a 
family located in Gang Ling Street tried to process opium. The fire wiped out most 
buildings and shops, causing a long-term recession of the Hekou market. 58According to 
the statistics released in September 1940, the total population of inhabitants of Hekou 
including opium addicts had decreased because of the WWII. Even in wartime, there 
were eight opium shops in Hekou, and they paid taxes by the quantity of the oil lamps 
they owned. Usually each ordinary sized shop owned four to five oil lamps, and small 
shops owned two to three oil lamps. Besides public opium dens, nineteen families had 
their own oil lamps. But in fact, the number reported in these statistics was probably 
considerably lower than the reality.59 
Usually, the Chinese, Muslim and Bai merchants from Western Yunnan, such as 
the Xizhou and Heqing merchants, dominated the regional and transnational trade routes 
that connected Southwestern Yunnan to Southern Yunnan, Tibet, and Burma. The 
Tibetan merchants were the only ones had enough courage to travel back and forth 
between Tibet and Yunnan through the snowy mountains in northwestern Yunnan. 
Merchants from southern and southeastern Yunnan were active traders in nearby regional 
markets as well as markets in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand.  In addition to that, local 
indigenous traders, such as the Dai and Akha actively engaged in cross-border business. 
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Akha merchants and caravans were also very active traders as early as the 8th century. 
Before 1950s, the Akha caravans could easily reach 100 horses, and a normal sized Akha 
caravan was consisted of 300 to 400 horses.60 They have been associated with different 
groups of people such as the Chinese and Dai particularly in Southwestern Yunnan, as 
well as the Chinese migrants and indigenous people in Laos, Vietnam and Burma. Akha 
merchants kept very good connections with the Dai caravans. In the Shan markets in 
northern Burma, the Akha merchants sold opium, cotton, pepper, pigs, honey and bee 
wax. They often traded Akha rice and white cotton for silk thread, gold and silver carried 
by the Chinese. They even delivered embroidered Chinese shoes to the female Chinese 
migrants in Laos and Vietnam who still practice foot-binding.61  
For more than three hundred years, the “indefatigable” Chinese merchants and 
caravans have developed a broad trading network in neighborhood countries.  The 
fluidity of the commodities and capital was highly market-oriented. The temporary 
absence of the Chinese traders would often be substituted by other indigenous merchants. 
For example, when it was too dangerous for the Chinese merchants to travel to Luang 
Prabang during the years of Panthay Rebellion (1856-1873), the Burmese peddlers filled 
the vacancy and kept facilitating the market. 62   
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Even in a later time when the railways and new roads began to connect the 
Yunnan borderlands with mainland Southeast Asia, caravans still remained very active in 
places that were still out of the reach of the modern transportations. 63 
The Hui merchants (the Chinese Muslim), in particular, established a highly 
active commercial network that tied all the cities and towns in Yunnan with China’s 
hinterland and Southeast Asia. First of all, the Hui people believed in the superiority of 
business over farming. For those who could afford horses, mules, and even bulls, it was 
common for them to deliver goods in a short distance as an extra job. For example, in 
southeastern Yunnan, the Hui people owned the best caravans, and these caravans also 
traveled to Siam, Vietnam and Burma. 64 The Hui population were under severe 
persecution after the Panthay Rebellion, and were killed or driven out of their land. Many 
of them either purchased mules and horses to start the transporting business or worked for 
the caravans. In addition, as the annexation of land became more and more common in 
the late Qing, large groups of Hui people lost their lands similar to other peasants of 
different ethnicities. The caravans thus became a good choice for securing a living and 
stable social network for those who were jobless and in need of survival.65 
From the 1880s, the Muslim caravans were also the most fearless transporters in 
areas where the railways were absent. 66 Chinese caravans would not take the risk to 
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travel along the trails in the mountains because of the threat from hot weather and malaria. 
In that case, the caravans from the Hui people’ settlements in Hexi, Yuxi and E’shan 
became the only carriers that would ship goods into Pu’er, Simao and Xishuangbanna. 
They looked for business opportunities wherever they went, and would travel beyond the 
Yunnan borderlands and arrive in cities and towns in Burma, Laos and Thailand, such as 
Kengtung, Lashio, Mandalay, Chiang Mai and Phongsali. 67 The Hui merchants had to 
walk through tropical forests, swamps and rivers, and deal with scorpions, beasts, tropical 
diseases and even bandits. Usually the caravans embarked on their journeys in late 
September, and rested during the rainy season from about March to August. 68  
In addition to the goods that they commissioned to ship, the Hui caravans also 
purchased commodities that were popular along the trade routes for exchange. For 
example, Tibetan felt blankets were welcomed by the indigenous people in the mountains 
because they were used to wrap dead bodies for funerals. Yellow wax was popular 
among the Buddhist believers for the use of rituals and ceremonies. Colored yarns were 
the favorites of the Jingpo people for the decoration of their outfits. When caravans 
returned, they were usually fully loaded with cottons that they could possibly sell at a 
good price in Simao. In Simao, they had a good chance to be hired by the tea merchants 
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to transport teas back to Kunming and other areas. 69  However, this business was still of 
very high risk. Many people lost money because their mules might contract illnesses on 
the way. Many caravans and merchants would also stay in Burma or Thailand to look for 
employment. Some of them married local women and never returned.70 
Before the establishment of the PRC, the Muslim Ma Tongzhu and his family 
gained a high reputation among the Muslim merchants and caravans from the Hexi 
Settlements since the late 19th century. Ma Tongzhu was famous for his accuracy as well 
as punctuality, and was trusted by many customers along the route from Southern 
Yunnan to Thailand.  His customers included retailers, small shop owners, government 
officials, and foreigners.71 In the 1920s, the Ma family decided to expand the business 
after Ma Tongzhu passed away. The Ma family sold their business in Burma and Laos 
and changed the focus to the business in Southern China, Vietnam, and Thailand. They 
organized a few grocery stores, such as the Yuan Xin Zhai in Mojiang, and the Yuan Xin 
Chang in Simao. 72  Popular local specialties such as opium, velvet antlers, otter furs, 
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ivory, dye, and lac were carried by the Ma family.73 Later Jing Chang Hao, a tea factory, 
was founded in Jiangcheng to process black tea to export to Vietnam and Hong Kong. 
The Ma family soon opened another grocery store in Jiangcheng and established their 
own commercial network that covered southern Yunnan and a few cities and towns in 
Thailand, Burma and Laos, such as Kengtung. 74  
The Ma family’s reputation enabled them to obtain contracts from foreigners, who 
generally occupied management position in customs, post office, and the bureau of salt 
affairs.  Usually the foreigners’ commodities were free from inspection at the Mengzi 
custom. With such an advantage, the Ma family could often hide opium inside of the 
shipping packages and smuggle it into Yunnan.  The foreign banks, customs, bureau of 
salt affairs, post office also hired the Ma families to ship the revenue to Kunming. Based 
such practices, the Ma family soon opened financial services such as remittance and 
currency exchange. Their regular customers included not only the foreigners but also 
Chinese government officials, and merchants, and caravans as well as workers who 
regularly traveled between Yunnan and other Southeast Asian countries. 75As the 
business of the Ma family expanded in Thailand, Ma Zihou, the son of Ma Tongzhu, 
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married a local woman whose father was Chinese, and mother, Thai. The wife’s family 
had relatives who worked for the Thai government. With the help from the wife and her 
families, Ma Zihou’s business soon thrived in Thailand, and he was elected to become the 
chair of the Yunnan Association. With such advantage, Ma Zihou established 
connections with the Fujian and Guangdong merchants in Thailand, which further 
promoted the Ma family’s business. 76   
New Roads, New Migrants and New Cities 
 
Before the construction of the Yunnan-Vietnam railway (the Dian-Yue Railway), 
the Yunnan borderlands had already connected with the Southeast Asian countries in a 
scale that surpassed previous centuries. Commodities from the European countries 
changed the perception of the indigenous people about consumption and brought new 
opportunities for trade.  This further stimulated the boom of local trade between the 
Chinese, Southeast Asian, and South Asian markets.   
 In the 1850s, the French opened the port of Haiphong with the intention to 
accelerate the trade between Vietnam, Hong Kong and other Southeast Asian areas. In 
southeastern Yunnan, mining towns such as Gejiu and Mengzi were soon connected to 
Haiphong via the Red River. In 1883, the French demanded the Chinese authority to open 
a few towns for commerce in southern Yunnan, including Mengzi and Simao.77 Before 
the eruption of the Sino-French War in the late 1880s, the regular transportation route 
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between Mengzi and Hong Kong had already been established. Commodities were 
shipped from Mengzi to Manhao by caravans and then loaded on the boats to Lao Chai 
and Hanoi, and then to Haiphong where they would be shipped to Hong Kong. In this 
manner, copper, lead, iron, tin and opium from southern Yunnan flowed along the Red 
River to the international market, whereas the foreign goods also flowed in. 78 
In southern Yunnan, the traditional Yinan Route that led to Siam attracted 
merchants from Yuxi, Hexi and E’shan to travel between Simao and Chiang Mai. They 
mainly stocked tea and sometimes other local goods such as felt, yellow wax, silk, 
bamboo hats, yarns and fabrics in Simao, Pu’er, Cheli (Jinghong) and Fohai, and then 
headed to Chiang Mai.  Occasionally, they would also travel to Mawlamyine, purchase 
medicines and manufactured goods imported from Great Britain and Germany, and return 
back to Yunnan. 79 In southwestern Yunnan along the ancient Shendu Route, merchants 
frequently embarked a 12-day trip from Lashio to Tengyue. They would pass Namhkam, 
Mengmao (Ruili), the first town that was considered within China’s territory, and further 
reached Wangding, Zhefang, Mangshi and Longling.80  In addition to these well-known 
routes, there were numerous small paths that connected the Yunnan borderlands with 
other areas of mainland Southeast Asia.  
 In 1865, the French established a Chinese Immigration Bureau in Saigon to 
recruit Chinese laborers. There were two major channels for the Chinese to move to 
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Vietnam through the French authority or earlier Chinese immigrants. Many of them 
signed contract with the French, and were assigned to work at the railway and city 
construction sites, mines, farms as well as rubber tree plantations. Others were sponsored 
by their families and relatives in Vietnam or by the Chinese associations. Cochi-china 
was the main area that received the majority of Chinese immigrants. By 1889, there were 
560,000 Chinese here. 81  Under the period of the French rule, over 4/5 of Chinese 
immigrants in Vietnam concentrated in Cochi-china, Annam and Tonkin.82 
Laos, in particular, experienced a big influx of Chinese immigrants in the 1890s. 
Over centuries, Laos was never an ideal destination for Chinese migration because of its 
relative isolation and limited markets comparing with Vietnam and Burma.83 The number 
of the Chinese immigrants in Laos never exceeded 2% of the total local population. 84 
After 1893, the French initiated a series of policies in order to attack Chinese laborers to 
fulfill the big vacancy in the job market. The French authority allowed the new Chinese 
immigrants to farm the land without paying taxes, and freely travel across the border. 
Besides, new Chinese migrants were also granted custom duty waver for exports and 
imports. The French also invited the Chinese who moved to Vietnam and Burma to come 
back to Laos. By the end of the 19th century, there were more than 5,000 Chinese 
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immigrants in Laos, and the total number reached 6,710 in 1921s. In the 1930s, the 
Chinese population in Laos dropped to 3,000 because the French placed a restriction to 
prevent the Chinese from entering into the Indochina area. 85 
Table 3.  Numbers of Chinese in each of the Countries of Indochina 86 
Country  1921 1931 Increase 
Cochinchina 156,000 205,000  49,000 
Cambodia    91,000 148,000  57,000 
Tonkin (Tongking)    32,000   52,000  20,000 
Annam    7,000   10,000    3,000 
Laos    7,000     3,000  -4,000 
Total 293,000 418,000 125,000 
 
In Burma, along the Salween River, there were more than 100,000 Chinese 
immigrants who engaged in farming, animal husbandry and trading in the late 19th and 
early 20th century. The Chinese could easily receive a piece of land to grow vegetables, 
so they often owned vegetable plantations. The also domesticated Chinese plants for 
trade, such as celeries, chives, leechee, dates, plums, peaches and etc. In Bahmo, Chinese 
people unitized every possible land that they could find, and turned them into cabbage 
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and bean fields. In Mawlamyine, Chinese orchards and vegetable plantations occupied in 
the hilltops. 87 By 1931, the Chinese population in Burma reached 193,594. 88 
In April of 1898, the Chinese and French reached an agreement to build a railway 
to connect Kunming to Vietnam. The French were responsible for building the section 
from the newly drawn Sino-Vietnamese border to Kunming. In 1900, French specialists 
initiated a one-year survey along the Mekong River, and they also mapped Yunnan in 
detail. 89 In October 1903 the two sides re-confirmed the French responsibility and agreed 
that the entire project should be finished by 1910.90   
The construction of the Vietnamese side began in 1901, mainly on the plains, and 
the Chinese side of construction began in 1903 in the mountains. The entire railroad 
would later include 172 tunnels and over 2000 bridges and culverts.91 In 1903, the Qing 
court established the Dian-Yue Railway Bureau to assist the French. The entire railway 
was divided into more than ten major sections as well as hundreds of sub-sections. Italian 
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engineers were contracted to manage the railway construction. Chinese labor was hired 
by individual sections, and each section received a compensation of 5,000 dollars per 
month from the Dian-Yue Railway Bureau. The initial plan was to recruit 20,000 Chinese 
workers.  Later, more than 6,000 labors from Northern China including Tianjin, Port 
Arthur, Zhili and Jinan and arrived from the sea, possibly through coastal Vietnam. 92 
Meager salaries, terrible working and housing conditions, as well as a high death 
rate marked the fate of these railway workers. These workers on average earned wages of 
six cents each day.  They built very simple shelters from logs and hay, and settled in 
groups.  Inside the shelters, there was nothing but piles of grass for bedding. There was 
no bathroom for workers, and the dorm area was always filthy and smelly. When the 
spring came, such working and living condition accelerated the spread of malaria. 
Workers died one after another. Sometimes, only twenty percent of workers could 
survive in each dorm. Contaminated dorms would often be burnt down and buried with 
dirt, eliminating the dead bodies as well as the diseased at once.  Sometimes, the sick 
who rested along the railway tracks were often pushed off the mountain valleys and died. 
Many workers escaped without getting paid, begging for food along the way until they 
reach Mengzi.  For all the 6,000 workers who were from Northern China, only 600 to 700 
survived and returned home.93 According to the statistics from the Dian-Yue Railway 
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Company, about 67,000 workers were recruited from China for railway construction. 
More than 12,000 died, and over 10,000 of them died in the road between Hekou and 
Laha and this number did not include those who were recruited from Yunnan.94 
After the loss of the Northern Chinese laborers, new workers were recruited from 
Vietnam and Guangxi Province of China. These workers seemed to adjust to the climate 
very well; however, they were often abused. There were cases of workers from Guangxi 
being beaten to death by their Italian bosses. 95 
Yunnan’s connection with the outside world was dramatically accelerated after 
railway was built.  Although the border between China and Vietnam was drawn, it was 
completely overpowered by the bilateral economic exchanges. The boundary sometimes 
even seemed invisible since the French were managing the railway transportation from 
Yunnan to Vietnam. Instead of a month’s journey through the mountains and rivers on 
horseback and boats, merchants now could easily haul their commodities from Kunming 
to coastal Vietnam, and then to other sea ports in Southeast Asia as well as East Asia.  It 
only took six to seven days to travel from Kunming to Hong Kong, and nine days to 
Shanghai. With the stimulation of reduced shipping fees and time, the circulation of the 
commodities and capital in Chinese and Southeast Asia markets immensely increased.  
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The tin mines in Gejiu were one of the beneficiaries after the Yunnan-Vietnam 
railway was built.  In the 1910s, the tin from Yunnan gradually climbed up to the top five 
of global tin markets, and became an important resource for Yunnan’s revenue.  The silk 
from Sichuan, wool, leather, ash, musk, herbs, spices and tea from Yunnan were always 
on the top of the exports list. 96  Simultaneously, foreign commodities also entered into 
the Yunnan and Southwestern Chinese markets. Cotton from Vietnam, as well as firearms 
from Germany and France were very popular.97  Besides that, cotton yarns, metals, 
automobiles, boats, tools, grains, gasoline, paint and medicine also arrived in Yunnan 
from Germany, France, Great Britain and the U.S. 98  
The Yunnan-Vietnam railway became the major channel for Yunnan to connect 
with other parts of China. Almost all the people who had to travel to northern China 
chose to take the train to Haiphong then travel to their destination.99  In 1913, the Yunnan 
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provincial government selected 30-40 youth for the study abroad program, and sent them 
out via the railway. Later the students who were attending the universities and colleges in 
the hinterland China depended on the railway for travel. 100The railroad also provided 
convenience for the politicians and revolutionaries to enter and exit China with less risks. 
For example, Cai’E entered into Yunnan via Vietnam in 1915. In 1921, Tang Jiyao, the 
Governor of Yunnan escaped via the railroad after his loss in the factional conflicts with 
Gu Pinzhen. 101 And soon cities along the railway, such as Hekou, began to accommodate 
political radicals and dissidents temporarily. The uprising organized by the Republicans 
and also by the CCP occurred in the cities and towns along the railroad.  
Around the same time, some forty government officials, intellectuals and 
merchants in Kunming proposed to build another railway that would connect Vietnam to 
Sichuan through Tengchong in southwestern Yunnan. This was largely a positive 
response to the requirement from the British ambition to facilitate the communication 
between the British Burma to China proper. After the Qing court approved this proposal, 
officials, intellectuals and merchants pushed to establish a railway company.102 
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In January 1906, the Dian-Shu Teng-Yue Railway Company was founded in 
Kunming, and was usually called the “Railway Bureau”.  At the open house, Chen 
Rongchang, the company head, and other speakers addressed the urgency of the railway 
construction, triggering the prevalence of nationalism at the event. This soon turned the 
company’s stock purchase promotion to a patriotic campaign and many people, especially 
merchants, immediately purchased the company’s stocks.  
Students from high schools and the military academy in Kunming promised that 
they would purchase the stocks with their school financial aid. Some government 
officials were forced to buy stocks in order to save their positions. Even more and more 
workers, peasants and hawkers began to purchase stocks. Fund raisings organized by the 
Railway Bureau were also held in various places in the city of Kunming after the railway 
company open house. Moreover, purchasing the stock of the Railway Bureau became a 
trend popular to demonstrate patriotism.103 
 Later more forms of fund raising were developed by the Railway Bureau: besides 
stock purchasing, civilians could also soon purchase railway lottery. The salt mine 
owners in the entire province were required to raise the price of the salt for five cents per 
jin in order to collect money for the railway construction. The land taxes in major 
counties were also raised. Furthermore, a small percent of the revenues of each county 
directly went into the railway construction fund, such as the lijin in Sanyi, and the coal 
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tax in Gejiu. At the same time, the railway company dispatched representatives to go to 
Southeast Asian countries and encourage the Chinese diaspora to purchase stocks.  104 
However, the plan was aborted because of the large scale of corruption spread in 
the company as well as the government officials who oversaw the project. Many higher 
level provincial bureaucrats were able to obtain stocks worth far more than the money 
they paid for purchasing. These special clients even began to receive bonus immediately 
after the purchase, which in fact drained the railway construction fund fairy quickly.  For 
example, the new Governor General of Yunnan received the bonus for ten years in 
advance, with the total value that was worth three times more than the money he paid for 
his stocks. In 1909, the warehouse manager of the Baiyanjing salt mine fled with more 
than 224,000 liang silver dollars, and more than 460,000 of which were for railway taxes. 
More problems existed in the land taxes usurping. A large amount of money were also 
spent in advertising in Southeast Asian countries, hiring the U.S engineers, road survey, 
purchasing big private houses and etc. By 1923, all the 8.3 million liang silver dollars 
raised for railway construction 1912 had shrunk for 60%, and the railway construction 
had seen no progress at all. 105 Nevertheless, this “railway dream” never diminished, even 
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for decades. Posters and advertisements that designed to invite civilians to purchase the 
railway stocks still could be found in Kunming in 1941. 106 
Although the blueprint for a Yunnan-Burma railway failed, the British 
constructed two regional railways in the nearby area: one was from Rangoon to 
Mandalay and then to Myitkyina; and another one was from Mandalay to Lashio in the 
Shan States. Besides that, several roads were also constructed in this area: one connected 
Lashio to Wanding in Yunnan, and another one connected Bahmo to Myitkyina. At 
Myitkyina, there were two roads that aimed at to two directions: one was heading 
eastward to Tuojiao and Pianma along the headwaters of the Irrawaddy River; and the 
other heading northward to Sumprabum of northern Burma along the Mali River (another 
headwater of the Irrawaddy River).107 These roads later became the ideal routes for the 
construction of the Burma Road especially because of the convenience provided by the 
railway that connected Lashio with Mandalay.108   
In the Honghe Prefecture, Mengzi Port and Hekou Port were open under the 
request from the French in 1895. New buildings such as the French consulate, banks, and 
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chapels raised in these town quickly after they were opened.109 In the early 1900s, tin 
mining in Gejiu attracted large numbers of merchants and labors. With the construction 
of the Yunnan-Vietnam railway as well as several other new roads, towns and villages 
flourished along the railway whereas the southern border of Honghe still remained 
relatively isolated to the outside world. 110 
Kaiyuan was the largest transitional center when the Yunnan-Vietnam railway 
began operation in 1902. In Kaiyuan, life changed for the local population. Missionaries 
from protestant churches arrived in Kaiyuan after the Yunnan-Vietnam railway was put 
into use. 111 The railway not only provided jobs for the adults but also to children who 
were obligated to help improve the financial situation of the family. Being pushed by 
poverty caused by wars, bandits as well as unemployment, children often tried all kinds 
of ways to get onto the trains to sell cigarettes to the passengers.  According to the 
recollection of Wang Zhong’en, a pilot who served in the PLA air force for thirty years, 
selling cigarettes on the trains that traveled back and forth from Xiao Longtan to Da 
Zhuang and Yang Jie had become their daily chores. 112 
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It was obvious that both these cigarette children as well as their parents were 
ignorant and seriously lacked awareness of safety. Cigarette children like Wang 
Zhong’en would try all kinds of means to avoid the French railway inspectors and get on 
the trains. Climbing onto the train, and even unto the top, and presumably, jumping off 
the train, seemed very dangerous and yet very common. Such reckless approaches 
brought their lives in to risk, and yet such situation was not observed or even 
intentionally ignored by themselves and their parents. A friend of Wang Zhong’en was 
killed in an accident, with his head chopped off by the iron bars on the Xiao Longtan 
Bridge. Another friend slipped under the wheels as he was trying to climb unto a running 
train and unfortunately lost his leg.  
Wang Zhong’en often felt lucky that nothing seriously happened to him except 
that he spilled all the cigarettes into the water when he was on the ferry across the river in 
Xiao Longtan, and was badly beaten by his mother when he returned home. 113 
The railway also brought to the new urban cities increasing influence from China 
and the outside world. In 1915, the Yiqun Tea house in Kaiyuan hosted a juggling team 
from Japan. 114At the same time, the Beijing opera was introduced in Honghe and gained 
many faithful supporters. Many celebrities from Shanghai and Hankou received 
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invitations from the local Tea House in Gejiu. Gradually fans of Dianju and Beijing opera 
organized associations in Gejiu, Jianshui, Kaiyuan, Mile and Luxi.115  
The earliest movie shown in Honghe was brought by the French in 1907.  In 1927, 
a local photographer in Gejiu named Wang Liwen opened the first professional movie 
theater. Wang rented the movie projector from Kunming and showed four Chinese 
produced silent movies. In 1939, Wang Liwen and another investor named Guo 
Shaocong remodeled the Wexi Theater and opened the first theater that could play sound 
films in this area.116 In addition to these professional theaters, many mobile film teams 
also traveled to other towns and cities in Honghe. 117 
Serious interruptions to these centers and regional markets occurred for the 
reasons of wars and bandit harassment.  In Jinggu, merchants began to move away after 
1938, tea shops closed and caravans stopped traveling because of the plague of wars and 
bandits. As the KMT government launched campaigns to pacify the bandits, merchants 
gradually moved back to the Mengzhu Jie of  Jinggu area, new stores were opened, and 
the ties between the markets in Jinggu, Lancang, Menglian and even Burma and Siam 
were re-established.118  In 1942, more salt shops and companies were opened not only in 
Jinggu but also nearby towns. Furthermore, seasonal merchants and caravans that only 
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traded during the slack season also became active. Opium, tea, salt, and sugar began to 
flow along the regional trading routes again. 119 
Through trade, the Yunnan borderlands were increasingly connected with both the 
Chinese domestic and mainland Southeast Asian markets. The closest connections were 
with the latter because of regional kinship ties, frequent movement of people, and the 
new roads as well as railways that overcame the restriction of the state boundary. The 
indigenous people as well as new migrants in the Yunnan borderlands and neighboring 
countries were introduced to opportunities to grow cash crops such as sugar canes, 
peppers, tobacco and rubber trees. They gradually became an important part of the global 
colonial markets. The heyday of this trans-national trading empire has come because of 
the worldwide colonial economic expansion. 
Wars and the Political Boundaries  
 
The boundary between the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia did 
not become clear when wars emerged between the traditional Chinese colonial force and 
the new colonial forces such as Great Britain, France, Japan, the U.S and later the 
expanding communist China as well as Vietnam. Since the 1930s, the Yunnan 
borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia were divided into the territories of the Japanese 
and the Allies, as well as the Communists and the Capitalists. The indigenous 
communities were redefined into the larger powers’ spheres of influence with boundaries 
that the indigenous communities would not otherwise recognize for themselves. Thus, the 
political boundaries of the trading empire began to appear. 
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It was the French colonial intervention that contributed to the emergence of a 
clearer boundary between China and Vietnam in the 1880s. 120 As the Qing court and 
French set up the boundary between China and French Indochina, the future boundaries 
between China, Vietnam and Laos was being hatched. 121At the same time, the boundary 
between China and Laos became clear since the Laos was annexed into the French 
Indochina. Mengwu and Wude, two of the local political units of Xishuangbanna were 
ceded to France and then combined with Laos, which became part of the present 
Phongsali area of Laos.122 
 On the Burmese side, two agreements between China and Britain reached in the 
year of 1894 and 1897 drew an unclear boundary between China and Burma. The 
borderline between China and Burma was divided into four major segments. Some of 
these segments had a clear line that divided China and Burma; some of them remained 
controversial; and some of them never had boundaries clearly drawn. Basically, the area 
north to the Jiangao Moutain did not have a set boundary; the area between the Jiangao 
Mountain and the Nanding River was clear; from the Nanding River to Nanbanjiang 
River (Nankajiang River), the boundary remained controversial; the area eastward of the 
Nanbanjiang River was set.  In this case, the boundaries of three sections of the Sino-
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Burmese border were not clearly solved, and further negotiations concerning the national 
boundaries were carried into the PRC era.123 
From the late 1880s to 1940s, the drawing of the boundaries did not change the 
fluid nature of communication as well as coherence between the Yunnan borderlands and 
the mainland Southeast Asia. The expansion of traditional colonial power and the new 
Western colonial powers were similar in terms of “civilization mission” they shared as 
well as the effort in gaining more resources. It was also the wars in the 1940s that 
significantly integrated the Yunnan borderlands with the mainland Southeast Asia as well 
as South Asia, and simplified the border as the boundary between the realms of the Axis 
and Allies. The construction of the Burma Road, the India-China Road as well as some 
regional highways especially propelled this process.  
In November 1937, the KMT government conceived the blueprint of the Burma 
Road on Yunnan’s side, which would extend the Kunming-Xiaguan/Dali road to Ruili in 
the Southwest. In January, 1938, the Chinese and British governments reached an 
agreement on the specifics of the road on Burma’s side. The plan was to connect Ruili to 
Muse, with eighteen kilometers’ road construction in Burma. After that, western Yunnan 
would be connected to two of the aforementioned major regional transportation arteries: 
the Lashio-Bahmo Road and the Rangoon-Mandalay-Lashio railway. 124   
The construction of the Burma Road began in December 1937. Seventeen towns 
and cities along the road were assigned to fulfill the daily labor quota. The Baoshan 
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County provided 28,000 people every day, the highest labor quota among them all. 
Around 115,000 workers of various ethnic backgrounds125 were regularly working on the 
road construction side. During urgent times, more than 200,000 laborers had participated 
in the construction.126 The road from Mangshi to Wanding and then Lashio was based on 
an existing path that the Tusi of Mangshi and Zhefang built from 1927 to 1931. These 
two Native Officers purchased five automobiles in order to go to Burma for sightseeing 
and worshiping. 127  The passage from Xiaguan to Wanding was extremely difficult to 
pave with mountain valleys and cliffs all along the way. In December, 1937, the workers 
gradually arrived at the construction sites. Many of them had walked a long distance 
varied from three to six days, carrying clothes, tools, and food supplies that usually lasted 
for ten days.  Simple shelters were built from tree logs chopped down along the way. 128 
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The average stipend was twenty cents each day. Because of the shortage of tools and the 
absolute lack of machinery, many had to dig with their own hands. 129 Workers’ health 
was troubled by harsh weather, malaria, hunger, and frequent accidents. 130 The 
technicians and engineers who participated in the road construction estimated that around 
2,000 to 3,000 people died during the process of the road construction.131 Many women 
were also recruited because of the labor shortage.132 
Kunming experienced a boom after the construction of the Burma Road. The total 
population of Kunming increased from 100,000 to 300,000, becoming the most important 
economic, cultural, military and transitional center in southwestern China. Cities and 
towns along the Burma Road such as Lufeng, Chuxiong, Xiaguan, Yongping, Baoshan, 
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Mangshi, Zhefang and Wanding also began to thrive. The town of Wanding only had four 
houses that accommodated four to five peasant families as seasonal farmers. After the 
Burma Road was constructed, factories and mechanic houses were also added. Soon 
modern government institutions such as the customs, taxation and police departments 
were established, hotels, restaurant and shops also flourished.133  
In September, 1938, the Nanjing government relocated the KMT Military 
Committee’s General Board of Transportation for the Imports and Exports in 
Southwestern China (The General Board of Transportation) from Guangzhou to Kunming, 
coordinating the transportation of military supplies as well as other supplies from 
Rangoon. In October 21st, 1938, after Guangzhou fell into the hands of the Japanese, 
China’s connection with the outside world had to depend entirely on the Yunnan-
Vietnam railway and the Burma Road. In 1939, the military supplies shipped into China 
via the Burma Road reached 27,980 tons, with a monthly average of 2,544 tons, and the 
highest record of 4,907 tons. 134  
After the Spring Festival of 1939, more than 3,000 Chinese workers and engineers 
(including two female drivers) in Southeast Asian countries gradually returned back to 
China via Vietnam and Burma to serve the KMT General Board of Transportation. They 
were initially stationed in Kunming and later organized into twenty teams, being 
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responsible for the transportation of the military supplies on the Burma Road. Besides 
these returned Chinese migrants, workers from Guangdong Province formed another 
major group of drivers along the Burma Road.135  
A year later, the Japanese landed in Beihai, Guangxi, and began to bomb the 
Yunnan-Vietnam railway. 136After the Japanese took over Vietnam, they paralyzed the 
railway in October 1940. The Burma Road became China’s only channel to break though 
the Japanese blockade.137  More than 7,800 military trucks as well as private cars rushed 
back and forth on the Burma Road day and night. In July, 1940, a truck that passed 
through the city of Mangshi every three minutes. 138 In 1941, the military supplies 
shipped in via the Burma Road reached 132.000 tons, one third of which was gas.139  In 
the same year, 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese refugees gradually returned back to China via 
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the Burma Road since April. 140During the WWII, China received the 1.37 billion US. 
Dollar’s financial aid from the $0.45 billion U.S Dollars from the U.K (1938-1941), and 
1.56 billion Chinese Dollars from the overseas Chinese (by August, 1941). More than 
half of the military supplies was transported via the Burma Road.141 
In 1941, the need to build a road that connected Yunnan with India became urgent 
as the Japanese took over central Burma. 142  In May 1941, Tengchong and Longling fell 
into the hands of the Japanese and the road construction was aborted.  A few years later 
the construction survey resumed in May 1944, and the construction began in summer 
though the Japanese still occupied Longling.  Many indigenous women joined the road 
construction and they proved to be very strong laborers. By November, two delivering 
squares were built to receive food airlifted from the aircrafts operated by China National 
Aviation Corporation that flew back and forth from Calcutta.143  
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From Tengchong to the Sino-Burmese border, more than 6,500 people including 
Chinese and U.S sappers engaged in more than ten hours hard work each day.  More than 
13,500 people and 200 machines joined the construction from Longling to Myitkyina.144  
Statistics show that of the total number of laborers participating in the Yunnan-India road 
construction, 20,000 were Chinese and 700 U.S sappers. 145  In March, 1944, the 
preparation and construction of the gas pipeline between India and China was initiated. 
This gas pipeline would connect Calcutta and Kunming, passing through the Hump of the 
Himalayan Mountains and stretching close to 2,000 miles.146  In the 1940s, more than 
490,000 tons of military supplies, 10,000 vehicles and more than 200,000 tons of gas 
entered into China via the Burma Road and India Road. 147  
It was obvious that the war did not stop the flow of labors, commodities and 
capitals, at least between the Ally countries. In the mid-1940s, the population of the 
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Chinese immigrants in Laos grew from around 3,000 in the 1930s to no less than 40,000. 
Since the WWII, the Chinese merchants in Burma gradually replaced the Indians and 
became the major shopkeepers, as the Indian population suffered a great decrease. 148 
“The Chinese overseas Bank, the Bank of China, and Chinese insurance, shipping, rice, 
and mercantile firms maintained five branches along the Burma Road and the payment of 
Chinese customs could be made through these branches.”149  
Within the Communist Camp 
 
In fact, the only boundary that the indigenous people wished to draw might be the 
line between the colonizers and themselves. However, such boundary was gradually 
merged with the division between the Capitalists and the Communists, and was 
sharpened, especially after the WWII. This further divided the indigenous communities 
into political and military segments with different national identification as well as 
ideological affiliation. On one hand, more wars and confrontations between same 
indigenous communities broke out because of their disagreements on national 
identification and ideological orientation. On the other hand, close connections between 
people within the same ideological camps sometimes overcame the national boundaries. 
Thus, indigenous communities paid a great price for the colonial expansion as well as the 
drawing of such “forced” boundaries. As a result, traditional transnational migration, 
trade as well as business cooperation, was interrupted and halted, and only persisted 
within the same political or ideological sphere.   
                                                 
148 Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia 2nd Edition (London, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), 45. 
149 Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia 2nd Edition (London, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), 45-46. 
190 
As the confrontation between the communist and the capitalist camp was 
regionalized after the WWII, the de facto boundary between China and mainland 
Southeast Asian countries began to fluctuate due to the Cold War regional politics, as 
well as China’s diplomatic policies.  The Sino-Southeast Asian borderlands were 
accommodated and divided up by various regional powers as well as local military forces, 
such as China, exiled KMT forces, and communist forces of Vietnam and Burma. Thus, 
the cross-border interactions became purely ideologically oriented. Trade and 
communications of the border people were limited to a small scale and usually restricted 
only within the communist camp. 150 
Up to the mid-1960s, the PRC stood at a “gray zone” in terms of its relationship 
with the adjacent countries in mainland Southeast Asia. The PRC kept its regular 
relationship with the Vietnamese and Burmese government, and also the communist 
forces in both countries. 151   
In fact, in order to save the Chinese communist revolution from the besieging of 
the capitalist countries, China initiated the strategy that the Soviet Union adopted in the 
1920s: exporting the communist revolution and aiding the communist parties in small 
countries. By 1967, it was estimated that more than five billion issues of the Quotations 
from Chairman Mao Tse-tung were published, with the average of 1.5 for each person in 
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the world.152 And yet as China’s Cultural Revolution escalated after the mid-1960s, its 
main diplomacy of exporting revolution and Mao’s idea exacerbated China’s tension with 
the international world as well as with neighboring countries. 153   
Gradually, the boundary between China’s revolutionary and diplomatic 
relationship with other countries blurred. In the neighborhood, although Nepal, Burma, 
and Vietnam received China’s aid over years, they openly rebelled against China’s 
propaganda. Nepal requested China to recall its diplomatic personnel in August, 1967 
after anti-Chinese demonstrations occurred. 154 Even Cambodia, with whom China tried 
to maintain a close relationship, could not bear such Cultural Revolution strategies. 155  
As the first non-Communist country to recognize the legitimacy of the PRC on 
December 18, 1949, Burma tried to demonstrate its friendship to the new born China, and 
neutrality in the Cold War politics. However, Burma was unavoidably caught in the 
extended Chinese domestic conflicts between the CCP and the KMT, as well as military 
confrontations between the world communist and capitalist camps.  The fraction between 
the CCP and the Burmese government has appeared in the early 1950s.  Burmese 
government’s axciety regarding the collaboration between the CCP and the Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB) never ceased. The CCP blamed the Burmese incapability to 
eliminate the KMT army led by General Li Mi. Simultaneously, the KMT army made 
serious efforts to stir up the hostilities between the Burmese and the Chinese 
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governments.  Burma accused the U.S for supporting the KMT army and initiated some 
anti-U.S strategies, including the refusal of the communication with the KMT, which 
caused the deterioration of the U.S–Burmese relations. At least, Burma had two major 
fears: first of all, the possible future intervention from the Chinese government and 
military confrontations with the Communist China; and second, the possibility of 
becoming another “Korea”. 156   
Before the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government clearly expressed that it 
would not interfere in the Burmese domestic politics and hoped that the Burmese 
government and the CPB could sit down for peace negotiation. However, the situation 
dramatically changed in 1966 as the communist movements intensified in Burma, causing 
tremendous distrust between the Burmese government and China. Large scale radical 
anti-Chinese actives occurred in Burma in the summer of 1967, and were soon as 
answered by anti-Burmese protests in China.157 With Mao’s approval, slogans that called 
for the execution of Ne Win became very popular in Beijing. The Burmese Embassy was 
attacked by Chinese civilians with bricks.158 The Chinese and Burmese media began to 
quarrel with each other via newspapers and radios. In June 30th 1967, the Chinese 
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government openly supported the military operations of the CPB, and criticized the anti-
revolutionary and fascist nature of the Burmese government. 159  
When China’s relationship with the Burmese government soured in 1968, 
thousands of Chinese educated youth crossed the Sino-Burmese border, and joined the 
CPB’s military base in northern Burma. The majority of these Chinese volunteer troops 
were from Yunnan. Many of them were attracted by the adventurous revolutionary life 
instead of hard and boring chores of faming each day.  The bulk of volunteers were 
young people who saw no opportunity of being recognized by the Chinese authorities 
because of the class status of their families. For them, going across the border meant 
reaching the very forefront of the “world revolution” and the chance to change their life 
as well as social status. 160  With the dream to support “international leftism”, they sought 
opportunities to prove their loyalty as well as value to their home country. They joined 
the CPB forces, looking for opportunities to become revolutionary heroes. Many of them 
carried a pamphlet about the story of Che Guevara when they crossed the border. 161   
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As for Laos, Chinese assistance in the communist occupied area in Laos began in 
early 1960s. From 1962 to 1963, China constructed the road from Phongsali to Paka in 
Xishuangbanna.162 In responding to the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) needs 
in fighting against the U.S, from November 1966 to September 1967, the CCP central 
committee and the LPRP reached a series of agreements that China would 
unconditionally build six paved roads near the Sino-Laos border, and also repave the 
Phongsali-Paka road. 163  In September 1968, a group of Chinese troops entered into Laos 
under the cover of artillery forces from the Second Artillery Corps as well as the Air 
Force dispatched from Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Lanzhou, Fuzhou, Nanjing, Chengdu, 
Kunming military regions. 164  During the ten year construction period in Laos, the 
Chinese artillery force engaged in ninety-five battle and shot down thirty-five planes and 
damaged twenty-four. The PLA army also encountered small battles in the road 
construction area, and suffered minor loss. 165 
On the Vietnamese side, China’s interaction with the Vietminh was what really 
impacted the Sino-Vietnamese border. From 1949 to 1978, the cross border trade did not 
cease between China and Vietnam before the Sino-Vietnamese War broke out.  From 
1955 to 1964, Vietnam heavily relied on the imports from China to restore the heavy 
industry sector. In 1952, China and Vietminh opened the border markets to allow the 
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local civilians to trade. In August 1953, the CCP and Vietminh reached an agreement and 
officially recognized small-scale bilateral trade. 166  In July 1955, China and Vietminh 
signed a treaty to allow the provincial governments on both sides to directly trade with 
each other. According to this treaty, the Yunnan Trading Company and the trading 
companies from Lao Cao, Ha Giang, Cao Bang and Lang Son further confirmed that 
from September, 1956 to 1969, the total trade value between Yunnan and Vietnam should 
be controlled within 1.5 million yuan each year. The commodities exported from Yunnan 
would be shipped from Kunming to Chinese ports, including Hekou, Jinshuie and 
Tianbao.167 In June, 1958, another treaty between China and Vietminh allowed the Hekou 
County Trading Company to have direct business with the trading companies in Lao Cai, 
which extended the government oriented trade on both side to the county level. From 
1958 to 1965, the Hekou County Trade Company handled 1,597,598 yuan value of 
commodities for exports and imports. 168  
As for the local civilians, in 1952, those who resided within 20 km’s radius were 
able to receive a border pass issued by the local government. Besides the border pass, the 
county government also permitted local civilians to purchase a pass to enter into 
designated market places for trade. 169 In 1955, the Provincial Government of Yunnan 
issued a new regulation to introduce passports as the valid travel documentation. The 
flow of cross-border communication significantly reduced in 1960 when small-scale trade 
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was terminated by the Chinese government. In 1960, only 108, 452 people crossed the 
Hekou Port. In 1961, the number slightly raised to 43, 422.  In 1962, the number 
decreased again, and only 22 982 people crossed the Hekou port from January to August. 
In 1963, the Provincial Government of Yunnan signed a treaty with the Northwestern 
Autonomous Region of Vietnam, Lao Cai Province, and Ha Giang Province in order to 
increase twelve regular routes for the civilians to travel. Besides that, temporary travel 
routes would be opened to the civilians during holidays. 170 This solution caused a rise in 
cross-border records, and yet the total number was still far below the records set before 
the small-scale trade was ceased. 171 
China continued to aid the Vietminh even when it was troubled by economic 
problems itself. The Sino-Vietnamese border in Yunnan saw frequent visits between the 
Vietminh and the CCP delegations up to 1978. 172  And yet, more and more conflicts 
occurred along the border since 1974. The Chinese records charges Vietnam with being 
responsible for more 121 conflicts along the border in 1974, 439 in 1975, 986 in 1976, 
752 in 1977, 1,108 in 1978 and 129 alone in the first 1.5 months in 1979. These cases 
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included confrontations between the border patrols from both sides as well as Chinese 
civilians’ being threatened by Vietnamese police forces. 173   
During the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, the Vietnamese army bombed the 
Chinese civilian sites in Malipo County 2,959 times, causing the death of 341 people and 
injury for 440 people.  Around 23, 272 mu lands were deserted, and 338 ditches and 
channels were destroyed. About 10,086 mu forests were damaged, and 2,250 mu cash 
crop forest were also destroyed.  Besides that, 21,996 people from 3,074 families of 120 
villages along the border also were relocated. 174 
On the Vietnamese side, the border people, regardless their age and sex, were all 
organized and joined the military forces to fight against the Chinese. When the Chinese 
troops went across the border and entered into Vietnam, the past experience of their 
fellow soldiers, their fear as well as strong desire to survive drove them to shot whoever 
Vietnamese they met. At that point, it was already too difficult to tell who distinguish 
ordinary border people from the Vietnamese troops and militia. 175 
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Trade vs. Wars, and Open vs. Isolation: 
Roles of Opium and Rubber Cultivation 
 
From the late 19th century on, two major currents battled against each other in the 
Yunnan borderlands and its adjacent counties: trade directed by the larger powers and its 
relatively open environment, and the wars led by the larger powers, and its consequence 
of isolation. In the Yunnan borderlands, either colonial economy before 1949, or the 
communist state economy after 1949 provided an ideal pattern to handle the economic 
connections between the indigenous societies and the outside world. The commonality 
between the trade and the wars, as well as between the open and the isolated environment, 
was that the indigenous population were often placed in a dilemma in terms of their 
agency to choose their own future development.  
The indigenous communities were caught in the clashes among the conventional 
imperial powers (such as China) when new colonial powers such as France and Britain 
and later Japan and the U.S. in the 19th and 20th century created frequent and devastating 
wars, making it impossible for constant foodstuff cultivation. Driven by the desire to 
relieve poverty and starvation, the indigenous people embraced new trade opportunities 
in opium and rubber that were presented by outsiders. Soon, local production of cash 
crops was stimulated and dramatically enlarged by increasing demand of the global 
market, and that of the Chinese domestic market in particular.  
Opium cultivation had become popular in Yunnan in the late 19th century, and 
reached its peak among many indigenous people from 1920s to 1940s. 176  “The 
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province’s currency was supported by opium, and the political independence of the 
regime was based firmly on opium income”, especially in the 1930s. 177   
For the mountain people, this new business promised a better and stable income, 
and fit their slash-burn style of farming. Opium poppy fields were soon found across the 
vast area from southern Yunnan to western Yunnan during the late 19th century and early 
20th century. Indigenous people such as the Bulang, Dai, De’ang, Lahu, Hani, and Wa 
were active opium poppy cultivators. 178  In Honghe, the opium tax paid by the Hani 
cultivators became the major income of the Native Officer in Situo. In the Wa 
communities, every family grew opium poppies. Opium were often used as dowry for 
marriage, credit in local banking, and even currency in the Wa market. Slaves were sold 
and purchased especially for opium cultivation. 179  
In the late 1940s, in order to fund their military operations, the CCP guerilla 
forces in northeastern Yunnan openly supported the indigenous people and mobilized 
them to grow opium poppies despite of the opium ban of the Republican government. In 
Luoping County, the CCP began to urge farmers to grow opium in 1946 and 1947. In 
1948, the opium cultivation areas also became the base for the CCP guerilla forces. In a 
vast area where Yunnan, Guizhou and Guangxi bordered, centers for opium growing and 
selling were organized and protected by the CCP military forces until 1951. 180 
The long-lasting and broad problems caused by opium cultivation and 
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consumption plagued the indigenous communities for more than 100 years during the 
19th and 20th centuries.  Heavy fines and taxes extracted from opium farmers proved that 
opium cultivation was not a cure for poverty. Indeed, opium cultivation triggered a chain 
of negative effects both in the short-term and long-run. 
For example, in Guangnan County near the Sino-Vietnamese border, the price of 
opium fields and suitable lands for opium cultivation exceeded that of the rice fields. The 
rising land prices motivated local landlords and gangsters to occupy farmers’ lands by 
force.  Tax collectors sent by local authorities always coerced the farmers for bribes. 
There were often conflicts between greedy officers and angry farmers. Wealthy opium 
dealers were able to purchase positions and became local officials. Once they become 
local officials, they never hesitated to raise tax rates in order to gain the money they 
needed to maintain their connections with still higher level officials. As for ordinary 
people, less than a quarter of them avoided opium addiction. Some children even had 
become drug addicts before they turned ten years old. 181 
In fact, the opium cultivation and trade accelerated the militarization and 
confrontations in the Yunnan borderlands. Wanting the tremendous profits that opium had 
promised, indigenous officers, landlords and gangsters organized forces and robbed 
caravans that were not from Yunnan on the trade routes, with the result that military 
confrontations often broke out. Merchants had to hire safety guards and equip themselves 
with armed forces for the sake of protecting their caravans. Soon weapons and firearms  
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became another popular commodity that began to circulate wherever opium was traded. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, robberies and homicides plagued Guangnan society. 182  
Opium cultivation in China gradually disappeared after the establishment of the 
PRC. But opium consumption and smuggling continued to plague the borderlands in 
Yunnan. In Laos, the CIA sponsored opium poppy cultivation remained into the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Opium also became the major source of income for the exiled KMT armies 
that were hovering in the mountains of the Northwestern Thailand, Laos and Burma. On 
the Burmese side, by the1970s, the CPB controlled “a 20,000 square kilometer area 
adjacent to the Chinese frontier, stretching uninterruptedly from the Mekong River and 
the Lao border to the border town of Pangshai where the Burma Road crosses into 
Vietnam.”183  Later after China withdrew financial support to the CPB in 1975, 
communist party members in Burma began to engage in the opium trade in order to 
become self-reliant. The drug problem along the Sino-Burmese border caused increasing 
problems as well as tensions between the CCP and CPB.  Heroin was being smuggled to 
Yunnan, and then distributed into other places such as Hong Kong.184 Thus, the opium 
cultivation and trade provided a middle ground where the interests of various forces from 
different ideological and political backgrounds were directed into a common world 
market, particularly that of the U.S. 
In order to resume regular cross border trade with Burma and eliminate the drug 
problem, the CCP tried to persuade the CPB leaders as well as high-ranking cadres to 
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give up and retire in China. The initial effort was made in 1981, and repeated in 1985 and 
1988. The offer from the CCP included asylum with monthly pension, with homes or a 
piece of land provided by the Chinese government. Eventually younger low ranking CPB 
cadres accepted. In early 1989, the Chinese tried again and were rejected again by the 
CPB. The current CPB chairman, Thakin Ba Thein Tin denounced Chinese interference. 
He expressed that the CPB had no desire to become revisionists like the CCP, saying that 
“this is the same as in 1981, 1985 and 1988.”185   
CPB leaders continued to visit China often well into the early 1990s, and were 
always provided transportation, like limousines, as soon as they stepped into the Chinese 
border.186 On March 12, 1989, the ethnic Chinese belonging to the CPB KoKang units 
openly rebelled, and within a month, the CPB collapsed. About 300 former CPB leaders 
found shelter in China. Many of them retired to Kunming, gradually passing away in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s.  Some younger former CPB cadres started small business as 
traders in Tengchong, Ruili and other towns along the border. 187 
Compared with the communist opium economy of the CPB controlled area in 
Burma, the indigenous people in the Yunnan borderlands engaged in another type of 
communist economy. From the 1950s to the 1980s, state farms along the Sino-Burmese, 
Sino-Lao, and Sino-Vietnamese border absorbed local peasants and private capital into a 
semi-isolated and militarized entity dominated by the state political economy. The local 
economy began to yield to the general needs of China’s domestic plan of economic 
development, potential world wars, and Cold War policies.   
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The PRC’s engagement in the Korea War and its urgent needs for rubber supplies 
led to systematically rubber tree cultivation in the Yunnan borderlands. From early 1950s 
to mid-1980s, rubber tree cultivation represented China’s self-sufficient response to the 
U.S embargo on China. During this time period, state farms became the centers for 
cultivation and technological support.  At the same time, cooperation between China and 
the Soviet Union boosted rubber cultivation in China and further satisfied the Soviet 
Union’s hunger for rubber.188 In Xishuangbanna, the first large-scale state farm was 
established in Mengzhe and Menghai in 1955. From then on, one main purpose of the 
state farm system was to build the second rubber cultivation center in China.189 Around 
1984 to 1985, private companies and peasants were allowed to separate from the state 
farm system and to establish their own plantations. Private rubber tree plantations 
boomed because of the tremendous profits they yielded. Today, rubber tree farmers are 
exhausting all the available lands to build more plantations.   
In the past 20 years, alleviating poverty has been the top priority for the local 
government, state farms and the peasants in the Yunnan borderlands. With an increasing 
need from the “bottomless” Chinese market and advanced technology, rubber cultivation 
provided the fastest way for both government and peasants to quickly get out of poverty.  
Farmers, private companies, state farms and government actively participated in the 
“white gold rush”, destroying the original local landscape and vegetation in the process.  
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From 1950s to 1970s, overly deforestation and hunting came as the result in the 
dramatic increase of the state farm population and their needs for food, housing and etc. 
From 1971 to 1972, Judith Shapiro personally witnessed the disappearance of more than 
forty springs in Jinnuo.190 “Rubber trees are like water pumps that suck a huge amount of 
water and moisture each day. Over decades, rubber tree cultivation has gradually taken 
away the moisture of Xishuangbanna. The weather has been getting hotter each year. The 
dry season is getting longer. We are expecting less rains each year.” Big, firm bamboo 
stalks that were used for building homes are difficult to find now because all the land 
where bamboo used to grow has been turned into rubber tree plantations. 191 In Menglun 
Town, the Dai people had to gradually give up the habit of collecting and cooking 
mushrooms and wild vegetables because of the disappearing rainforests. Villagers in the 
Chengzi Village even cleared the original rainforest for rubber tree cultivation in the 
sacred White Elephant Mountain where logging and farming was forbidden for centuries. 
At the same time, many also stopped growing kassod trees for firewood, not only because 
of the widespread use of electronic appliances but also because rubber trees have already 
taken every possible piece of land for cultivation.192 
With the introduction of the PRC political economy, the Yunnan borderlands 
became separated from the adjacent Southeast Asian countries, and was turned into a 
remote cash crop cultivation base for China. The relatively better-off life on the China 
side of the border does suggest the success of China’s economic policies to certain degree, 
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if all the setbacks before the late 1980s are not taken into account. However, the progress 
speaks more to stagnant economic development on the mainland Southeast Asian side, 
caused by constant social turmoil throughout recent years. Even at the end of the 20th 
century, the border people were still fighting and seeking opportunities for cross border 
trade, trying to improve their financial status. 
Landmines: Another Type of Trauma that We Don’t Mention 
 
From the 1980s, when the indigenous population on both side tried to resume the 
trade and regular communication between Yunnan and its neighboring countries, the 
greatest challenge came from the physical destruction in the borderlands. This includes 
the threat of the landmines, a subject that is often neglected by both the Chinese civilians 
as well as most of scholars. 
During the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, China and Vietnam laid more than one 
million landmines along the major routes between China and Vietnam. The landmine 
zone in Wenshan Prefecture extended for 438 kilometers and covered fifteen townships 
as well as 142 villages. More than 5,000 mu fields were deserted because of the threat of 
landmines. The regular connections that the border people used to have for generations 
were cut off. 193 Over the years, the wars as well as the landmines explosion have killed 
1,683, disabled 1,274 and injured 1, 418 people. 194  
                                                 
193 Wenshan Zhou Sao Lei Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi (文山州领导小组办公室), “Zhong Yue Bianjing 
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Over the years, many local civilians in Yunnan and Guangxi lost their legs and 
lives when they crossed the border to trade with the Vietnamese. 195 For example, the 
landmine zone in the Tianpeng Town of the Funing County used to be the main passage 
for people to travel between Tianpeng and Binh Tay Market. A large number of 
landmines, including anti-tank mines, were buried, which essentially hindered 
development of this potentially most important outpost of the trans-national trade 
between Yunnan and Vietnam. 196  The Balihe village is separated from Vietnam by the 
Dongshan Mountain, which was one of the most important battle sites during the Sino-
Vietnamese War. There are fifty-four families in the Balihe village, and more than 100 
people have lost at least one leg in landmine accidents. That is one leg per family. 197 
From April 1993 to September 1994, the central Chinese government and its 
military committee organized the first large scale landmine elimination campaign. The 
military and more than 8,287 local workers swept through 200 square kilometers area and 
cleared 83,643 unexploded ordnance (UXO), 27,661 bullets, 13,996 fuses, as well as 
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197 Xiao Huanhuan (肖欢欢), Dilei Cun Chai Dan San Ren Xing  “地雷村”拆弹三人行[The Fellowship of 
Demining] in Guangzhou Ri Bao 广 州 日 报  [Guangzhou Daily]( November 29, 2013), 
http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/html/2013-11/29/content_2467140.htm, accessed  January 5th 2015. 
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more than 1,000 caltrops.198 Later, they blocked off around 145 square kilometers land 
with wood and concrete bars as well as barbed wires.199  Following this operation, in 
1993, the total foreign trade value of this area increased 63% compared with 1992, 
achieving a trade surplus for the first time.200  
However, these landmarks for the landmine zones were gradually removed or 
relocated by floods as well as landslides that are common to the mountainous terrain. The 
landmine accidents began to increase again. From the rainy season of 1995 to 1997, 489 
accidents occurred, injuring and killing hundreds of cattle as well as 139 people.  The 
terror caused by landmines was again gripping the border. 201 From January, 1997 to June 
1999, a second landmine elimination campaign was organized, involving more than 500 
troops from the provincial army as well as the village cadres and militias near the 
landmine zones. Government demining teams swept through around 92.1 square 
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kilometers area and blockaded close to 55 square kilometers of land. The local villagers 
were compensated with 670,000 yuan.202 
In fact, China has planted an estimated ten million mines along its borders with 
Russia, India, and Vietnam over the years.  At the same time, China declared that it was 
“not a country seriously affected by (land) mines.” 203 By the late 1990s, only 60% of the 
mines were cleared along the Sino-Vietnamese border by the government. After the last 
campaign, signs and concrete walls were built to stop civilians entering into the landmine 
zones. According to government officials from the Malipo County government, the 
government has blockaded the mountains and discouraged civilians from wildcat 
demining, meaning to clear the mines themselves. The government is planning to close 
the landmine zones for several more decades until the land mines expire. Until then, 
professionals will be hired for demining. Currently, the state government does not 
provide any compensation for those who were injured by landmine accidents.  The 
provincial government set aside around 2.5 million yuan each year, and gives 2,600 yuan 
per disability compensation to villagers. 204 
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203 UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office: Impact of Landmines on Children in the East Asia and 
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Ultimately, some local civilians took the responsibility to clear landmines instead 
of passively waiting for the government’s actions. Volunteers from the Balihe village 
near the border began to detect and clear landmines twenty years ago. By 2013, Wang 
Kaixue, Wang Kaifu and three men from the Balihe Village in Malipo County of 
Wenshan Prefecture had already cleared up more than 20,000 landmines on China’s side, 
and turned hundreds of mu of landmine zones into productive farming lands.  205  
Nevertheless, it would to too arbitrary to argue that the landmine zones between 
the Sino-Vietnamese border have completely cut off the connection between the two 
sides. Over the years, border people have figured out numerous paths to cut through the 
landmine zones. These routes provide convenience for local bilateral communications, as 
well as cross-border smuggling and human trafficking.  
In fact, China gradually loosened its control on the cross border trade in the 1990s, 
allowing small scale border markets to flourish. Recently, China actively promoted the 
economic integration of Yunnan and mainland Southeast Asia and initiated several 
regional projects such as gas pipelines that connect Yunnan to Burma and the Trans-
Asian Raiway (TAR). China’s private capital also flowed into Vietnam, Laos, and Burma 
for building rubber tree farms as a substitute of opium poppy cultivation. And yet, the 
majority of the border people were not the direct beneficiaries of the state policies 
promoting foreign trade as well as regional cooperation. Their daily consumption on 
foreign commodities, the same as for many other Chinese people, is still affected by 
China’s strict tariffs and high taxation. Driven by the large needs of China’s domestic 
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market and profit, smuggling has been very common. But the most cunning smugglers 
were those who walked across the landmine zones between the Sino-Vietnamese border.  
In June, 2014, a joint mission named LS06 that involved customs agents from 
Shenzhen, Xiamen, Jinan, Zhengzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Nanning, Chengdu, 
Kunming and Urumqi cracked an electronic devices smuggling network through the 
landmine zones along the Sino-Vietnamese border. The smuggling network avoided the 
traditional routes through Shenzhen, and developed a seemingly high risk but safe route 
using their experience and familiarity with the landmine zones.  
 
Map.4. Smuggling Routes via the Landmine Zones in Yunnan, 
by Zhang Dingping,Jinbao. 206 
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This revival of legitimate border trade and smuggling echoes earlier periods, but it 
is only a fraction of the vibrant trans-border economies of the Qing and Republican 
periods, when the Western colonial forces dedicated to incorporating the trading empire 
of the Yunnan borderlands and mainland Southeast Asia into the global market. The PRC 
and modern national borders destroyed many of the old ties that bonded China with 
Southeast Asia and South Asia, placing a political boundary across a vast transnational 
trading empire. Recently, China strives to revitalize Yunnan’s nature as the transnational 
corridor and promote regional economic cooperation. 207 In the early 21st century, China 
began to actively lead the economic integrations betweenYunnan borderlands and 
mainland Southeast Asia. 
In August 2014, China and Thailand reached an agreement to initiate the 
construction of the railways that connect Yunnan and Thailand in 2015, as a part of the 
Trans-Asian Railway (TAR).  The TAR starts at Kunming, and is supposed to split into 
three routes in Yunnan. These three routes will connect some major cities in Yunnan, 
such as Kunming, Yuxi, Dali, Mengzi, Jinghong, and Hekou to the major cities in Burma, 
Laos, and Vietnam, and eventually merge in Bangkok, Thailand. After that, the TAR will 
proceed to Singapore via Malaysia. The total budget worth 143 billion yuan would be 
split by the China and Thailand. However, the Chinese side is responsible for the 
construction, providing all the technicians, mechanics, as well as equipment. It is highly 
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possible that China would request Thailand to trade all the technological support that 
China provides with its rice. 208 
Map.5. Trans-Asian Railway by Wang Chuncai, Jinghua Shibao. 209                      
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On the other hand, the construction of the railway between Kunming to Kyaukpyu, 
Burma, as a part of the TAR, was suspended in July, 2014. This was largely resulted by 
the objection from the Burmese civilians, as well as the Burmese government’s lack of 
interests at the surface level. 210   
Currently, it seems difficult for China’s Southeast Asian neighbors to accept its 
offers of economic integration without hesitance because of their fear and distrust 
towards China’s power. The borders between China and adjacent countries are more 
defined than ever before, marking the boundaries of national security for both sides better 
than demarcating any ideological or political order. 
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CHAPTER 5   FROM A MULTICULTURAL LAND TO 
A REMOTE SOCIALISTFRONTIER 
 
As militarized and pro-trade people, the indigenous communities in the Yunnan 
borderlands did not deliberately focus on the development of education, particularly as a 
way for upward social mobility in ways that fit into the traditional Chinese perception of 
education.  Generally speaking, by the late 19th century, the Buddhist, Muslim and 
Christian communities possessed relatively advanced educational systems while the 
Confucian communities of Chinese upheld education as the main approach for political 
participation. The Chinese government attempted to civilize the barbarians by 
establishing Chinese public schools and norms in the frontier area, but it failed to 
penetrate and change the indigenous society, rooted in cultural and political localism.   
This makeup of the educational systems did not change too much during the 
Republican era, although standard curriculum that stressed personal development as well 
as citizen education appeared in Chinese public schools. And a result, generally, the 
development of a public educational system allowed the co-existence of alternate 
educational approaches that fostered the soil for multi-culturalism.  
The context of the Chinese civilizing mission in the Yunnan borderlands changed 
after 1950 when the CCP arrived as the new leader. Representing an alien culture and 
norms, as did the Mongolian as well as Manchu, the CCP initially intended to transform 
the frontier by Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong’s Marxist theories. However, even 
the CCP itself did not have a clear vision of its long-term goals for educational reform in 
the context of socialist nation building. 
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The CCP failed to anticipate the practical problems caused by its new policies, 
and, at the same time, also failed to anticipate the social and cultural disconnect caused 
by the dramatic transformation of education and the tightening of state ideological 
controls. Moreover, the CCP leadership simplified educational reform, equating it with 
ideological education and propaganda, and thus significantly degraded the status of 
education in the society. The CCP leadership was itself confused and constantly plagued 
by factional conflicts, which contaminated the educational sector and triggered nation-
wide confrontations and confusion. 
The Soil for Multi-culturalism 
 
The education in the Yunnan borderlands varied significantly because of the 
different cultural and religious traditions represented in indigenous societies, including 
animist, Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, and Confucian communities. Generally, the animist 
sphere overlapped with the Buddhist as well as Confucian sphere. The Muslim sphere 
adopted certain educational approaches from the Confucian sphere. The Christian sphere 
remained relatively independent. Education was provided in different ways, and thus bore 
different purposes and outcomes in the distinct spheres. The existence of the Confucius 
sphere did not suggest that Chinese education became the overarching force that shaped 
the cultural landscape of the Yunnan borderlands.   
Informal education provided most indigenous people with the basic knowledge 
and living skills, such as farming, hunting, tool making, and house building. 1 The 
youngsters were usually homeschooled by parents and seniors or taught in the fields, 
                                                 
1Guo Chaoting, Lin Dezhong and Xian Zhi (郭朝庭, 林德忠, 线智), Baoshan Shi Shaoshu Minzu Zhi保山
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orchards, and hunting sites for an early age.2 Bai boys started their apprenticeship at eight 
years old. 3 The Lisu boys followed their fathers for group hunts, where they learned how 
to distinguish beasts according to their footprints and feces, and also how to track and 
hunt them with dogs.4 After a period of training, Lisu boys received small hunting tools 
that were customized for them, like jute nets, bows and arrows, and crossbows, allowed 
them to catch birds, rabbits and other small animals in the fields and woods near their 
homes. In addition, Lisu boys were given small plows so that they could practice plowing 
with dogs.5  During the time that the whole family gathered together, parents and seniors 
also passed on the knowledge of their own history, moral judgment and ethics to the 
younger generation in the form of conversations, storytelling, and art. Myths and stories 
of the creation, big flood, migration, romantic love as well as people’s interaction with 
the environment were very common in indigenous parables, songs, dances, and dramas. 6  
Indigenous people also developed special skills according to their specific needs 
and cultural characteristics. For example, martial arts were very popular in the highly 
militarized Dai and Jingpo communities. The Dai martial arts had around a hundred 
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routines. Martial arts and sword contests were quite common in the Dai communities. 7 
The Jingpo people also frequently held hunting, shooting, martial arts, as well as other 
forms of athlete competitions so as to test and challenge both young men and young 
women’s skills and strength. 8 
Relatively formal education came from religious activities and institutions, such 
as the Buddhist Temple and Muslim Mosque, the content and intensity of which varied 
due to specific religious beliefs and cultural traditions. Education received in the religious 
institutions was usually elite education, aiming at the preservation of indigenous history 
and tradition, as well as the facilitation of social mobility and political participation.  
Generally, almost all the frontier settlers had the tradition of ancestor worship, 
regardless of their religious inclinations. At the same time, animism co-existed within the 
Buddhist as well as Confucian communities. Thus, ancestor worship as well as animist 
rituals and ceremonies were a common part of what children learned about their beliefs, 
history, societal laws and regulations. For example, the Lisu priests, wizards, and singers 
often chanted the doctrines of their animist belief as well as the mythical origin of their 
tribal history.9  Achang children followed and learned from their parents in all the 
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religious activities. Over the years, they mastered the procedures and the vocabulary 
needed to conduct all kinds of ceremonies, setting an example for their own children.10 
Among all the religious institutions outside of the Confucian sphere, Buddhist 
monasteries provided the most formal education in the Yunnan borderlands during the 
second millennium. The tradition for young men to spend a significant amount of their 
early life in the temples in order to become literate and educated began no later than the 
10th century. In the Buddhist communities, temple schools often co-existed with informal 
educational institutions, aiming at elite education. By the mid-20th century, the most 
consistent, systematic and wide-spread educational opportunities were still found in the 
Buddhist temples. In the plains of Xishuangbanna, whoever failed to dwell in the 
Buddhist temple for education was considered as “Ai-li”, meaning a stranger who was 
not civilized, and was often despised by others. 11 The Dai people’s discrimination 
towards the Hani people was a demonstration of their superiority generated from regular 
Buddhist monastery education.  
The Dai men usually followed two steps to become a monk: first, they needed to 
serve as an apprentice in the temple. In Xishuangbanna, they were called Ke-yong. Ke-
yong boys began to attend classes at a local Buddhist temple without residency at the age 
of seven to eight. In Dehong, apprentices in the temple were called Jiabei, meaning those 
who were not shaved. They were usually about ten years old. Apprenticeship served as 
the kindergarten education so as to prepare young boys for the Dai language skills and 
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the basic Buddhist knowledge that they needed in order to start official schooling in the 
temples.12 Second, when the time was ready, their heads would be shaved, and they 
would dress up in yellow and become official monks with a particular home-leaving 
ceremony. New monks were usually called Panan, meaning young monks. As their age 
and knowledge grew, they moved closer to the medium level of the sangha ranks.13 
Usually, not many young men would desire to be dedicated enough to spend their whole 
lifetime in the Buddhist temple, so the majority chose to return to secular life as grown 
men. Higher ranking sangha were Buddhist scriptorians, who were rarely found in the 
community. At the same time, strict selection procedures kept their population small. The 
legitimacy of higher ranking sangha as well as the selecting procedure had to be 
sanctioned by the local secular authorities.14 
Thus, it is clear that Buddhist temples produced both professional and temporary 
sangha, a pool of social elites who further stabilized the religious as well as secular 
authority. In the indigenous society, especially in areas where Buddhism reigned and was 
interdependent with the secular authority, religious leaders usually were kin of secular 
leaders. And some of the secular leaders even acted in the position of religious leaders. 
Buddhist monastic education thus maintained a decent size of sangha monks who were 
loyal to both the religious and secular authorities. Also it provided the platform for future 
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religious and secular leaders to develop and cultivate connections with current authorities 
when they were still on the preparatory stage of their life.  
Moreover, monastic education opened the channel for the upward movement of 
Dai commoners, and even a small number of non-Dai converts. In Xishuangbanna and 
Dehong, smaller ethnic groups such as the Bulang people and De’ang people, who 
cohabitated with the Dai, often followed the Dai norms of education, learning the 
Buddhist classics as well as the Dai language.15  In the 16th century, when Buddhism was 
introduced into Luxi in western Yunnan, Buddhist monastic education became standard 
not only for the Dai people but also for the De’ang people. Besides the Dai language, Pali 
script, and Buddhist scriptures, they would learn about medicine and herbs, skills like 
paper cutting, drawing and divination, as well as rituals for marriage, funeral and other 
occasions. 16 Education in the Buddhist temple enabled the Bulang people to get involved 
in the Dai dominant society and climb up on the social ladder in their communities.17 It 
was rare, at least before the 1950s, to find an adult man who had never spent time in the 
Buddhist temple in his youth. 18  
Another outreach aspect was the mass education the educated male elites were 
able to bring to the commoners, including women, who had no other opportunities for 
formal education. Those who were once temporary sangha returned to the religious and 
                                                 
15 Zheng Peng and Yang Shengneng (征鹏, 杨胜能), Xishuangbanna Fengqing Yiqu Lu (Di San Ban) 西双
版纳风情奇趣录 (第三版) [The exotic culture and customs in Xishuangbanna, 3rd edition] (Kunming: 
Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 209. 
16Yang Guangxing (杨光兴), Luxi Xian Jiaoyu Zhi潞西县教育志 [The gazetteer of the education of the 
Luxi County] (Jinghong: Dehong minzu chubanshe, 1993), 55,184. 
17 Zheng Peng and Yang Shengneng (征鹏, 杨胜能), Xishuangbanna Fengqing Yiqu Lu (Di San Ban) 西双
版纳风情奇趣录 (第三版) [The exotic culture and customs in Xishuangbanna, 3rd edition] (Kunming: 
Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 209. 
18  Zheng Peng and Yang Shengneng (征鹏, 杨胜能), Xishuangbanna Fengqing Yiqu Lu (Di San Ban) 西
双版纳风情奇趣录 (第三版) [The exotic culture and customs in Xishuangbanna, 3rd edition] (Kunming: 
Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1997), 209. 
221 
secular social network, bringing with them Buddhist knowledge, a sense of loyalty 
towards the authorities, and also the opportunities of literacy.    
The Dai language was based on the ancient Pali script, the main written language 
of the Theravada Buddhist scriptures. There are four major dialects of the Dai languages 
adopted by the Dai people in the Yunnan borderlands: the Dai-Le, Dai-Na, Dai-Beng and 
Dai-Duan (or Jinping-Dai).19  The Dai-Le is the classic Dai language and popular in 
Xishuangbanna, which was also used in the Chiangmai area in Thailand, Kengtun in 
Burma, and Laos as well. Dai-Na language was possibly created somewhere during the 
14th century, by the end of the century, it had become an official language adopted by the 
Sangha as well as indigenous nobles in western Yunnan.20   
When monks returned to secular life, some of them became clerks in the village, 
while others, teachers for the commoners. Uneducated young people usually liked to set 
aside three months in summer each year to learn the language. Three months was 
considered as the time needed to become a rudimentary reader in the Dai language. 
Students would learn vowels, consonants, syllables, and spelling rules so they could 
gather together and begin to read simple Buddhist scriptures as well as songs and drama 
scripts. 21 In Longchuan, each student brought the teacher a few baskets of grain for 
tuition. 22 Such learning methods had functioned for more than 500 years and remained as 
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one of the most important ways for the Dai culture and traditions to be passed on, 
sustaining a literacy rate of around 10%-20%.23 
In western Yunnan, by the early 1950s, there were 140 Buddhist monastery 
schools in Luxi County, which provided education for 11% of the Dai intellectuals. 24 In 
Longchuan, 102 Buddhist temples were in full service. 25  These Buddhist schools 
disappeared in the 1950s, and did not reappear until the 1980s. 26 In southern Yunnan, 
183 Buddhist temples were still found just in 230 villages in Xishuangbanna in 1955. 27 
Muslim mosque schools appeared around the late 18th century during the 
Qianlong era (1735-1796). They were the only non-Chinese institutions what would offer 
Chinese language classes. The major reason for this was that the Muslims, as migrants 
from inner China, had higher level of involvement in the Chinese domestic politics as 
well as the civil service examination. During the Qianlong rule, Muslim scholar Ma 
Dexin (1794-1874) from Dali incorporated the practice of Chinese private schools in 
Islamic institutions and organized the Muslim mosque schools. 28 
The Muslims in Baoshan of western Yunnan organized a Chinese-Arabian school 
at the local mosque in Changning, teaching both Chinese and basic Arabic to a limited 
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number students.29  Muslim education began to extend from elites to the public in the 
beginning of the Republican era when private schools appeared in Muslim settlements. 
More young people were able to learn Arabic, and some of them were selected to study in 
the schools in Weishan.30  In Xinping of southern Yunnan, the Mosque school was 
opened in 1913. In 1942, the Mosque school was put under the direction of the Xinping 
County Educational Bureau, and shared the same curriculum with other regular Chinese 
public schools. The only difference was that while all the public schools were off in the 
afternoon, the students at the Muslim school stayed to learn Arabic and scriptures.31  
Christian church schools appeared in the late 19th century when the missionaries 
arrived in mountainous areas that were considered too remote to be settled by the Chinese. 
They lived among the indigenous people, learning their languages and then developing 
written language systems such as the Lahu, Jingpo and Lisu languages. These newly 
developed written languages became very popular among the indigenous elites, and later 
became formal languages for the local church schools as well as worship services.  
In Shuangjiang of Southern Yunnan, the Lahu people, Yi people, and Wa people 
were the major groups who used Lahu language to receive Christian education before the 
first indigenous Chinese teacher began to practice in 1927. 32 The Lahu people’s multi-
gods religious system included Mahayana Buddhist elements, and Taoist and animist 
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ingredients as well. In the 1920s, many of them converted to Christianity and began to 
learn the Lahu languages that had been recently introduced by an American missionary 
who arrived in 1905. 33  The Yi people in the same area were Buddhist believers before 
the Jiaqing era (1796-1820). Towards the late Qing era, they converted to Christianity 
and studied the Holy Bible in Lahu language.34  From the 1920s to 1940s, the Yi people 
were forced to attend public schools, but only a few of them mastered Chinese by 1947.35 
The Wa people in Shuangjiang were converted to Buddhism during the Ming and Qing 
dynasties. Some of them became Christians during the Republican era and also began to 
study the Holy Bible in Lahu language. 36 
In western Yunnan, the protestant church began to thrive in Luxi in the 1890s and 
chapels were raised in more than ten towns and villages. A Baptist church missionary 
from America named Ola Hanson (1864-1929) arrived in the Kachin area of upper 
Burma about this time and formulated a local Kachin written language based on the 
Jingpo language system.37  In the late 1890s, missionaries also formulated the Lisu 
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written language in the Muchengpo area of Luxi and opened more than four church 
schools among the Lisu settlements.38  
The newly introduced Jingpo language was frequently used by the missionaries to 
proselytize, and also for the literacy classes. 39  This new language became very popular 
among the Christian converts and the Jingpo nobles in the late 19th century. 40   In the 
beginning of the 20th century, the first copy of the New Testament and a hymn book in the 
Jingpo language came into being.41  At the same time, both Protestant and Catholic 
churches began to build more schools in Jingbo and Lisu settlements in Huwa, Nongxian, 
Bangwan, Gongshan, Lubao, Gaoli and Shibei. 42  On the other hand, Chinese was spoken 
only by a few indigenous nobles,  43 and Chinese public schools were not established 
until a few decades later.  The government’s effort in developing education in Longchuan 
was interrupted by a lack of teachers and funding. 44 By 1937 there were only five public 
schools for the 319 students in Longchuan and adjacent area. The student’s number kept 
decreasing in the following decades because of war.45   
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The missionaries’ effort to proselytize and build schools was not stopped by low 
attendance or war.  Two more church schools were built in the Jingbo and Lisu settlement 
in the 1930s, with around forty students in their classrooms. 46  For example, in 1937, a 
missionary with a Chinese name of An Shipu built a chapel in Mushui for church as well 
as school, converting over ten people and enrolling more than ten Jingo children. An 
Shipu’s effort persisted until he and his families were captured by the Japanese army and 
sent to Wanding in 1942. 47  At the same year, most schools were closed because of the 
Japanese invasion. In 1945, only five schools were still providing classes for around 100 
students. After two years’ recovery period, the school number in Longchuan reached 
twenty-four in 1947, admitting 666 students. 48  In the year of 1946 and 1947, 
missionaries from Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic Church resumed their 
work in Longchuan and remained active in the 1950s. 49 
 Christian church schools in Luxi became the main platforms for the indigenous 
people to gain education and became literate before the public schools proliferated. 50  By 
the 1950s, many Lisu people who were over 50 years old could read and write, and even 
teach the Lisu language. Blackboards could be found in every house, with parents 
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responsible for teaching their own children. On the other hand, those Lisu people who 
were proficient in Chinese were extremely rare to find. 51  
Christian church schools’ curriculum also brought a new scope for the indigenous 
education. In 1932, the Manyun Christian Church in Xishuangbanna administered by 
missionaries from the U.S opened an elementary school that provided Chinese language, 
Dai language, English language, math, and medical classes. 52 The Mingdao-Yuan 
Christian Church founded by American missionaries in the mountains in Luxi provided a 
four-year education for the indigenous people. Both English and Chinese were taught. 
Besides that, students could also take abacus, music, morality and ethics, PE, art and 
other classes. This new school even attracted the Native Officer of Zhefang to send his 
sons and nephews for school. 53  The Gongshan Church School in Longchuan used the 
Holy Bible as the main text book. But students were also taught Jingpo language, 
Burmese, English and Chinese. For the second and third graders, geography, history, 
music, PE and art classes were part of the curriculum.54 Outside of the church schools, 
those indigenous people who were converted were taught to stay away from Ghost 
worship, stealing, prostitution, and gambling. Besides that, the hygiene situation among 
the converts was significantly improved.55  
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Besides religious educational institutions, Chinese private schools flourished as 
Chinese migrant workers moved into southern Yunnan to work on the tea plantations and 
mines. In Longchuan, schools run by Chinese migrants were concentrated in the Chinese 
settlements. Some schools that taught in both Chinese and Dai languages were even 
established before the 16th century.56 During the Qing dynasty, these private schools were 
mostly occupied by Han children and it was rare to find indigenous children. 57 Some 
private Chinese schools in Tengyue not only taught Confucian classics but also 
calligraphy, writing, and abacus.58  Chinese schools were also found among the Chinese 
settlements in the mountains. In Luxi, each Chinese school provided education for forty 
to fifty families on an average basis by the late Qing era.59  In Xishuangbanna, Chinese 
and Confucianism based private schools were founded after 1892 in Yibang and Yiwu 
after a big influx of Chinese migrants who arrived for tea business. By 1902, six private 
schools were found in Xiangming, Yiwu, Mengla, Laojie, Jiumiao, and other areas, 
although they were turned into public schools after 1910. 60   
Another form of the private Chinese schools were operated by the Native Officers 
and indigenous nobles, with the purpose of learning Chinese so as to facilitate 
communication with the Chinese authorities. These schools appeared during the Ming 
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dynasty and became very common during the Qing and Republican China era. Native 
Officers often hired Chinese teachers and set aside a room or two in their own residence 
for such a school. These schools only admitted children of the Native Officer as well as 
indigenous nobles, and occasionally, other Chinese children. In these classrooms, both 
Chinese language and Dai language were taught, and yet most of the text books were 
based on Confucian classics. 61    
By the late Qing era, the Yunnan borderlands demonstrated a dynamic cultural 
landscape sustained by its educational diversity. On one hand, in terms of individual 
spheres, the dominant religious or cultural institutions provided the main educational 
platforms as well as the standards of moral and value judgment while allowing the 
existence of practices from other spheres. Both the Dai communities and the Muslim 
communities demonstrated this pattern by accommodating Chinese approaches. In this 
case, the individual religious and cultural sphere appeared to host a certain cultural 
pluralism in which the dominant cultural norms co-existed with those of various other 
cultures. This structure sustained stability and assured inheritance of particular 
indigenous cultures and social structures.   
The Chinese Civilizing Mission 
 
Government public schools, were also called Confucius Temple schools. 
Compared with the Chinese private schools that the Chinese migrants sporadically built 
in their settlements, public schools stood as the symbols of the expansion of Chinese 
power and its aim to transform the culture and traditions of the frontier in conformity 
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with Chinese norms. Besides preparing students for the Civil Service Examination, public 
schools had another distinct mission, which was to civilize and educate the indigenous 
population. During the Republican China era, besides the pedagogy of Confucian norms 
and ethics, a standardized curriculum as well as citizen education were introduced as new 
elements in the public schools. However, the Chinese Civilizing Mission had little 
success until the establishment of the PRC.  During the PRC era, intensive language 
training, standardized curriculum based on the Marxist ideology, the overall dominance 
of public schools, and indoctrination of patriotism as well as state selected values pushed 
the indigenous value-based educational system off the horizon.   
The expansion of Chinese colonial power brought Chinese public schools to the 
western Yunnan borderlands as early as the second century BC. However, these schools 
soon perished as indigenous powers rose and expelled China’s authority. It was not until 
the Ming dynasty that they began to thrive again. 62 During the mid-Qing era, as the gaitu 
guiliu policy was hastened in the Yunnan borderlands, the government opened Yixue 
School, particularly for common indigenous children. Northeastern Yunnan initially saw 
the founding of sixty-one Yixue schools. The purpose of opening Yixue was to civilize 
the “barbarians”.63 Indigenous children were required to go to school and study with the 
Chinese children for six years. The school curriculum was based on the Confucian 
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classics. Yixue forced out those who made no accomplishments and selected new 
candidates to fill the vacancies. Outstanding students, on the other hand, were assigned to 
teach indigenous children outside of school as part of a selection process. 64  
The situation in southern Yunnan was nothing compared to western Yunnan. The 
earliest public school did not appear until 1729 in Pu’er when the gaitu guiliu policy was 
initiated. The candidates had to pass a strict examination in order to enroll. 65 In 1737, 
Yixue began to appear in southern Yunnan. The indigenous officers in Yibang (one of the 
oldest tea centers), Jinghong and Mengzhe provided funding and organized three Yixue 
schools. However, in the year of 1788, these three schools were closed down, largely 
because of the shortage of both teachers and students.66 By 1746, over 700 Yixue were 
established throughout Yunnan. 67 By the late Qing era, more than 100 Yixue schools 
were fully in function in Southern Yunnan.68  
As the indigenous youth enrolled in public schools and received Confucian 
educations, the path for moving higher and participating in Chinese domestic politics 
seemed to have opened for the indigenous people.  However, few could take advantage of 
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such an opportunity in the frontier area. First of all, only a small portion of the indigenous 
students performed well under the Chinese language and Confucian based education. The 
Bai, Yi and Muslim students particularly had an advantage because of their long-term 
involvement with Chinese authority and education.  For example, the Yi and Bai people 
who moved to Baoshan with the expansion of the Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms sent their 
children to Chinese schools. Especially during the 19th and 20th century, Chinese public 
schools thrived within the Bai settlements in Western Yunnan. 69  
 The Yi people, who dwelled along the area where Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan 
intersected, actively engaged in civil service examinations and some gained access to the 
Chinese bureaucracy.  Moreover, Yi nobles usually liked to go to Chinese schools and 
become government officials in order to improve their social status, perfectly 
understanding that this meant acceptance of Chinese cultural norms. 70 During the 
Republican China era, Yi poets and intellectuals appeared, and the number of those who 
had participated in the civil service examination were too large to trace. 71 
Second, the autonomy of the frontier area, separated from the centralized Chinese 
political system, created disconnect between the social mobility of the Yunnan border 
lands and that in China proper. As elaborated in the previous chapters, the independent 
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roots of indigenous power and authority made it relatively less appealing and even less 
meaningful for the indigenous elites to pass beyond local politics and interact with the 
core of Chinese authority emanating from Beijing. There was little incentive for the bulk 
of indigenous elites to try to succeed within the Chinese educational system. Nevertheless, 
Yixue successfully taught the indigenous elites the advantages as well as disadvantages 
of reconciling with Chinese authority. Overtime, many indigenous elites aligned 
themselves with Chinese authority and even participated in military operations to pacify 
other indigenous rebellions.72 
Educational reform in the Yunnan borderlands sped up after the establishment of 
Republican China. The expansion of public schools had a new goal: to train and cultivate 
indigenous people as modern citizens of the Chinese nation. However, these efforts 
largely failed, for public schools failed, because of strong localism and the dominance of 
indigenous education and, at the same time these effort were often interrupted by frequent 
wars and social disturbances.  
The public school system became more formal and expanded faster in the 1920s, 
and yet often failed for the lack of students. 73  In 1927, all the private schools in 
Xishuangbanna were replaced by the public schools promoted by the Republican 
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government. 74 In 1930, the Chinese educational system received the support from the 
Dai indigenous leaders of Xishuangbanna and began to grow. In 1931, the provincial 
government of Yunnan promoted the Periphery Education program (边地教育). Thus, 
Chinese language learning was urged even by indigenous leaders. Children at eight years 
old were required to go to school. Those who had already begun school in the Buddhist 
temples were asked to attend the Chinese language class held at the Zhuangdong Temple 
in Jinghong. 75 In 1937, a private school operated by the Native Officers was combined 
with the Longchuan elementary school and administered directly by the educational 
department of the province. 76  By 1941, sixteen elementary schools were functioning in 
Zhenyue; and by 1938, eight elementary schools, two short-term elementary schools, a 
provincial administered elementary school and a church elementary schools were found 
in Jinghong, enrolling 399 students all together.  77 
As for higher level education, in 1935, the Jinglong Buddhist temple in Menghai 
hosted a short-term training program for teachers. A year later, this program was turned 
into an official rudimentary normal school that was overseen by the provincial 
government. Later, two more rudimentary normal schools were also established in 
Jinghong in 1936 and Zhenyue in 1941. Many of schools were suspended because of the 
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Japanese attacks that occurred in the spring of 1942; they resumed later. In 1944, the first 
middle school in Xishuangbanna was founded in Zhenyue. In 1946, the state Twelve-
Xishuangbanna Middle School opened. Six elementary schools in Cheli and eight 
elementary schools in Nanqia and Fohai were also restored.78 
With the fast expansion of public schools, standard curriculum and citizen 
education were put onto the agenda. The effort to cultivate the awareness of “new 
citizens” of a modern nation began after the Xinhai Revolution. In 1912, the Nanjing 
government announced a new educational principle that stressed the balance of the 
ethical, intellectual, physical, and artistic cultivation of the students.  Although the old 
texts were discarded, Confucian behavioral principles were still taught. 
In Tengchong of western Yunnan, the principal of the Tengzhong County Middle 
school established the new school regulations that were based on the Educational 
Ministry’s blueprint. The fundamental goal for education was to educate and elevate 
elites for the society and country, towards high moral judgment, noble character, and pure 
personality.79  Each week students would gather in the classroom for a particular training 
session on the School Motif. The school motto emphasized honesty, self-independence, 
bravery, cleanliness, politeness, obedience, social ethics and strength, which more or less 
resembled the Educational Principles established by the late Qing court in 1906. In fact, 
each month there would be a day when the school principal and faculty members led the 
students in bowing to a Confucius tablet. After that, the principal would give a lecture or 
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a special moral training session based on the Confucian classics.  At the end of each 
month, all the faculty members would have a meeting, discussing and improving 
approaches for moral education at school. 80  
In southern Yunnan, honesty, respect, filial piety, and the obedience to the school 
discipline became the basic behavior codes for elementary students. In 1929, the 
government declared that the Three Principles of the People should be the foundation on 
which education was based. The schools in Simao all produced a moral educational 
blueprint. The elementary school attached to the 4th Provincial Normal School in Simao 
implemented a series of ethical training exercises that stressed diligence, providence, 
moderation, and forgiveness. The training outcomes were designed to teach some 
traditional Confucian and Taoist values. Students were required to reflect on personal 
development as well as their roles at school, at home, in the communities, and in the 
country. The stress on indignity, independence, strong determination, harmonious 
relationships and personal cultivation was intended to produce a higher level of collective 
identity and good citizens of a modern country.81 
In Shuangjiang, students at advanced elementary schools began to take citizen 
lessons (the KMT Party Principle) in the 1930s.  Every Monday morning, all the students, 
staff and faculty members would gather together, bow to the picture of Sun Yat-sen, and 
sing the national song. The school principal and faculty gave lectures on topics such as 
respect for teachers and seniors, love for parents, care for classmates, and love of country. 
At the same time, national holidays were also established to enhance the awareness of 
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citizenship and national unity. For example, on March 12th of each year, for the Memorial 
Day of Sun Yat-sen that was also Arbor Day, students were required to plant trees on 
school campus to fulfill their obligation to the country.82  
The Anti-Japanese War served as an opportunity to develop patriotism and 
nationalism among the new socialist civilians at the local level. During the Anti-Japanese 
War era, Boy Scout (Tongzi Jun) classes began to be popular in Shuangjiang. Students 
also learned to sing anti-Japanese songs. Individual responsibility and the survival of the 
country was indoctrinated into every student at school. 83  
In Tengchong, all boys under fifteen were required to join the Boy Scouts and its 
training. For those who were sixteen and above, military training was required. A military 
training class was held once a week for three hours, included weapons and firearms, 
strategies, and tactics, as well as physical training.84 In Yiwu, Zhenyue elementary school 
became the center for patriot activities after 1939. Students participated in anti-Japanese 
parades, public presentations, and mobilization. 85 
Standardized curriculum came relatively late, in 1936. It was difficult to initiate 
the common curriculum because of the lack of qualified teachers.  According to the 
standard junior high school curriculum published in 1936 by the educational ministry, 
two middle schools in Xishuangbanna began to provide regular classes including citizen 
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training, PE and scouts, national language, English, math, physiology, botany, zoology, 
chemistry, physics, history, geography, craft, art and music. 86 But it was not until later 
that other parts of the Yunnan borderlands began to adopt the standardized curriculum. In 
1944 the Zhenyue middle school started to follow the standard curriculum. However, 
because of the lack of teachers, only National language, math, English and Thai language 
classes were available by 1946.87  
The Communist Civilizing Project 
 
Educational reform took a gradual and yet sharp turn in the 1950s after the 
establishment of the PRC. Beginning in the early 1950s, the indigenous people were 
identified as ethnic minorities, and given specific ethnic identities. In the eyes of the CCP, 
the backwardness of ethnic minorities was demonstrated in various ways: first of all, 
according to Marxist theories, the indigenous societies’ modes of production were 
backward, placing them in the primitive, slavery, and feudal stages of development, 
which in turn dictated the backward level of their culture and education. Their problems 
could only be solved once a socialist mode of production was established in China, 
enabling the indigenous societies to advance to a higher level of social development.   
Second, the CCP believed that religion equaled superstition, which in turn 
exacerbated the backwardness of the indigenous people. Why did almost all the 
indigenous people have religious beliefs?  A standard answer is that they were ignorant 
and weak. In order to understand life and death, up and downs, and even the changes of 
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weather and climate, they relied on illusions, primitive religions and cults to help them 
understand reality. 88  Moreover, religion was the way that the ruling class fooled and 
brainwashed civilians in order to maintain control over society. 
Third, the CCP stressed that the backwardness of the indigenous societies made 
them vulnerable to manipulation and segregation by outsiders, such as the KMT, Chinese 
landlords, foreign missionaries, and all types of other oppressors. Thus, the CCP’s 
mission was to save the indigenous people from inequity and discrimination in the first 
place. Second, the CCP would lead the indigenous people and advance them to a higher 
level of social, economic, and cultural development. 
In order to liberate indigenous people from ignorance and backwardness, the first 
remedy was to replace all the religious educational institutions with the state run, and 
politically correct public educational system. 
The CCP considered the appearance of foreign missionaries and churches not 
only a challenge that undermined the CCP’s theoretical foundation of Marxism, but also 
that connected the “uncivilized” and “ignorant” people to anti-communist and anti-
revolutionary forces. This was dangerous for a newborn country, threatening the stability 
and unification of China. Thus, cleaning up the foreign influences projected by churches 
and church schools and protecting the purity of the communist ideology became more 
and more urgent during the 1950s. The connection between indigenous education and 
foreign forces must be cut off, and the church schools had to be remodeled to fit into the 
socialist framework of the New China. Most church schools in Yunnan were closed in the 
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1950s, while a few newly opened ones stumbled through and eventually failed before 
1960, when a large scale socialist reform swept the country.  89  
In Longchuan of southern Yunnan, the Gongshan Church School was founded in 
1947.  The main text book was the Holy Bible, but students were also taught Jingpo 
language, Burmese, English, and Chinese. For the second and third graders, geography, 
history, music, PE and Art classes were in the school curriculum.90 In 1951, the PRC 
government assigned a representative named Wang Enzuo to teach at the Gongshan 
church school in order to stress patriotism, promote CCP policies, and undermine the 
influence of church teaching.  Many students who studied at the Gongshan Church 
School had no awareness that they had become Chinese citizens and showed indifference 
towards the concept of a new fatherland of China.91  In 1953, the government tightened 
the restrictions on Gongshan Church School and implemented a series of reforms, 
including that the County government would directly monitor the Gongshan Church 
School, teachers could only be assigned by the government, the school would be no 
longer allowed to charge students for tuition, book fees and any other school fees, and the 
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County government would be responsible for the school budget.92  As the Gongchan 
Church School was subtly transformed to a government public school, it eventually 
closed down in 1958. 93 On the other hand, the number of public schools grew. By 1958, 
thirty schools in Longchuan hosted 2,410 students and among whom 1,425 were of 
indigenous background. In the year of 1958 alone, seven schools were established 94  
Dramatic changes also occurred within the Buddhist and the Muslim communities. 
Strong propaganda about materialism as well as atheism and the state’s opposition to 
religious influence in China not only created harsh religious conditions but also cut off 
the very social and cultural fiber on which traditional indigenous education was built. 
Thus the impact on Buddhist monastery education was most devastating.  With the 
religious institutions deprived of roles as educator as well as the elite selection 
mechanism, traditional channels for commoners to elite upward mobility at the local level 
was terminated and were replaced with a system based on Chinese language and new 
CCP standards. Compared with previous periods of the Chinese history, the opportunities 
to move up the social ladders became dim not only common indigenous people, but also 
for previous indigenous leaders, because of language and ideological barriers. 
The educational reforms began at the elementary school level, admitting not only 
young children but often, adults. At the same time, not just ordinary indigenous students 
but also Buddhist monks were pulled out from the temple to attend government schools. 
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In1955 and 1956, Yun Jinghong Elementary School opened two bi-lingual classes solely 
for the Dai youth, and 50% of the students in these two classes were young monks. 95 
While the CCP promoted elementary school education, the CCP cadres also made efforts 
to gain support from the indigenous nobles as well as senior monks. Some ethnic nobles 
not only sent their own children to government public school, but also convinced others 
to do so. Some senior monks even urged their young apprentices to go to public school 
instead of staying in the temple.96  For example, in a small town named Puwen in 
Xishuangbanna, most Buddhist temples ceased to select senior monks in 1958, allowing 
the young men to go to elementary schools. In 1959, fourteen new elementary schools 
were established.  These schools accommodated 415 new students, and the total student 
population in Puwen almost doubled, with 530 indigenous students in total. 97 From 1961 
to 1964, some students temporarily returned to the Buddhist temple schools as religious 
activities became less restricted. However, in 1966 when the Cultural Revolution 
occurred, all religious activities were banned again, and all the Buddhist temples were 
destroyed except the Mangangna Temple 98   
There was no substantial change to the educational system in the Yunnan 
borderlands in the late 1970s. According to an official record, from 1979 to 1984, the Dai 
people in Puwen transferred their enthusiasm of rebuilding Buddhist temples into 
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building schools.99 In fact, in the early 1980s, the central government and local 
government published regulations to outlaw any religious activities that would interrupt 
or prevent the Dai children and youth from attending public schools. In order to eliminate 
the traditional Buddhist monastic education, the prefecture government of 
Xishuangbanna initiated a new policy in 1985 to ensure that the monks were attending 
public schools. New schools were founded in order to recruit junior and senior monks to 
study in the monks-only classes or mix classes. 100 
Besides that, the government even organized regular classes in the Buddhist 
temples.  In 1988, two classes for the monks were open at the Jingzhen Temple, and 
recruited eighty-three monks, including six senior monks for school from nine temples 
nearby. The Dai language, Chinese language equivalent of the junior elementary school 
level, math, music, PE and art were the major classes that these monks needed to take.  
The Dai language teachers were local senior monks, and the Mengzhe elementary school 
provided teachers for other subjects. In December, Li Tieying, a high ranking official 
from the central government visited Mengzhe elementary school and highly commended 
the contribution of this class.  By 1990, among the 5,353 monks in the whole prefecture 
of Xishuangbanna, there were 2,060 who had reached the school age, and 1,388 of them 
were officially enrolled in government public schools. 101 
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Gradually, not only the Buddhist temple schools but also the Muslim Mosque 
schools turned into sites solely for religious worship and indigenous language training. In 
the late 20th century, the Muslim mosque school began to thrive again. Usually each 
mosque had its own private school. Gradually, these mosque schools became pure 
language and scripture learning institutions. In Baoshan of western Yunnan, A-hongs 
taught young children Arabic every evening. Special language classes were held during 
the summer and winter recessions. Outstanding students were sent to more advanced 
schools in Dali, Kunming and Weishan County.102 
Thus religious educational institutions in the Yunnan borderlands were 
marginalized and separated from the domestic politics and the popular ideologies. 
Religion’s function of social integration and social control in the Yunnan borderlands 
were also diminished. Religion and religious activities became pure cultural practice, and 
strictly kept away state power. Furthermore, religion and non-Chinese cultural practices 
of the indigenous people were considered “economically useful”, especially after the 
1990s when ethnic monitories and their culture became popular commodities in the 
burgeoning Chinese market economy. “In Xishuangbanna, Dai culture, including 
Theravada Buddhism, is the bedrock upon which trade and especially tourism are 
founded. Temples and other institutions are sources of revenue, and help spur growth in 
the hospitality sector. Religious traditions shared with transnational Tai communities 
function as social capital that can be deployed to forge trade agreements and regional 
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development schemes. ”103 As Buddhism became the government’s instrument to 
facilitate transnational and trans-regional business as well as foreign relations,104 the 
indigenous people’s identification towards their traditional culture and religions were 
contaminated by economic pragmatism and opportunism promoted by the state. 
While the issue of ignorance seemed to be solved by eliminating religious 
educational systems, the CCP began to solve the inequity issue caused by the long-term 
segregation of the Chinese and ethnic communities.  In the mid-1950s, ethnic autonomies 
were gradually established at various administrative level within the framework of a 
unified Chinese nation so as to fulfill the e indigenous people’s right to be independent 
and self-governed that was promised by the CCP.   
In echoing the policy of ethnic autonomy, the CCP began to organize ethnic 
schools and Chinese literacy classes. The year 1951 marked the beginning of a growth of 
ethnic schools on the frontier. Ethnic schools sprouted in 1951 and 1952, and were 
directly administered by the provincial educational ministry.105 In Xishuangbanna, 
twenty-six elementary schools were in full function by 1953, and enrolled 3,193 students 
from ten ethnic groups. 106  The expansion of ethnic school was challenged by low 
literacy rate among all the indigenous communities. Low literacy rate was not only found 
                                                 
103  Susan K. McCarthy, “Economic Development and the Buddhist-Industrial Complex of Xishuangbanna”, 
in Faith on Display: Religion, Tourism, and the Chinese State, edited by Tim Oakes and Donald Sutton 
(Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, and Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 
159. 
104 Susan K. McCarthy, “Economic Development and the Buddhist-Industrial Complex of Xishuangbanna”, 
in Faith on Display: Religion, Tourism, and the Chinese State, edited by Tim Oakes and Donald Sutton 
(Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, and Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield publishers, Inc., 2010), 
178. 
105Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun(管开荣, 王军健), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi 西双
版纳傣族自治州教育志  [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic 
Autonomous Prefecture] (Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe,1998),47 
106Guan Kairong and Wang Jianjun(管开荣, 王军健), Xishuangbanna Dai Zu Zizhi Zhou Jiaoyu Zhi 西双
版纳傣族自治州教育志  [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic 
Autonomous Prefecture] (Kunming: Yunnan Minzu Chubanshe,1998),48 
246 
in the indigenous written languages, if there were any, but also the Chinese language.  In 
1952, the first elementary school in Megla County of Xishuangbanna began the classes at 
the previous residence of the Native Officer. Chinese teachers and local students could 
not understand each other at all without the assistant of an interpreter who had to aid the 
students of all age groups. 107 
At the same time, public schools also suffered other problems, such as low 
education quality and high loss of students. 108  Low education quality originated from 
the lack of qualified educators, as the outcome of the fast expansion of public schools. 
High loss of students were caused by various reasons, including the lack of labor at home. 
In the Town of Puwen, lots of people did not want their children to go to school for they 
feared that their children might become the party cadres after receiving the education and 
would not farm and take care of the families. 109 
 In order to solve these problems, the district educational department of 
Xishuangbanna stressed that education should become "ethnicized", meaning teachers 
should be able to speak or learn to speak indigenous languages or dialects. Besides that 
educators should use approaches that the ethnic students liked in order to motivate them, 
and increase the efficiency of their teaching. In the year of 1955, the "ethnicized" 
education was again emphasized by the prefecture educational department of 
Xishuangbanna. Each school had the responsibility to help their teacher understand that 
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ethnicization would be the direction of the future education in this area. 110  However, 
native language was still not the focus of public education. It was considered as a basic 
transitional skill for the students to be able to eventually learn knowledge in Chinese. 
Schools in Longchuan began to use the Dai and Jingpo language text books organized by 
the provincial as well as local government in 1961. The government also especially 
selected and trained some ethnic students to become teachers, and also required non-
ethnic teachers to learn indigenous languages. In 1963, Longchuan began to implement a 
series solutions in order to improve the quality of Chinese language learning. 111  
At the same time, the Dai and Jingpo language class began to be available even 
for the first graders in some schools. A semester later, some students could even read the 
Tuanjie News in their own language. The Nongguan Elementary school provided weekly 
Dai language class for the third graders and above. By the time the students graduated 
from elementary school, they were able to use the Dai language in a basic way. Bilingual 
education was halted at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and was not resumed 
until 1972. In Manla Elementary school, the first graders would learn Dai language for a 
whole year, and then began to learn Chinese in the second grade. From the second grade 
to the third grade, students were only provided one to two Dai language classes weekly. 
So by the time they graduated from elementary school, most students’ Dai language 
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ability still stayed in an average level.112 In 1978, preschool for Dai children were opened 
in Yun Jinghong elementary school with the purpose of Chinese language training and 
eliminating the language barriers for the Dai students when they were ready for the first 
grade. 113 The Mengzhe elementary school opened a Dai-Chinese bilingual testing class 
in 1986. Thirty-seven students who enrolled had to learn the Dai language for a year to 
fulfill the pre-school requirement. Beginning in the second year, as first graders, they 
were given Thai-Han text books. Although there was opportunity for them to learn in 
their native language, Chinese was still the main subject for learning as well as teaching, 
and Thai, the supplementary. 114 
Over time, the problems of ethnic as well as bilingual education began to emerge. 
The CCP often criticized the traditional Chinese superiority towards the non-Chinese 
based on the Hua-Yi division and Wufu system, and proclaimed the equality of all people 
in China. However, the CCP never recognized the ironic outcome that brought forth not 
by its ethnic theories and practical policies. While the Chinese government denied the 
superiority of any cultural group in China and granted legal equality to all the ethnic 
minorities,   inferiority of ethnic minorities did not cease to exist and yet was intensified 
by CCP’s ethnic classification, 115 as well as the nation-wide acknowledgement of the 
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social, political and cultural backwardness of ethnic minorities. 116 Thus, some scholars 
believed that the existence of the notion of backward ethnic minorities was the stepping 
stone on which a more advanced, or civilized, Han Chinese group was established. 117 
As the CCP has been touting its ethnic identification and all kinds of special 
policies that it gives to the ethnic minorities in the education, it ironically fortifies the 
majority Han Chinese attitudes of superiority towards the ethnic minorities. The 
privileges that ethnic minorities have at school, such as extra credit for all sorts of 
qualifying examinations as well as ethnic only classes as well as schools label them as 
weaker and less competitive compared with the Chinese. Even in the political sphere, it 
has been a common rule that the CCP cadres of ethnic background would not be on the 
top of the CCP leadership at any level, even within the ethnic autonomies. Ethnic 
officials are seen at the assistant positions of the local leadership, or sometimes the 
governors’ position in the government. And yet, they are never to be found as the chairs 
of the local CCP committee that overpowers all the local authorities.  In this case, the de 
facto disadvantages of ethnic minorities is justified by the Marxist theory; and the 
backwardness of ethnic people as well as the exemplary role of Chinese is maintained, 
although with a new face,  is disguised by the Marxist theory. 
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As a specific approach of ethnic education, the bilingual education maintained the 
development of indigenous culture and traditions in limited ways, particularly in cultural 
tourism and commercial sectors. And its contribution towards the overall personal 
advancement in a Chinese-norm dominated country stays feeble. First of all, ethnic 
people who do not have a script see no possibility of receiving bilingual education; 
second, “When ethnic groups with different languages were classified in the same minzu, 
it is impossible to use bilingual teaching materials in only one of those languages for all 
the members of the minzu” ( for examples: people classified as Hani in Xishuangbanna 
do not use the Romanized script created for their minzu, because it is based on the 
Luchun dialect of Haini living mainly in Luchun, Honghe,Yuanyan, and Jinping. 
Consequently, there is no bilingual teaching for the people classified as Hani .mainly 
Akha, Akhe and Phusa) in Xishuangbanna,118 
In fact, the bilingual market is shrinking in terms of personal education since the 
channel for upward mobility has been sealed off to those who do not master mandarin 
Chinese. In currently situation, knowing English, Japanese or other popular foreign 
languages instead of native language would even bring more educational or occupational 
opportunities. Many members of local elites received higher level education and are 
happy to embrace main stream Chinese culture.  At the same time, teachers who are 
proficient in both Chinese and ethnic native languages have become increasingly rare and 
are disappearing. Those who are proficient and use their own language on daily basis are 
not qualified to become educators. These people either lack the professional 
qualifications to teach at public educational institutions, or they find it too difficult to fit 
                                                 
118 Mette Halskov Hasen, Lessons in Being Chinese: Minority Education and Ethnic Identity in Southwest 
China, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1999), 5-6.  
251 
in, such as the Buddhist monks, local artists and musicians.  The discontinuity of the “old 
ways” and the emphasis of the new norms established by the government has driven 
representatives of the old culture and traditional indigenous education away not only 
from the core of popular cultural, but the local power structure as well. 
When the Lines between Education and Propaganda Blurred 
 
 As the consequence of the CCP’s mass mobilization, as well as social and 
political campaigns, the boundaries between the education and propaganda has been very 
blurring. The purpose and function of school education and mass education converged, in 
order to be in conformity with the CCP’s political agenda as well as ideological 
propaganda. Moreover, the inconsistency of the state political agenda and ideological 
propaganda campaigns made it impossible to fulfill the PRC’s fundamental goals for 
education before 1980s, such as cultivating the awareness of citizenship as well as the 
individual development of students.   
Facing the large number of illiterates well as the ignorance of the communism and 
state politics, art performances, displays, and movies were the most effective ways of 
mass education. Government led cultural centers (wenhua zhan)119 and organizations 
surfaced and provided civilians various types of educational programs. From 1950s to 
1980s, film and live theater, in particular, surpassed all the other forms of arts, becoming 
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the dominant way for Chinese civilians to construct a spiritual world. Movies and theaters 
were the place where the civilians received and constructed their understanding on state 
ideology, and formed value judgments promoted by the state authority.120  Over years, 
education in the Yunnan borderland with a rich cultural heritage was replaced by a single 
public ideological discourse of language and communication.  
From the late 1950s to late 1970s, the education in the Yunnan borderlands 
suffered devastating blows just like elsewhere in China. The interruptions and 
destructions of schools drove off a large number of students. The semi-paralyzed school 
system turned its educational function over to societal mobilization. Social and political 
movements penetrated into schools, and replaced school education with ideological 
education and political struggles. 
For examples, in 1951, schools in Shuangjiang organized large scale singing and 
dancing performances to assist the state propaganda about the establishment of the new 
PRC government, Korea War, and the contributions of the CCP. Students were taught to 
love and support the party and the PLA. Communist heroes who fought in the Anti-
Japanese War, Civil War and Korea War such as Liu Hulan, Huang Jiguang and Qiu 
Shaoyun were glorified as role models. 121 In Tengchong, the patriotic education was 
focused on the theme of “Against the America and Aid Korea” in 1951.  Schools were 
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required to help the students understand the power of the socialist movement and the 
weakness of the capitalistic camp. Soviet Union heroes such as Pavel Korchagin from the 
novel How the Steel was Tempered, as well as Zoya Kosmodemyansky and her brother 
became role models. Many students wrote letters to the PLA soldiers in the Korean War, 
and participated in the fundraising effort to increase military budget. All of the sudden, 
the military academies became a popular place for students to apply for. 122    
In 1953, Young Pioneers that were selected in Simao area for participation in 
intensive service projects in afforestation, the Four Pests Campaign, public property 
protection and caring for the veteran’s families. 123  In 1955, in response to a nation-wide 
socialist campaigns, schools in Shuangjiang were required to be sure that students 
understood that the socialist reforms were the only way to lead China out of poverty. In 
1957, Marxism theories became a mandatory part of indoctrination about socialism, 
patriotism, nationalism and revolutionary traditions.  124  The state empowered the 
civilians with what it perceived as appropriate. In ther words, the state established new 
standard for proper education, the cultivation of consciousness as well as value 
judgments based on the socialist virtues it preached. 
However, the state indoctrination still faced a great challenge in the early 1950s, 
because the majority of indigenous people were unschooled and illiterate, and often kept 
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their children at home. Thus, mass education seemed urgent, and the government cultural 
centers became the most important outpost for that purpose.   
The missions of the cultural centers during this time period included eliminating 
literacy, organizing villagers’ club and peasants’ mobilization.125  In Southern Yunnan, 
two month after the PLA occupied in Kaiyuan in January, 1950, the People’s Cultural 
Center was open to the public, with the specific purpose to serve as the main propaganda 
instrument of the CCP, and as a facilitator in the social and political movements. In 
February 1953, a broadcast station was set up and began to broadcast three times a day 
through the speakers installed on the old city tower and the streets. Most of the 
broadcasting scripts were supplied by the Propaganda Department of the CCP County 
Committee, Educational Department, and Working Teams. Other scripts were from 
newspapers. Each week, the Propaganda Department of the CCP County Committee 
would develop programs and schedule them for the forthcoming week. At the same time, 
the broadcasting station also served as the event organizers for the County Council. 126  
Besides that, cultural centers often offered classes on literacy, and sometimes, basic 
science knowledge, hygiene and farming skills. 127 Along the Sino-Vietnamese border, 
more than 80 people graduated from various levels of the literacy classes in 1954. 128   
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In 1950, the PLA 39th Division organized a film team to show movies such as The 
Triumphant of the PLA, and The Liberated China across the nation. In Simao, a 
propaganda team sent by the central government arrived with a revolutionary film titled 
The Red Banner in the Western Wind (红旗漫卷西风) in the same year. In 1952, two 
film teams from Kunming traveled to ten towns and showed movies about the unification 
of the Chinese nation, Korea War as well as the happy life in the Soviet Union. In 
December, the film team of the PLA 39th Division finally arrived in three small towns 
and played more revolutionary and patriotic movies produced in China and the Soviet 
Union. The Wa people in this area were able to see a movie for the first time in their life. 
In 1954, film teams from Kunming were assigned to stay in Southern Yunnan, covering a 
vast area from the Xishuangbanna to Mojiang. 129 
In the 1950s, anti-bandits shows and land reform shows echoed current political 
and social movements. Students’ propaganda teams often joined the cultural center to 
bring about more public attention.  Li Zhensheng, a local intellectual from Kaiyuan, 
recalled the time that when he joined the students’ propaganda team and set on a 
performing mission for two months in the mountains. According to Li Zhensheng, they 
did not have a fixed place to host the shows. Instead, they often walked almost every day 
to different villages in the mountains, dragging their luggage and costumes from place to 
place. They ate two meals a day, mostly corn meals and yams. Two shows that they 
performed were about the cruelty of the landlords and harsh life of the peasants as to 
trigger strong hatred from the audience. On occasions, angry peasants became so agitated 
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and irritated by the show that they jumped onto the stage to beat up actors and actresses 
who played the landlords. 130  Even in the In the 1980s, when the Sino-Vietnamese 
relationship soured, the Qiaotou Cultural Center not only aired programs on the CCP and 
PRC’s foreign policies, but also sent flyers and pamphlets over towards the Vietnamese 
side. Programs praised the traditional friendship between China and Vietnam. Performing 
teams were organized to visit the border patrol and the border outposts. The Qiaotou 
Cultural Center was never closed, even though it was situated in the frequent bombed 
area by the Vietnamese.131 
In 1958, the radical propaganda of the Great Leap Forward campaign began to 
plague the educational system. The Three Red Banners (the General Line for socialist 
construction, the Great Leap Forward and the people's communes) became the compass 
for the direction of education. In mass education sphere, Five Golden Flowers (Wu Duo 
Jinhua) made the national debut in 1959, promoting the concept of submitting personal 
interests to collective interests. This movie portrayed the story that the young Bai men 
and women dedicated their life into the Great Leap Forward campaign, reconciled their 
own personal desire to the common goal of the society, and were eventually rewarded the 
romantic love from their equally dedicated comrades. In the nation-wide zeal to surpass 
the western countries, educators and students were required to follow their role models, 
and participated in intensive ideological and labor education. The damage was soon 
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overwhelming: too many political assignments interrupted regular class schedule, 
occupied the curriculum and eventually, led to the decline of the educational quality. The 
greatest disaster was associated with the Great Leap Forward mentality, which still 
influences the educators in a subtle way today. 
No school was exempt from the political quest in how to support the Great Leap 
Forward. In Xishuangbanna, many second graders were required to set the goal to “leap” 
into the fifth grade within a year. Some teachers even finished one semester’s math 
lessons in fifteen days. Unsurprisingly, many failures in the school examinations 
occurred. 132 In middle schools, regular classes were replaced by educational as well as 
political assignments to eliminate the illiteracy, and labor campaigns such as plowing, 
planting, harvesting, and working in the backyard furnaces. 133   
In 1960, a new principle was added in, which was to eliminate the capitalistic 
thoughts and promote those of the proletariat.  Students were required to stick to the goal 
of becoming good children of the Chairman Mao.134 In 1962, the CCP stressed that 
school education must follow the principle of class struggle: students should be organized 
to visit factories and the poor in the country. Elderly workers, peasants, cadres and PLA 
veterans should be invited to talk about the history of their factories, villages, families as 
well as revolutionary careers.  In 1963, students in Xishuangbanna and Simao were 
encouraged to follow the example of Leifeng to serve others, obey the school discipline, 
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protect the public facilities and reconcile to the collective interests.135  In Shuangjiang, 
besides Lei Feng, schools also glorified several other national heroes such as Wang Jie 
and Liu Wenxue, as well as the model of submitting and sacrificing personal life for the 
collective interests. 136 From 1964 to 1966, three of Mao’s essays as well as his 
quotations became the main text for the ethnic and politic training class.137 
Early in 1961, elementary school system encountered a great setback caused by 
famine and errors in government policies. In that year, 6,261 students including 5,962 
ethnic students in Xishuangbanna left school, directly causing the closure of many public 
schools.  In order to get the students back, mobile schools, and farm-and-read schools 
were organized. In the Jingna Elementary School of Jinghong, 52.6% of students 
frequently missed or even dropped out of school after 1961.  From February to April 
1962 almost all the students disappeared, returning home for farming so as to earn the 
labor credit in order to redeem monthly stipend from the people’s commune. This left 
only eight regular school attendees.  It was not until the end of the year, that students 
came back for school after a big the effort was made by the CCP district committee. 138  
In Luxi County of western Yunnan, people still insisted that their children should 
participate in the people’s commune so as to multiple the income of the family instead of 
going to school. Also parents believed that farming instead of school gave their children 
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the opportunities to learn practical skills. In order to recruit more students for school, the 
government enhanced the ideological as well as patriotic education. The government 
initiated propaganda procedures that addressed the necessity of receiving education in the 
following aspects: 1. Teach the civilians to love the Party and Chairman Mao. Through 
the education that the Party as well as Chairman Mao were mighty, glorious and correct, 
and the educational policies of the Party a demonstration of its concern on the behalf of 
people, the goal was to persuade the civilians to love, and then be obedient to the Party’s 
call for education; 2. Cultivate patriotism. Through the comparison of the “Old China” 
and the “New China”, students were encouraged to recognize the superiority of the CCP 
led socialist China, and to set goals to study in order to protect and construct the new 
country; 3. Enhance the understanding on the importance of education; 4. Tie the 
education with the long-term goal of building the socialist and communist society, and 
prepare civilians to contribute towards such transformations led by the Party. 139  
Later during the Cultural Revolution, domestic politics, class struggles as well as 
factional confrontations were fulfilled as the main purposes of education at the expense 
of basic knowledge learning. 140 In 1966, many teachers were recognized as anti-
revolutionaries throughout the borderlands, such as in Longchuan, Baoshan and may 
other places. 141 Those educators who survived the harsh political scrutinization were 
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afraid of teaching. Students were gradually tired of learning Mao’s words and essays. 142  
In 1967, according to the new policy that the military force should be in charge of the 
society, and support the left wings of the society as well as the working class and 
peasants, the PLA representatives began to take charge of schools throughout the Yunnan 
borderlands. The military administration as well as training was initiated, and the 
intellectuals were banished143.  
In terms of mass education, it witnessed a sharp turnaround during the Cultural 
Revolution. The movie Beautiful Xishuangbanna was criticized for ignoring the class 
struggle, pleasing Imperialism and Revisionism. 144  The documentary series that 
recorded Liu Shaoqi’s visits to Indonesia and Burma were criticized for Revisionism, and 
his betrayal of international communist movements for his communicating with Ne 
Win.145  The puppet animation Peacock Princess (1963) was found guilty for preaching 
the braveness of the prince as well as the beauty and kindness of the princess. Also the 
intention of praising the ruling class, their patriotism, and romantic love became a huge 
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offense to the working class people. 146 A Shi Ma (1964) was also found guilty in 
preaching the purity of romantic love and attacking the socialist system.147  
As for the previous mentioned Five Golden Flowers (Wu Duo Jin Hua, 1959), the 
major offense key in the portrayal of the romantic love of the young people instead of 
their political progress. Besides that, the songs also had major problems. 148  Yang Likun, 
the major actress who casted in A Shi Ma and Five Golden Flowers was persecuted as 
counter-revolutionary. On the other hand, movies such as Lishaungshuang (李双双) and 
Duo Yin (夺印) were actively praised and promoted by the government.149  
At school, the traditional PRC ethnical principle that was established in 1949, the 
Five Loves, was now criticized for preaching the capitalistic theory of humanity. Strong 
populism and anti-intellectualism emerged while schools were destroyed, and teachers, 
humiliated. Top students who obeyed school rules were considered as Revisionists. The 
new models became the rebellious and those who followed Zhang Tiesheng’s example to 
hand in an empty sheet for examination.150    
In 1971, the central government initiated another plan, which required that 
schools should be available to all of the poor. The slogan that “every village owns an 
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elementary school, every production brigade owns a middle school, and every commune 
owns a high school” triggered the nationwide radical educational reform, and further 
paralyzed the educational system by irrational school expansion and upgrading. In 
Xishuangbanna, in order to fulfil this goal, rudimentary elementary schools that only 
taught the first and second graders now began to admit students from third grade and 
above. Elementary schools began to provide middle school education, and teachers were 
often drafted to teach middle school, leaving vacancies filled by new and possibly 
underqualified teachers hired within the community. School funding was always tight and 
facilities severely inadequate. 151   
In Tengchong, all the elementary school shortened the school duration from six 
years to five years according to Mao Zedong’s Five-Seven Command (五七指示). The 
next year, elementary schools began to hold middle school classes in 1970.  In 1973, 
eighteen middle schools were established. Two years later, the Xiaoxi Commune 
established an Agricultural University. In the 1970s, the educated youth from urban area 
became an important sources for new teachers across the Yunnan borderlands. By 1976, 
53 schools were closed and 2,313 students left school in Xishuangbanna compared with 
the previous year. In 1979, as the educated youth returned back to urban cities, the 
Yunnan borderlands, the state farm school system in particular, faced a large scale 
shortage of teachers. 152 Thus, low educational quality, lack of teachers, inconsistence of 
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版纳傣族自治州教育志  [The gazetteer of the education of Xishuangbanna Dai People’s Ethnic 
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the text books, the termination of ethnic language learning and teaching had become the 
landmark of these years. 153   
After the Cultural Revolution, low school attendance was the number one 
challenge. Low school attendance rates was not only caused by the revival of the 
Buddhist activities after the Cultural Revolution, but also the civilians’ hesitance towards 
the public education as well as state politics in general. In Xishuangbanna, the school 
attendance rate was 71.3% and only 58% at the rural area by 1982.154 Another challenge 
was to move away from the constantly shifting educational principles back to a 
standardized core course, although the standard course itself remained vague and was still 
dominated by the state politics and ideological orientation. 
In 1977, the Xishuangbanna Educational Bureau dropped the basic knowledge of 
industry and military training classes off from the school curriculum, and attempted to 
resume physics, chemistry, foreign language, biology, and PE.  However, such effort was 
frustrated because of the lack of qualified teachers.  155  In addition to the attempt to 
revise the curriculum, traditional PRC citizen education focusing on the patriotism or 
nationalism as well as the loyalty to the party was also revised due to the new political 
climate. Slogans such as Five Stresses, Four Beauties and Three Loves, as well as Five 
Loves dominated schools in the frontier.  
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Although personal development has been stressed by the government over the 
years, it was narrowed down and settled on the basis of patriotism and nationalism that 
conform to the orientation of the dominant faction within the CCP core leadership.  
Moreover, even the narrowly defined patriotism or nationalism was also subtly replaced 
by hatred, prejudice, and antagonism towards what the dominant faction within CCP 
leadership has perceived as wrong.  
Accompanying the establishment of a standard public thinking and behavioral 
code was the loss of indigenous cultural education and local history. Local culture and 
history classes are not provided since it is not part of the requirement for advancing to 
higher level of education. As students and educators actively engaged in the course of 
national building at schools as well as all kinds of public scenarios, their awareness of 
local history and legacy are replaced by the curiosity as well as eagerness to participate in 
the mainstream Chinese culture. Indigenous culture and religious beliefs are separated 
from the substantial advancement of the local societies, in terms of political and societal 
development. They gradually became “decorations” of the main stream cultural and 
ideological orientation that demonstrate the achievement of the government policies, or 
symbols of exotic cultures and cultural tourism that please the outsiders and brings quick 
cash. Overtime, the soil for the survival of multi-culturalism has depleted.  The 
indigenous societies are being pushed into a mono-cultural dominated sphere with limited 
individual characteristics and awareness of self-identity. 
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CHAPTER 6   CONCLUSION 
 
 
Growing up in the western Yunnan, I always knew that I was a minority there. 
Although I have the blood of Tibetan, Muslim and Han Chinese running in me, I was 
officially registered Han Chinese.  I was told by many people that we were living in the 
Lao-Shao-Bian-Qiong (老少边穷) area, a term that describe the places that remained in 
poverty, especially those old revolutionary bases like Yan’an and frontier areas with 
many ethnic minorities. Even in the late 1980s, when my parents and I went shopping at 
the market place, we easily recognized those who were different. Among them, we stood 
out easily, because we did not dress up in the ethnic costumes, and also, we spoke 
Chinese without ethnic accent. I remember the Yi women from the mountains who 
always wore beautiful clothes, with embroideries on the sleeves, pants and sash.  I 
particularly remember their triangle shaped hats, as well as round-shaped felt pads that 
they wore on their backs. They were usually white color with two black dots at the center.  
These Yi women always brought honey, fern, pine pollen, pheasants, mushrooms, and all 
kinds of cool things that excited my eyes. In July and August, they brought tons of pine 
tree logs for people to burn for the Fire Torch Festival. And in the late fall and throughout 
the winter, these women came back in town with baskets of chuckles hauled by mules for 
heating supplies.  When I was small, my father always  taught me to talk and behave 
carefully and with respect around the Muslim as well as Tibetan lamas whom we might 
come across time to time, so I would not offend them and get into trouble.  
When I went to elementary school, we were required to speak mandarin all the 
time, and many of my Bai classmates really had a hard time with their accent.  They felt 
more comfortable at home when they could speak the Bai dialect. But at school, it was 
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quite a transition, and unfortunately, many of them did not do well at all especially in the 
Chinese class.  Over-correction and criticism from the teachers about their way of 
speaking Chinese gradually destroyed their self-esteem and motivation to learn.   
The school provided us with breakfast every morning. It was either buns or rice 
noodles with pork sauce. My Muslim classmate Lina Ma learned to eat pork because no 
accommodation was made for her on the rice noodle days, which she hates.  My father 
still talks about the day he was surprised to run into Lina Ma after she happily bought a 
pork and ate bacon cake for the first time in her life. 
When it was time to take the national examinations for college (gaokao), in the 
late 1990s, our teacher asked all non-Han students who were eligible for getting extra 
credit granted to ethnic minorities to raise their hands. Everyone in the class raised their 
hands except two or three of us.  
 This was also the same time when Yunnan became popular tourist destinations, 
especially ethnic theme tours.  Everywhere there were colorful images of ethnic 
minorities, popular ethnic music, and portrayals about unique ethnic traditions, such as 
the matrilineal society in Lijiang.  When I arrived in Xi’an for college in 1999, almost 
everyone I talked to looked at me with amazement because I was from Yunnan, a place 
they considered remote, backward and full of ethnic people. 
All I knew about Yunnan up until my twenties related to ethnic people.  This did 
not change until I began to study history and read more books on my own.  I was never 
taught about Yunnan’s rich local history at school. Even my parents never mentioned 
local history to me! Only my grandfather, who was born in 1903, told me some stories 
about the Nanzhao Kingdom. There was a local history text book on my uncle’s book 
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shelf, who was a high school history teacher. But no one cared to teach from that book. 
There was no need to speak about local history, because Yunnan was a part of China. It 
was China’s national history that I needed to care about.   
Knowledge of local history is disappearing fast as new generations of Chinese 
students like me attend public schools and are trained to become modern patriotic citizens 
of the New China.  In this part of China, the history and complicated local context has 
been gradually replaced by the tourism-associated ethnic history with a simplified context 
that fit into the Marxist categories. The public image of Yunnan was stereotyped, 
becoming a remote, primitive, and exotic place where ethnic minorities dwell. It became 
a place for people to escape the civilizations and urban life, and be entertained by those 
who were different and essentially, not Han-Chinese. In the most extreme case, Yunnan 
also became a place for “sex tours” where the minority women, whose customs and 
habits did not conform to that of the Han-Chinese order, were turned into “the ultimate 
‘sexual personae’ for the ‘Eastern Eye’ of the broader Han Chinese society.” 1 This 
situation fits into a nation building discourse that stresses the unification of fifty-six 
                                                 
1 See Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990), 40, 71, in Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring 
Majority/Minority Identities”, in Journal of Asian Studies 53, no.1 (February, 1994), 92-123.  Dru C. 
Gladney gave a Beijing taxi driver’s account on ethnic women in Yunnan in 1991. This male taxi driver 
confessed that ethnic women in the TV programs and other public media were “a lot ‘looser (suibian, 
casual) than Han women. They bathe naked in the rivers and wear less clothing.’”  The taxi driver really 
“liked to watch those minority girls.” Some of his friends, as he told, “have gone down to Yunnan….or was 
it Guizhou?....to see if they would meet some minority girls” who were considered to be very casual. 
Gladney pointed out that “the image of Dai (Thai) and other minority women bathing in the river has 
become a leit-motiv for ethnic sensuality and often appears in stylized images throughout China, 
particularly on large murals in restaurants and public spaces. School children are often encouraged to make 
wood-block prints of Thai bathers and other exotic representations of minorities.” For example, Felicity 
Lufkins argued that the public portrayal of minority nudes in China at the Beijing Capital Airport in the late 
1980s and early 1990s was too confrontative and too publicly exposed.” See Dru C. Gladney, 
“Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities”, in Journal of Asian Studies 
53, no.1 (February, 1994), 92-123. See also Felicity Lufkins, Images of Minority in the Art of the People’s 
Republic of China. M.A. thesis, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 35 in Dru C. Gladney, 
“Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities”, in Journal of Asian Studies 
53, no.1 (February, 1994), 92-123, quotation from 15. 
268 
ethnic minorities into one Chinese nation for over 2000 years. It also glorified the CCP’s 
contribution in liberating and civilizing the ethnic minorities, bringing them into a new 
socialist Chinese nation as equal citizens. Why would people study the local history that 
challenges this discourse?  
Moreover, after five decades of national history discourse building, Chinese 
scholars have become used to interpreting the local history of Yunnan in ways that follow 
the main stream national narrative. Ironically, the records of the Non-Chinese people in 
the Chinese historical documents still provide solid evidence to prove that they were a 
part of the Chinese nation for thousands of years.2 Sometimes, even western scholars, 
lacking in-depth understanding on the local history of Yunnan, conduct research in 
acceptance of the discourse on ethnic minorities that China has constructed.3  And yet, on 
                                                 
2 The Western scholars have pointed out a long time ago that the historical records of the non-Chinese 
people in the Chinese ancient documents were gathered for “political reasons”. For example, W (Wolfram) 
Eberhard and Herold J. Wiens stressed that “the overwhelming bulk of the information about alien people” 
was gathered “to inform the Chinese frontier authorities who had to do with these aliens; to inform the 
military who had to fight them; to inform the ‘diplomats’ who had to know how to deal properly with them; 
and finally to inform the ‘interior’ magistrates of China Proper in the event of the arrival of tribute 
missions.” At least, these historical documents also served the purpose of demonstrating the superiority of 
the Chinese civilization and touting its position as the Kingdom of Heaven. See W. Eberhard, Kultur und 
Siedlung der RandVolkers China, T’oung Pao, Supplement to Vol. 36 (Leden: 1942), in Herold J. Wiens, 
China’s March toward the Tropics (Hamden: The Shoe String Press, 1954), 30-31, quote from 3.  
3 In fact, most scholars who study China’s frontier are bounded by the narrative of the fifty-six ethnic 
minorities of China, Sinicization, and other ethnic-related issues. Ironically, they more or less accept the 
discourse that the CCP deliberately and gradually established in discussing the non-Han people for over six 
decades. In another word, such discourse actually has become the very foundation on which a lot of ethnic 
studies are based. When scholars only concentrate on the ethnic people in China’s frontier, their identity, 
their classification as well as their non-Chinese cultural and traditions, they somehow engage in the project 
of the construction of Chinese ethnic minorities, both historical and contemporary. The ethnic centered 
frontier study creates a historically “imagined” community composed by the majority, the Han, and the 
minority, the non-Han people. Ethnic discourse exaggerates the degree that the minority was absorbed into 
the majority. Furthermore, it equates the influence of the Chinese migrants with that of periodically indirect 
rule of the Chinese, and then magnified both to that of an overwhelming force of assimilation.  Although 
problems have been diagnosed, it only provides answers or solutions to problems existed “within” the 
Chinese ethnic construction system. Both the praising and criticizing words from various scholars fulfill the 
needs of the propagandas for the continuing construction of such “imagined community”. In fact, as shown 
in this dissertation, this imagined community actually did not always exist along the Yunnan frontier, 
where the Chinese population were not the majority and Chinese norm was not the only standard. Even 
during the PRC era, the acceptance of the Chinese way only happens in a few scenarios, especially in the 
spheres of political participation and government propaganda, when the Chinese way means ideological 
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China’s frontier, especially in Xinjiang, the state has been challenged by unceasing ethnic 
independent movements. This makes re-discovering local history more urgent.  
This dissertation is not simply trying to explain how the Yunnan borderlands were 
transformed to a frontier of China. It tries to present a rich local history in a more 
complicated context that has disappeared from sight. It also tries to show how China’s 
periphery areas became a part of China, and the deeply-embedded problems that remain 
unsolved in that process. These questions are crucial to understanding not only today’s 
Yunnan borderlands, but also border and frontier issues in other parts of China.  
Admittedly, the Yunnan borderlands are different from Xinjiang and Tibet, and 
yet there are many parallels that can be found between China’s frontiers with Mainland 
Southeast Asia and the latter with Central Asia. Historically, the Yunnan borderlands 
were the corridor connecting China with Southeast Asia and South Asia, just like 
Xinjiang, the then Western Region, that connected China with Central Asia. These shatter 
zones were the places where ideas, people, cultures, religions as well as commodities met 
either at the trans-regional market place or battle fields. These areas were rarely ruled 
indirectly and permanently by certain state power.  The mosaic makeup of the settlers, the 
limited natural resources, as well as people’s approaches to exploiting natural resources 
resulted in the main characteristics of the indigenous border societies: being pro-trade and 
                                                                                                                                                 
correctness and further brings economic and political security to individuals.  And the nature of the Chinese 
way during the PRC period is obviously different than that of before. Besides that, the commonalities 
between the Han and ethnic people in the daily life nowadays indicate the similarities formed on a more 
technological based life style, instead of Chinese norms and customs. The most powerful forces that shape 
the coherence between the Han and ethnic people seem to be patriotism and Chinese nationalism, which are 
disputed by a handful of ethnic elites. Besides that the non-Chinese economic dependence on the Chinese 
people played a tremendous role to glue these two parts together. Thus, a coherent Chinese nation 
composed by various ethnic minorities is still wishful thinking. At certain point, the distinction of Fifty-six 
ethnic groups can be narrowed down to one: the dichotomy between the majority and the minority, as well 
as the Han and ethnic. This is still the wall for the ultimate integration of the Chinese nation. The Han 
people are still Han and the non-Han people are still barbarians. Such deep-embedded notion emerges to 
the surface especially when the Han and non-Han tension was escalated after the terrorist attacks in China 
recently.  
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highly militarized.  Trade and the natural flow of migrants tied indigenous societies 
together, so that at times they could exercise regional power. Constant military 
confrontations between indigenous political units gave an opening to external super 
powers for entering in and establishing indirect, or, occasionally, direct control over the 
indigenous groups by supporting one of the local powers holders.  
In fact, there was an obvious difference between the Yunnan borderlands and 
Xinjiang as well as Tibet. At certain point of time, the local authorities of Xinjiang and 
Tibet became allies with Beijing, whereas, the local authorities of the Yunnan 
borderlands were mostly under the control of the Chinese. There were “stateless” 
communities in these shatter zones in terms of their loose connections with regional 
larger powers, and yet all the local political units were well organized under indigenous 
powers. They were always ready to fight for what they needed to survive, but more likely 
to make alliances in order to dominate local competition. 
Historians cite ancient Chinese documents that often record the “barbarians” 
adoration towards the Chinese civilization, and their willingness to learn from China and 
become civilized. They often neglect the political and economic motives behind these 
flattering words. The roots of the indigenous legitimacy remained local, being supported 
by local religious authorities. The indigenous powers were often more interested in 
seeking the support and protection from the regional power rather than total submission. 
There was no need for the indigenous people to integrate into a distant and alien cultural 
and political system. Before the 1911 Revolution of 1910-1912, the Chinese Hua-Yi 
distinction and Wu-fu system strictly segregated the barbarians from the Chinese. There 
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were no vehicles for the central Chinese power to penetrate to the local level, just as there 
was no way for indigenous people to join the core Chinese power establishment. 
Besides protection from China, indigenous societies on China’s frontier had other 
options. In Xinjiang, indigenous people wished to establish an independent Muslim 
country, claiming connections to the ancient Turkic people, and receiving the support 
from Russia, British, Japanese, and then later the Soviet Union. In the Yunnan 
borderlands, local tribes also were once reconciled to Burman, Tibetan, and later the 
French authority as well as British. With the support from the British, the Tibetans 
attempted to organize a great Tibetan Nation that included part of the northwestern 
Yunnan in 1950s, and many have not given up this idea. It would be naive to argue that 
the assertion of colonial powers in either Central Asia or mainland Southeast Asia was 
the solely result of a one way expansion, without considering the agencies of indigenous 
political units and their practical choices. 
And yet, with the coming of colonial expansion as well as the formation of the 
nation state in the 19th and 20th centuries, it placed the indigenous people’s agency under 
the wing of outsiders.  The indigenous people were trapped in the confrontation between 
colonial powers and thus pulled into the world colonial market. Indigenous political units 
became divided, ruled and indoctrinated along different cultural and ideological norms. 
 When communist insurgences arrived to push the colonial powers out of Asia, 
Yunnan borderlands were transformed to a frontier of socialist China in 1950s. The 
adjacent Mainland Southeast Asia countries were also divided up into the spheres of 
influence by colonial powers as well as communist-led nationalist indigenous forces. In 
Central Asia and South Asia, Xinjiang and Tibet became buffer zones separating the 
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socialist China-Soviet Union camp from the capitalist British-India Camp. The expansion 
of the Soviet Union into Central Asia further caused political, economic and social 
divisions in the region. In mainland Southeast Asia, the confrontation between the 
communist and capitalist camps, and later between communist regimes brought further 
segregation and destruction. At China’s boundaries, both the Yunnan borderlands as well 
as Xinjiang lost their position as corridors for trans-regional and trans-national 
communication, becoming strictly bound within ideological boundaries. Their territories 
were pulled into the state political economy and turned into militarized zones, governed 
by means of state farms and populated by a large number of Chinese state farm soldiers 
and workers. Decades later, the soldiers and workers in the state farms of Northwestern 
China suffered poverty, because of the stagnant economic institutions. The soldiers and 
workers in state farms on the Yunnan borderlands faced the same challenge. 
Ironically, when indigenous people were pushed into the concept of a single 
nation, they were not given many options.  They were left divided and warring against 
each other across borders, not because of their own collective identification but because 
of political and ideological boundaries set by state power or regional military powers.  In 
mainland Southeast Asia cities like Rangoon, Saigon and many other cities that once 
were among the most flourishing Asian transnational trade centers were gradually 
degraded because of wars. A few years after the WWII, Kengtung, “the largest and 
wealthiest of the Shan States” began to host “a large number of Chinese army deserters, 
bandits and orginary immigrants.” This once prosperous city and trade center was 
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plagued by smuggling throughout the 1950s, and finally became one of the least 
accessible regions of Burma to operations by government forces.4   
The expedient commodity for indigenous people to relieve their poverty, 
including those organized as communist forces, was heroin.  When opium poppy 
cultivation was banned in China in 1950s, rubber tree cultivation in the Southwest along 
with the natural gas and oil fields in the Northwest---- the white gold and the black gold--
-- became the backbone supporting local and China’s wartime economy.  The Yunnan 
borderlands was constantly plagued by the drug smuggling from the Golden Triangle. 
Xinjiang had to deal with drugs smuggled from the Golden Crescent.  
Today, many have argued that people in China’s Yunnan Province as well as 
China’s Xinjiang seem to be better off than brothers and sisters in neighboring countries, 
having been elevated out of extreme poverty and wars.  In terms of material life, that may 
be so.  The communist political economy has made the material life of indigenous people 
within China’s boundary better than that of fellow border dwellers on the other side.  For 
example, the economic superiority of Chinese side turned Hekou, the Chinese border 
town with Vietnam, into the major site that accommodates not only thousands of 
Vietnamese traders each day, but also numerous active Vietnamese prostitutes.  In 
Mengla, a border town next to Laos, Laotian brides willingly marry Chinese men, risking 
stateless status for years.   
China’s transformation of its borderlands with mainland Southeast Asia as well as 
with Central Asia shows its advantages, but only in comparison to the war torn 
neighboring areas that have not had a proper opportunity for social, economic, cultural 
                                                 
4 Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The Effect of Chinese Nationalist Military Activities in Burma on Burmese Foreign 
Policy (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1959), 3. 
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and educational development. In these adjacent countries, it is clear that the decisions by 
the external powers centering on their own interests at the expense of the agency of the 
local people have caused deep trauma to the indigenous societies. Political and 
ideological confrontations between larger external powers destroyed the social fibers as 
well as economic bonds that used to hold the indigenous communities together, leaving 
long-term and deep political, social, economic, cultural and religious segregation. It is 
difficult for the current indigenous communities to mend and build bridges to connect to 
not only other culturally and politically heterogeneous groups, but also to their traditional 
cultural heritage and history. The insintegration of the indigenous homogenous 
communities, marked by distrust and fear towards each other and especially towards 
China’s increasing grip in regional and global politics, would become a major obstacle as 
China tries to push forward the regional ecomomic integration in Southeast Asia as well 
as Central Asia, and resume both Yunnan as well as Xinjiang’ role as the corridors for 
transnational migration and trade.  
In China, the public discourse about nation building and national history has 
mended and bridged these gaps for the indigenous people. It also has subtly changed the 
indigenous people’s way of perceiving their individual as well as collective identities. 
Years of poverty and political struggle have proved that economic development is top 
priority. As the Yunnan borderlands are integrated into the Chinese domestic market as 
well as political system even much closely than before, indigenous people who are left 
more outside the main stream cultural and educational system have less opportunities to 
improve both their economic and political status. On the other hand, the PRC has 
gradually developed a broad group of new local elites who have been the beneficiaries of 
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the existing system and unwilling to make any changes. Local culture and traditions 
gradually are absorbed into the elite culture that are promoted by intellectuals and artists, 
or are preserved in museums and books. What to preserve and pass to future generations 
becomes a rough issue that few intellectuals and artists freely tackle.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Geographic Terms 
 
哀牢山 Ailao Mountains  
安平 Anping   
安阳 An’ yang  
白象山 the White Elephant Mountain 
白盐井 Baiyanjing 
八里河 Balihe 
邦弯 Bangwan 
抱母 Baomu  
北江 Beijiang River  
大马散 Da Masan 
菜杉坪 Caishanping 
滇国 Dian Guo   
德钦 Denqin 
东江 Dongjiang River 
东山 Dongshan 
峨山 Eshan 
富宁 Funing   
高丽 Gaoli 
高黎贡山 Gaoligong Mountains 
广南 Guangnan 
贡山 Gongshan 
拱山 Gongshan 
桂江 Guijiang River  
河口 Hekou   
鹤庆 Heqing 
河西 Hexi 
红河 Honghe  
户萨 Husa 
户瓦 Huwa 
尖高山 Jiangaoshan Mountains 
江城 Jiangcheng 
江心坡 Jiangxinpo  
金沙江 Jinsha River  
金平 Jinping  
景洪(车里)Jinghong (Cheli) 
景东 Jingdong  
景谷 Jinggu 
开化 Kaihua  
开远 Kaiyuan 
澜沧 Lancang 
腊萨 Lasa 
吕保 Lvbao 
临沧 Lincang 
陇川 Longchuan 
龙陵 Longling 
麓川 Luchuan 
潞江 Lujiang  
礼杜江 Lidujiang River  
马关Maguan 
马散 Masan 
孟艮Menggen 
蛮耗Manhao 
孟定Mengding 
勐海Menghai  
勐憨Menghan 
勐库Mengku 
蒙化 (巍山) Menghua (Weishan) 
勐腊Mengla 
孟连Menglian 
勐勐  Mengmeng 
勐卯(瑞丽) Mengmao (Ruili) 
孟梭Mengsuo 
勐旺Mengwang 
蒙自Mengzi  
勐遮Mengzhe 
勐住Mengzhu   
勐主Mengzhu 
冕宁 Mianning 
弥渡Midu 
磨黑Mohei 
木城坡 Muchengpo 
南甸 Nandian 
南定河 Nandinghe River 
南溪河 Nanxihe river 
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宁洱 Ning’er 
弄贤 Nongxian 
片马 Pianma 
坪边 Pingbian  
普洱 Pu’er 
普文 Puwen  
千信 Qianxin 
且兰国 Qielan Guo   
邱北 Qiubei  
瑞丽江 Ruilijiang River 
沙甸 Shadian  
三迤 Sanyi 
思茅 Simao 
绥江 Suijiang 
顺宁 Shunning 
石碑 Shibei 
腾越(腾冲)Tengyue (Tengchong ) 
拖角 Tuojiao 
通海 Tonghai 
佤山 Wa Mountains  
文山Wenshan  
维西 Weixi 
维新Weixin 
威远Weiyuan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
祥云 Xiangyun 
西畴 Xichou 
西盟 Ximeng 
喜洲 Xizhou 
小龙潭 Xiaolongtan 
夜郎国 Yelang Guo  
迤南 Yinan 
迤西 Yixi 
益香 Yixiang 
银生 Yinsheng  
永北 Yongbei 
永昌(保山) Yongchang (Baoshan) 
永康 Yongkang 
元江 Yunjiang   
元江 Yuanjiang River  
云龙 Yunlong 
永州 Yongzhou 
玉溪 Yuxi 
云县 Yunxian 
镇南 Zhennan 
镇康 Zhenkang 
镇源 Zhenyuan 
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哀牢 Ailao  
百越 Bai-Yue  
百濮 Bai-Pu  
氐羌 Di-Qiang    
金齿 Jin-Chi  
鸠僚 Jiu-Liao 
狄獂戎  Diyuanrong:  
河蛮 He-Man  
裸濮 Luo-Pu  
茫蛮Mang-Man  
茫蛮Mang-Man 
闽濮Min-Pu  
苗瑶Miao-Yao  
濮/ 蒲 Pu  
羌     Qiang  
君长 Junchang  
昆明 Kunming  
夜郎 Yelang  
邛都 Qiongdu 
靡莫Mimo 
冉駹 Ranmang  
身毒 Shen du  
蜀     Shu  
嶲  Xi  
白衣/ 白夷/,摆夷 Baiyi  
班箐佤族  Banqing Wa people 
布朗 Bulang   
布依 Buyi  
傣     Dai  
德昂 De’ang  
侗     Dong people  
僮族沙人 the Sha branch of the  
                 Dong people  
景颇 Jingpo  
汉傣(花腰傣)Han-Dai  
哈尼 Hani  
回傣 Hui-Dai  
苦聪人 Kucong people 
拉祜 Lahu people  
傈僳 Lisu  
侬人 Nong people   
苗     Miao 
瑶     Yao  
永不劳佤族 Yongbulao Wa people 
壮     Zhuang 
佤     Wa  
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陈荣昌 Chen Rongchang 
杜文秀 Du Wenxiu 
丁光福 Ding Guangfu 
方文明  Fang Wenming  
宫里雁 Gong Liyan  
郭少聪 Guo Shaocong 
何宏年 He Hongnian 
纪祥廷 Ji Xiangting 
柯树勋 Ke Shuxun 
柯祥晖(柯祥辉) Ke Xianghui 
刘道衡 Liu Daoheng 
李秉阳 Li Bingyang 
李承祥  Li Chengxiang 
李希哲 Li Xizhe 
罗树昌 Luo Shuchang  
罗正明 Luo Zhengming 
马文德 Ma Wende 
沐   英   Mu Ying   
马泽如M Zeru 
马同柱Ma Tongzhu 
马子厚Ma Zihou 
马德新Ma Dexin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
侬廷章 Nong Tingzhang  
浦世民 Pu Shipmin  
思伦法  Si Lunfa 
孙天霖 Sun Tianlin 
汤希禹 Tang Xiyu 
王恩祚Wang Enzuo 
王立文Wang Liwen 
王开富Wang Kaifu 
王开学 Wang Kaixue 
王仲恩Wang Zhong’en 
吴荣轩Wu Rongxuan 
徐为光 Xu Weiguang 
杨兴国 Yang Xingguo 
杨振寰(杨震寰) Yang Zhenhuan 
宰散 Zai San 
赵国华 Zhao Guohua 
召亚卖 Zhao Yamai 
召亚陶 Zhao Yatao 
召香水 Zhao Xiangshui 
张文光  Zhang Wenguang 
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土司   Tusi  Native Officer  
山官  shanguan   the Mountain Officer 
宣慰/宣慰使司 Xuan Wei/ Xuanwei 
Shisi  the Pacifying Commissioner  
改土归流  gaitu guiliu  
户萨土司 the Tusi of Husa 
保乐土司 the Tusi of Baole  
登埂土司 the Tusi of Denggeng 
顶真土司 the Tusi of Dingzhen 
邦瓦山官 The Mountain Officer of 
Bangwa 
干崖土司 the Tusi of Ganya 
六顺土司 the Tusi of Liushun  
勐海土司 the Tusi of Menghai 
猛悻土司 the Tusi of Mengxing 
勐遮土司 the Tusi of Mengzhe 
思陀土司 the Tusi of Situo 
三保历代 Sanbaolidai 
阿佤哩 Awali 
当龙师 Dang Long Shi 
古姆萨 kumsa 
古姆朗 kumwong 
寨老 Zhai-Lao   
摆八 Baiba 
摆孙 Baisun  
波沃 Bowo 
祜巴 Huba 
戛备 Jiabei 
科勇 Keyong 
帕囡 Panan 
景龙佛寺 Jinglong Fosi  The Jinglong 
Buddhist Temple  
曼洒佛寺Mansa Fosi     The Mansa 
Buddhist Temple 
勐海大佛寺Menghai Da Fosi  The 
Grand Buddhist Temple of Menghai 
帕沙佛寺 Pasha Fosi  the Pasha 
Buddhist Temple 
清静道 Qing Jing Dao 
一贯道 Yi Guandao  
童军 (童子军) Tongjun (Tongzi Jun) 
Boy Scouts  
五七指示 Wu Qi Zhishi  the Five-Seven 
Command  
官学  Guanxue government schools 
 义学 Yixue  the Yixue schools  
庙学 Miao Xue   the Confucius Temple 
schools  
Periphery Education program 边地教育 
贡山教会学校 Gongshan Church 
School 
戡乱委员会委员/弹压委员会 Pacifying 
Committee  
恒丰源茶庄 Heng Feng Yuan Tea Shop 
义庆邦 Yi Qing Bang   The Yiqing 
Gang 
源鑫昌 Yuan Xin Chang 
源馨斋 Yuan Xin Zhai  
逸群茶园 Yi Qun Chayuan  Yi Qun Tea 
House 
文明茶园Wenming Chayuan  Wenming 
Tea House 
滇舞茶园 Dianwu Chayuan  Dianwu 
Tea House 
